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Abstract 
 
 
 
Purpose: The thesis aims to explore the roles that board directors undertake and 
understand whether there is an impact of the external organisational environment as well as 
several board characteristics on these roles.  
Design/ Methodology Approach: Building on existing literature a model is developed to 
test hypothesized relationships—i.e. directors’ roles with external environment and board 
characteristics. Measurements are designed—withdrawing them from the literature—to 
collect quantitative data from directors of UK organisations. The responses were collected 
from 115 directors working in UK organisations. Principal component analysis is 
conducted to reduce the data and propose a set of directors’ roles and correlation as well as 
regression analyses are utilised in order to test the hypothesised relationships. 
Findings: The results of the principal component analysis propose a set of six distinct 
roles for board directors, providing a new framework for future researchers. In addition, it 
is found that both the external environment and the board characteristics have some impact 
on what directors do, extending the limited empirical evidence found in the literature. 
However, the theoretical framework needs further examination and research.  
Limitations/ Future Recommendations: The current thesis is evidenced by various 
limitations. Firstly, additional constructs can be added as determinants of the directors’ 
roles. Secondly, the response rate in the survey is low, which is regarded as a limitation, 
although there are limited studies offering quantitative results from board members.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 3 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Corporate governance has drawn considerable attention from academics, 
researchers, policy makers and practitioners over the last couple of decades, with 
increasing interest throughout the years.  Perhaps, this is mainly due to several corporate 
scandals—which many studies report in their introductions (e.g. Zalewska, 2014; Elsayed, 
2007; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; MacHold et al., 2008; Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010). 
The scandals that keep being reported, such as at Enron (USA), WorldCom (USA), 
Adelphia Communications (USA), Polly Peck (UK), Parmalat (Italy) and Satyam (India) 
are largely related to abuse of managerial power. Hence, the common characteristic among 
these scandals is that the involved companies were exposed in high level of 
mismanagement, either due to fraudulent activity, or due to poor capability. On one hand, 
this mismanagement has led to the introduction of various codes and regulations across 
many countries (e.g. The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012; Sarbanes Oxley Act, 
2002; ICGN, 2005; OECD, 2004). On the other hand, an academic interest has arisen over 
the years, investigating—among other related issues—the roles and behaviours of board 
directors and mechanisms that may be used to affect them.  
 Following the above opening observations, the topic of the thesis contributes to the 
field of corporate governance, by studying the roles of board members and also by taking 
into account factors that might influence the execution of these roles. To achieve this 
general aim of the study, various research steps need to be taken, that will be presented in 
details in the eight chapters of the dissertation. 
 This initial chapter of the thesis presents a general view of the study. The following 
sections discuss the motivation of the study and the identified gaps in the extant literature, 
and the theoretical framework proposed along with the aim and objectives of the thesis. 
Finally, the methodology used is briefly presented before concluding with an outline of the 
significance of the study.  
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1.2 Motivation of the Study and Literature Gaps 
 
 Management has been systematically studied for more than half a century. Within 
the extensive literature, there are a few studies that have tried to capture the roles of 
managers, including the popular works from Mintzberg (1973) and Drucker (1973). 
Although the work of managers is constantly examined over the years, there is no 
consistent and systematic study of the roles that another leadership group of organisations 
has, i.e. the board of directors. Hence, the motivation for the current thesis was given by 
realising the potential interest that could arise for a detailed and thorough analysis of 
directors’ roles.  
After the early research period, it was found that different theories/perspectives are 
used in the literature trying to understand the phenomena in question, although the two 
dominant ones are agency theory and resource dependence perspective. On one hand, the 
agency theory is important as it discusses the principal-agent relationship, which can be 
controlled with the board of directors. On the other hand, the resource dependence 
perspective is also at the centre of corporate governance agenda as it considers the board of 
directors as a critically important mechanism that connects the organisation with the 
external resources available. For example, the board directors, can provide links with 
financial institutions or regulatory bodies. Moreover, while researchers, scholars and 
practitioners agree on the importance of the board of directors in ensuring the long-term 
well being of organisations, there is no clear and consistent identification of a board’s 
functions and activities. As such, the author of this thesis was motivated to thoroughly 
research the area and achieve a contribution in the field of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, during the study period, it was discovered that certain gaps exist in 
the previous literature. The roles of the board directors have been repeatedly described 
with different terms—i.e. monitor, control, service, resource dependence, advice and 
counsel, strategy—and in cases these roles describe overlapping activities. 
Finally, a significant gap that was identified in the literature is the direct study of 
the environment’s impact on the roles of directors. Although there are discussions from 
scholars (under resource dependence perspective) indicating that there are pressures from 
the external environment that could determine the roles that board members undertake in 
an organisation, there are no studies—according to my knowledge—that have developed 
hypotheses and have empirically examined the proposed relationships. 
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1.3 Theoretical Framework and Research Aim and Objectives 
 
The thesis has approached its research framework mainly from the two dominant 
theoretical perspectives existing in the literature, i.e. agency and resource dependence 
perspectives—presented in chapter two. Based on these, the framework aims to examine 
the impact of the external environment and the board characteristics on the roles of the 
board members. As such, the following objectives can be formed to describe the direction 
of the study: 
 
1. To review the literature exhaustively on board roles, external environment 
and board characteristics, which comprise the research framework of the 
study. 
2. To develop a methodology in order to empirically test the research model. 
3. To collect data in order to examine the relationship between board roles and 
the independent constructs of the research model (i.e. external environment 
and board characteristics). 
4. To provide recommendations for future researchers and practitioners in 
better understanding board roles and the impact of external environment 
and board characteristics. 
 
Figure 1.1: Overview of the Theoretical Model of the Thesis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The theoretical mode of the thesis can be seen in figure 1.1. More 
specifically, it can be argued that the above objectives of the thesis can be depicted 
in two main research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: Does the external environment of the organisation affect the 
board roles? 
External 
Environment 
 
Board 
Characteristics 
  
Board Roles 
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Research Question 2: Do the board characteristics of the organisation affect the 
board roles? 
1.4 Methodology Used in the Thesis 
 
Interestingly, there is increasing number of published articles over the last years in 
the literature of corporate governance, but there are a few studies trying to understand the 
roles of board directors. In addition, most of these—relatively few—studies have collected 
qualitative data through interviews with board members, aiming to explore their main 
duties (e.g. Roberts et al., 2005; Long et al. 2005; Machold and Farqular, 2013).  
The current thesis manages to meet the aim and objectives by testing hypothesised 
relationships that can hopefully lead to generalised findings. According to this, it is 
believed that the positivist approach has been adopted in the study. Moreover, the approach 
used can be characterised as deductive, since the purpose of the study is to test proposed 
relationships and either support or reject them, rather than develop new theory.   
The measurements used to achieve the objectives are quantitative and primary data 
from UK based companies was collected through a survey method. Finally, the study is 
characterised as cross sectional since the survey was conducted at a specific point in time.  
1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
It is argued that the current research thesis is significant as it achieves to contribute 
to knowledge, both theoretically and methodologically. As a result certain implications for 
researchers and practitioners are suggested. 
Theoretically, it can be argued that the proposed framework has been approached 
from a multi-theoretical perspective, potentially giving a new direction to future 
researchers. In addition, the thorough literature review on the main construct of the 
study—i.e. board roles—results in a proposed clarification of its dimensions. The literature 
lacks consistency in the discussion of board roles and a variety of terms are used to 
describe them. Therefore, it is believed that another reason why this study is significant is 
the clarification of the roles, by proposing a specific set of roles for future research. 
Furthermore, although the theoretical framework has certain limitations—discussed in 
conclusions chapter—the fact that external environment is included as a potential predictor 
of board roles can be thought of as a significant input in both conceptual and empirical 
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levels. In other words, the inclusion of the external environment in the theoretical 
framework is a positive contribution, as previous researchers have discussed relationship 
of environment to the board but not systematically. In specific, the environment has been 
approached theoretically (i.e. mainly through resource dependence perspective) and 
empirically (i.e. mostly examining impact of environment to board characteristics, but not 
directly on roles). 
Methodologically, the study can be regarded as significant for two mainly reasons. 
Firstly, the thesis has achieved to provide a recommendation for a set of roles to be used in 
the future, as a result of principal component analysis. Secondly, the study’ positive 
contribution is the type of data collected and analysed. Most studies have offered 
findings—from UK companies—through interviews and the current thesis is one of the 
limited that have conducted a questionnaire survey. As such, despite the low response rate, 
the findings have some level of originality. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 Chapter one introduces the background of the current study to the reader, by giving 
information on the motivation of the study. It proceeds with a brief presentation of the 
theoretical framework and the main aim and objectives of the thesis. Moreover, the 
methodological approach is outlined, followed by discussion on the significance of the 
study. 
 Chapter two firstly discusses broad definitions of corporate governance and 
secondly explains the importance of boards in the field. It proceeds with a presentation of 
various theoretical perspectives that exist in the literature related to corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the chapter proceeds with a detailed review of the literature for each of the 
constructs of the study’s theoretical framework. 
 Chapter three presents the measurements identified in various existing studies 
aiming to capture the constructs of the current thesis. In addition, the propositions and 
hypotheses developed for testing are presented. 
 Chapter four initially discusses general philosophical considerations in business 
research and proceeds with the description of the used research design, the survey design 
and sampling framework of the thesis, which is followed by a brief presentation of the 
methods used for data analysis. 
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 Chapter five presents the initial descriptive results produced from the conducted 
survey, along with detailed description of these results coming obtained from the empirical 
data. 
 Chapter six proceeds with examination of data and presentation of the results from 
the principal component analysis, which was used for data reduction. The results from the 
validity and reliability tests are also shown in this chapter.  
 Chapter seven shows the findings resulting from the correlation analyses conducted 
and proceeds with the analysis of regression results derived from the different models 
used. Subsequently, summary of results from the hypothesised relationships between 
variables is provided. 
 Chapter eight starts with discussion of the main findings of the study and provides 
some conclusions resulting from them. Moreover, it discusses the potential contribution of 
the study to knowledge and the possible implications for practitioners. Finally, the 
limitations of the study along with some recommendations for future research are 
described.  
1.7 Summary 
 
The current chapter introduced the topic to the reader by outlining the main issues 
of this thesis. Specifically, some background information was provided that was followed 
by discussion of study’s motivation and identification of gaps found in the literature. 
Subsequently, the theoretical framework and the aim and objectives of the thesis were 
presented, followed by a brief description of the methodological approach, before 
concluding with some points on the study’s significance. Next chapter will focus on the 
constructs of the theoretical framework and the thorough review of the literature found on 
them. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
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2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Due to the crash of tech stocks in the late 1990s, the proliferation of corporate 
scandals (such as Enron’s and WorldCom in US, Siemens’s in Germany, Parmalat in Italy, 
Satyam’s in India) and the recent global financial crisis, corporate governance has attracted 
the attention of academics and business practitioners (Lazarri et al., 2001; The McKinsey 
Quarterly, 2007). Previous studies have shown that top managements’ inefficiency in 
monitoring procedures, have resulted in financial losses (e.g. Clarke, 2005; Parker, 2005; 
Petra, 2005).  
The following sections will examine the constructs of the theoretical model, as 
these have been covered in the existing literature. The literature review was based on a 
specific approach that was followed, in order to increase the possibility of collecting all-
important references relevant to the topic. All top journals in the field—from the ABS 
2012 guide—were explored to find articles on the study’s constructs. Specifically, all 4 star 
journals under the general management, organisation studies and strategy fields were 
checked as a first step. Secondly, the journals related to corporate governance, regardless 
of their ranking, were also browsed. All the issues of these journals were checked for the 
period 2005-2014, trying to identify titles that could be relevant to the topic. The journals 
that were primarily used are shown in Table 2.1.  
After finishing this procedure—that was being updated year by year—further 
search was conducted by using keywords in various databases (e.g. EBSCO, Science 
Direct, JSTOR, Sage, ABI/Inform Complete, Emerald, Ingenta, Proquest, Taylor and 
Francis) and the library’s SUMMON function that provides results from multiple 
databases. Some of the keywords used included: boards of directors, corporate governance, 
board roles, directors, monitor, control, service, external environment, dynamism, 
complexity, munificence, hostility, board characteristics, board size, duality, board 
independence, agency theory, resource dependence perspective. 
Needless to say, that this was the approach used primarily, however during the 
whole process, there were sources that were found with other possible approaches (e.g. 
reference list of articles). 
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Table 2.1: Journals browsed while reviewing the literature 
Journals 
Academy of Management Review Journal of Business Ethics 
Academy of Management Journal Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration and Institutions 
Administrative Science Quarterly Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 
Journal of Management Business Ethics Quarterly 
Journal of Management Studies  
Harvard Business Review  
British Journal of Management  
Strategic Management Journal  
Organisation Science  
Organisation Studies  
2.2 What is Corporate Governance? 
 
Donaldson (1990: 376) describes corporate governance as a “structure whereby 
managers at the organisation apex are controlled through the board of directors, its 
associated structures, executive initiative, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding” 
thereby narrowing the “scope” and “structure” of the board of directors. In contrast, 
Kaplan and Norton (2000), focus on “stakeholder participation”, defining corporate 
governance as “the connection between directors, managers, employees, shareholders, 
customers, creditors and suppliers to the corporation and to one another” involving more 
“interest groups”.  
Corporate Governance refers to the “integrated set of internal and external 
controls” (Baysinger and Hoskison, 1990: 72) and deals with issues like: board size, 
leadership structure, and CEO dependence and independence, assuming that boards 
influence the strategic direction and performance of the corporations they govern (Beekun 
et al., 1998: 3). The internal control is related to the control of the firm’s management and 
the external control mainly refers to provision of resources (i.e. providing legitimacy, 
linking the firm to important stakeholders). Another attempt to define corporate 
governance was made by Tricker (1984), which in my opinion accurately highlights the 
overall governance role of the board that is at the centre of discussion: “the governance 
role is not concerned with the running of the business of the company per se, but with 
giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive 
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actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and 
regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundaries”.  
The next section further explains why the board is important for the governance of 
an organisation and outlines the main functions of it. 
2.3 The Importance of Boards in Corporate Governance 
 
To understand corporate boards, one should begin with the question of what do 
directors do? And in order to answer that question, it is important to understand how it 
differs from the question of what should directors do? This second question is partly 
answered, by the legal obligations imposed by corporate law (both statute and precedent), 
having to do with fiduciary obligations (Adams et al., 2010: 64). In agreement with  
Adams et al. (2010: 64), it is important to pose this distinction, as what is followed in 
practice in relation to what should be followed, might have a significant difference.  
As Fama and Jensen (1983: 311) have argued the board can be described as the 
“apex of the firm’s decision control system”. According to Iskander and Chambrou (2000), 
the board of directors is the centre of the internal system of corporate governance and, in 
this scope it has the responsibility to assure long term viability of the firm and to provide 
oversight of management. It can be generally argued that the board of directors is the 
element of the highest interest in the corporate governance agenda. The main duty of the 
board is to monitor self-interested behaviours of executives and to fulfil stakeholders’ 
expectations (Daily et al. 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Similarly, many scholars have 
described the board’s primary purpose of existence as to evaluate, reward and monitor 
management and vote on important decisions in an effort to maximise the value of 
shareholders (Becht et. al., 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Fistenberg and Malkier, 
1994; Salmon, 1993).  
In the following pages, some theoretical views related to corporate governance and 
the boards of directors are presented, as found in the relevant literature. These perspectives 
will be presented, setting the scene in the field under which the roles of board directors will 
be described in the following sections. While trying to understand the roles that board 
directors undertake, it is important to firstly take these perspectives into account, as they 
try to approach and explain the director’s responsibilities from a theoretical view. 
 13 
2.4 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Different schools of thought have been developed to explain issues of corporate 
governance and more specifically the attributes of boards, such as agency, resource 
dependence, upper echelons, stewardship, institutional and social network perspectives. 
Each of these views approaches the subject from different lenses and the following 
sections offer a description of these different perspectives as they appear in the literature. 
Although all perspectives are being used from various researchers, the dominant ones in 
the study of corporate governance appear to be the agency theory and the resource 
dependence theory. The reason why the two perspectives are found more often in the 
studies of corporate governance is their explanatory power in terms of the nature and 
function of the boards. Both the agency theory and the resource dependence theory can 
well explain the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and its relationship with 
the linked stakeholders. Further justification is provided in the following sections. Hence, 
agency and resource dependence perspectives will be discussed in more detail, as these are 
also the two perspectives on which the theoretical framework of this thesis is based.   
In the following parts, all perspectives are presented, by providing the background 
and some examples of where these theories have application; however more emphasis is 
given on agency theory and resource dependence theory.  
2.4.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory was originated by economists (e.g. Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968) 
during late 1960s, in an effort to describe the risk-sharing problem as one that arises when 
different parties (individuals or groups) cooperate having different approach toward risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This problem was later identified as the agency problem, which 
appears when a principal-agent relationship exists. In that case, one party (principal) 
assigns work to another (agent), who has to carry out this work. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989: 58) there are two problems that might be confronted when such a relationship 
exists. The first one, known as the agency problem appears when “the desires or goals of 
the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify 
what the agent is actually doing”.  In other words, this problem refers to the difficulty of 
the principal to make sure that the agent is doing his work appropriately and by aligning 
his interests to those of the principal. “The second problem is the problem of risk sharing 
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that arises when the principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk”. This is 
translated as the potential for different choices of action that the two parties would take, 
because of their different risk preferences.  
As stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) “if both parties to the relationship 
are utility maximizers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act 
in the best interests of the principal”.  They further claim that the principal can limit the 
losses from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives to the agent, or by 
introducing monitoring costs to ensure that the agent is making the optimal decisions from 
the principal’s viewpoint. It is also strongly argued, that it is almost impossible to avoid 
these costs and even in that case, there will still be some divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and the decisions that would maximize the welfare of the organization. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) suggest that control of agency problems is important when the decision 
managers (i.e. executives of the firm) who initiate and implement important decisions are 
not the major residual claimants (owners) and as a result, do not share a great share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions. If effective control of the decision managers does not take 
place, it is very likely that the actions of these managers will diverge from the interests of 
principals. Therefore it is argued (Jensen and Meckling 1978; Fama and Jensen, 1983) that 
in order to have an effective control mechanism of decisions, the control has to be separate 
from the management of decisions. Thus, assuming that a decision process in broad terms 
has four steps that are initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring, it is 
recommended that these should be allocated to different agents according to the nature of 
them. The first and third steps are usually allocated to the same agents and they are 
“grouped” under the term decision management, while under the term control 
management, ratification and monitoring are included.  
Moreover, “since the relationship between stockholders and managers of a 
corporation fit the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should be no surprise to 
discover that the issues associated with the ‘separation of ownership and control’ in the 
modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem 
of agency” (Jensen and Meckling, 1978: 309).  Thus, it is suggested that agency theory is 
highly aligned with corporations, as by definition there is an existence of agency 
relationships since ownership and control are often two distinct attributes. Furthermore, 
one of the aims of corporate governance is to manage these relationships that exist in the 
vast majority of large corporations around the world. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 2) have 
tried to support this point since they view corporate governance as “the ways in which 
 15 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return of investment” 
emphasizing economic return, security and control. 
Agency theory literature focuses on the monitoring function of the boards of 
directors and argues that, by reducing the agency costs, firm performance can be improved. 
In other words, it is suggested that the main function of the board should be to monitor the 
management (agents) of the company, in order to protect shareholders’ (principals) 
interests, which is usually translated to improved performance. Moreover, it is argued that 
a framework for analysing how firms can address differences between the interests of 
principals and agents, can contribute in assessing the efficient structure of executive 
compensation contracts and corporate governance relationships (Beatty and Zajac, 1994). 
The structure of executive compensation is determined by the scheme of compensation that 
is agreed in the contract of the director (cash, stock options, non-cash incentives etc.) that 
is strongly related with the risk bearing of the company. Depending on the compensation 
scheme, the agents will have different share of the wealth effects, based on their decisions. 
Thus, executives that are paid mostly based on their performance (i.e. stock options) are 
expected to have higher incentives to perform well, as this will affect their level of 
compensation. 
By stating structure of corporate governance relationships we mean the leadership 
structure (duality-separation) and board dependence (ratio of internal/external members). 
For example, previous studies have shown that there is a preference for a dominance of 
external independent directors in a board, as boards consisting mainly of internal members 
or even of externals that are not independent of the current management of the firm, have 
less incentive to monitor management. Similarly, studies have shown that when the same 
person holds the CEO and Chairperson positions, there is less power in the board to 
monitor the management of a firm.  
2.4.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), which was formalised during the 1970’s, 
discusses the management of external resources of a company, by describing the 
corporation as an open system, dependent on contingencies in the external environment 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 1). Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978) further argue that “this point 
of view is important for those that seek to understand organisations as well as for those 
seek to manage and control them”.  Furthermore, this view suggests that organizations are 
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part of an environment and for their survival and success they are dependent to these 
environments. An organisation “is linked to environments by federations, associations, 
customer-supplier relationships, competitive relationships and a social-legal apparatus 
defining and controlling the nature and limits of these relationships” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978: 2). RDT has been applied broadly across the research domain to explain these 
relationships. As stated by Hillman et al. (2009) in a review of RDT theory there are five 
mechanisms through which external dependencies can be minimized which are, 
mergers/vertical integration, joint ventures, boards of directors, political action and 
executive succession. These five options were initiated by Pfeffer and Sanlancik (1978) but 
for the purpose of this thesis we are mainly interested in boards of directors and at some 
extent in executive succession.  
Scholars’ effort to link this perspective with corporate governance, and especially 
with the boards of directors, seems to be reasonable. Pfeffer (1972) claims that the boards 
can enable firms to control these external factors and minimize the dependence of the 
organization to the environment. Also, it is implied that the boards of directors can bring 
resources to the firm. Subsequently, resource dependency theorists examine the provision 
of resources as the main function of the boards of directors in comparison to the agency 
theorists that focus on the monitoring function. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 162-163) 
support the view that the need of an advisory or governing board should lead an 
organization to appoint outside directors who apart from the monitoring function, should 
have two additional responsibilities. The first is to provide the organization with 
managerial expertise, since one of the criteria for appointing a director to a board is their 
skills and experience. The second one is to offer support to the firm. An organization that 
appoints a director to a board, “expects the individual will come to support the 
organization, will concern himself with its problems, will favourably present it to others, 
and will try to aid it” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 163). Usually the appointment of an 
outside director is decided based on his personal attributes but also his potential ability to 
support the firm by controlling contingencies in the external environment. The actions that 
directors can take to control these contingencies will be discussed in the following part 
about board functions and specifically under the provision of resources section.  
RDT perspective however, has faced some challenges and critiques. As Pfeffer 
(2003: xxiii) states the very success of RDT has also been a problem. He argues that the 
idea of this theory has been so widely accepted and taken for granted, that it is not 
explored, tested and questioned as thoroughly as it might be. Furthermore, there might be 
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some other issues that may weaken the validity and reliability of this perspective. Hillman 
et al. (2009: 1421) argue that although they agree with the success and wide acceptance of 
RDT they do not concur that this success might have ruined the theory itself. However, 
they suggest that an integration of RDT with the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
could lead to a productive outcome.  
According to the literature the distinction between the two perspectives is not very 
clear. This could be one major limitation of the theory itself. Hillman et al. (2009: 1417) 
base their argument on the fact that both perspectives complementarily focus on resources. 
Kraaijenbrink et al. (2010: 350) explains that RBV “aspires to explain the internal 
resources of a firm’s sustained competitive advantage”. This definition at first shows a 
distinction between the two, as RDT observes the external environment and focus on the 
resource dependencies that come from the outside, while the RBV tries to explain the 
internal resources. But Kraaijenbrink et al. (2010: 350) continue by saying that the central 
proposition of RBV theory is that “if a firm is to achieve a state of sustained competitive 
advantage, it must acquire and control valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable 
resources and capabilities, plus have the organization in place that can absorb and apply 
them”. In other words it is suggested that the internal resources that the theory attempts to 
analyse have to be acquired, which is the point where the distinction of the two 
perspectives become unclear. These resources will be acquired from the external 
environment of the organisation. Nevertheless, gaining resources in order to help the 
organisation to achieve a competitive advantage or improve its performance is also 
discussed in the RDT. 
2.4.3 Upper Echelons Theory  
 
The Upper Echelons Perspective suggests that the organisational outcomes, both 
strategies and effectiveness, are reflected by the values and cognitive bases of the most 
powerful and important actors of the organisation. Based on this argument it is expected 
that through empirical search, such linkages can be uncovered. The theory was originated 
by Hambrick and Mason (1984) and is mainly concerned with the study of the top 
management teams of organisations which in turn can help in drawing useful conclusions 
for the performance of the organisations they run. More specifically, they argue that 
executives think, make decisions and act, based on how they interpret specific strategic 
situations; and these interpretations are clearly a function of their experiences, values and 
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personalities. Therefore, if these experiences values and personalities can be captured, we 
might be able to predict organisational outcomes. Moreover, Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
mainly argued two things. First, that it is better to focus on the characteristics of the top 
management team rather than focusing on one top executive (i.e. the CEO), as leadership is 
a shared activity and a collection of cognitions, skills and interactions of the whole top 
management team. Second, that the executives’ values and cognitive bases can be captured 
with their demographic characteristics, since collecting psychological data—which is 
maybe more appropriate—is very difficult. Thus, characteristics such as functional 
background, industry and firm tenures, educational qualifications and affiliations can be 
used as proxies, although these indicators may contain more noise than the psychological 
measures.  
Over the years, the theory was further developed and two more moderators were 
added to the theory’s predictions; these were managerial discretion (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987) and executive job demands (Hambrick et al., 2005). According to 
Hambrick (2007) the managerial discretion exists when there are multiple acceptable 
alternatives and there are no constraints from environmental factors (e.g. industry growth), 
organisational factors (e.g. weak board) and the executive himself/herself (e.g. tolerance 
for ambiguity). Similarly, the job demand is related to whether the CEO has to complete 
demanding tasks under great pressure, although the general idea is that all CEOs are 
carrying heavy loads. In reality, the jobs differ widely in their difficulty.  Hambrick (2007: 
335) gives example of “CEOs that operate in munificent environments, with well-fortified 
strategic positions and very capable subordinates, whereas others have none of these 
cushions”.  
Moreover, it is argued that the higher the managerial discretion and job demands, 
the more the executive characteristics will matter in predicting the organisational outcome. 
It seems that the theory is relevant to the study of top leadership roles and in that sense 
someone could argue that it should be at the centre of discussion in the studies of boards. 
Nevertheless, although there are a few studies in corporate governance literature 
approaching their research from the upper echelons perspective (e.g. Jensen and Zajac, 
2004; Mueller and Barker, 1997), board researchers generally neglect to use it. In addition, 
it is argued from Yamak et al. (2014: 70) that there is no systematic effort in the literature 
to examine the impact of the external environment on the upper echelons composition 
processes and strategic choices—which is one of the objectives of this thesis. This simply 
occurs because the theory proposes that strategic choices and organisational outcomes can 
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be predicted from executives’ demographic characteristics, as it is the top management 
team’s job and not the board’s to make decisions. The board’s responsibility is to ratify 
and monitor the strategic choices, thus the board members’ characteristics should not be 
accounted as predictors of organisational outcomes. 
2.4.4 Stewardship Theory 
 
There are scholars arguing that a manager of a company does not have a self-
interested behaviour and that s/he might act for the achievement of collective goals, 
contrasting to the predictions of agency theory. This view is supported by the stewardship 
theorists, who believe that the managers—viewed as stewards rather than agents—are 
motivated to act to the best interest of their principals.  
The theory seems to have its roots in the sociology and psychology domains, and 
was designed for researchers to examine situations where executives act as stewards, to the 
best interest of shareholders and not by having a self-serving behaviour (i.e. in agency 
theory). The debate between the two theories exists for many decades and falls under the 
effort of scholars to describe the ‘model of man’. As stated by Davis et al. (1997: 27), 
according to agency theory the man is rooted in economic rationality. Nevertheless, 
Argyris (1973: 253) argues that this is a simplified view of man and that a more complex 
and humanistic model is required. According to this view, human looks for more than just 
to maximize his or her individual utility; instead the human’s behaviour is lead by pro-
organisational, collectivistic behaviours which have higher utility than individualistic 
behaviour (Davis et al., 1997: 24). 
According to Davis et al. (1997) and Angwin et al. (2004), the differences of the 
two perspectives can be mainly found on the assumptions made about motivation, 
identification and use of power. Regarding motivation—based on the stewardship theory—
a steward focuses more on intrinsic rewards such as opportunities for growth, achievement, 
affiliation and self-actualisation, which are not easily quantifiable. On the other hand 
agency theorists view managers as motivated by extrinsic rewards (i.e. tangible, 
exchangeable commodities like salary, medical insurance, retirement plans). Moreover, it 
is believed that identification of managers with the organisation’s objectives helps them act 
as stewards. Finally, power of managers that is not considered as institutional power (i.e. 
derived from position), but is personal power instead (i.e. power developed over time in 
the context of relationships), is believed to result in steward behaviour. 
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The theory has been used in a few board studies to explain empirical results 
(Alexander et al., 1993; Brickley et al. 1997) and in many articles it is used on the side of 
agency theory, to serve as agency’s opposite (Martynov, 2009; Angwin et al., 2004, 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991). However, stewardship theory has not been used as 
extensively as agency theory (in studies of boards), although it is considered to be its 
diametric and as such, one would expect to find them both being used in the same context. 
To my opinion, the predicted outcome of the two theories is indeed diametric, but the main 
reason for lack of use, is the fundamental conceptualisation of the stewardship theory. The 
stewardship theory does not base its assumptions on the separation of ownership and 
control—that is at the centre of discussion in board literature—but on the nature of 
managers’ behaviour. It is suggested that in turn the owners will benefit from their 
behaviour, but the reason originates from their need for collective behaviour (i.e. intrinsic 
rewards). On the other hand, agency theory bases its assumptions purely on the principal-
agent relationship arguing that whenever there is separation there is a potential conflict of 
interests resulting into the agency costs. 
2.4.5 Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional theory was originated more than a century ago, as according to Scott 
(2005: 408) it was a dominant theory at the end of the nineteenth century. Used widely in 
different fields like sociology, cognitive psychology, economics and political science, 
institutional theory “is not a single, unified system of assumptions and propositions, but 
instead a rather amorphous complex of related ideas, a broad theoretical perspective or 
family of approaches” (Scott, 2005: 408). 
However, Eisenhardt (1988) tries to describe the institutional theory from an 
organisational perspective, suggesting that organisations are the way they are, just because 
this is the only legitimate way to organise. The key idea behind the theory is that much 
organisational action follows a pattern of doing things that evolves over time and becomes 
legitimated within an organisation and within an environment (Eisenhardt, 1988: 492). In 
other words, after some period, things are done in a specific way having gained legitimacy 
and each individual is interested to comply, otherwise his actions in the system cannot be 
understood (Zucker, 1977: 726). Therefore, the theory can be used to predict practices 
within organisations, from perceptions of legitimate behaviour.  This behaviour can derive 
from cultural values, firm or industry traditions and management trends. Nevertheless, 
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these arguments do not indicate that institutional choices are unavoidably irrational; 
instead, it is argued that the use of structures and processes that gain legitimacy from the 
environment can be practical, establishing an appropriate, rational and modern 
organisation which avoids claims of negligence in case something goes wrong (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977: 344). According to Boyd et al. (2011: 1901), “resource dependence theory 
and institutional theory are similar in that both contend that organizations must adapt to a 
constantly changing and uncertain environment”. 
Relatively limited studies in corporate governance have used the institutional 
perspective to explain or predict certain phenomena (e.g. Young et al., 2000; Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1988). According to previous studies, the theory’s main 
idea—when utilised in the study of boards—is that the board can be a mechanism to 
provide legitimacy for the firm and that the external environment might influence or 
provide constraints to this function.  
2.4.6 Social Network Theory 
 
Social network theory—also referred to as social exchange theory (e.g. Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 2005; Westphal and Zajac, 1997)—has its roots back to at least 1920s, 
bridging such disciplines as anthropology, social psychology and sociology (Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 2005: 874). The theory seeks to understand how firm behaviour and 
performance may be explained via a pattern of ties with external actors. It is argued by 
Boyd et al. (2011: 1896) that “organisations are interconnected with other entities through 
a range of social networks, including supplier relationships, resource flows, association 
memberships, relationships among individual employees and alliances”. This view at first 
seems to be similar to the resource dependence theory, as it argues than an organisation is 
related (or dependent in resource dependence) to other entities.  
The two perspectives mainly differ on the fact that social network theory gives 
emphasis on the role of the social context versus the resource constraint that appears in the 
resource dependence. As further stated by Boyd et al. (2011: 1896) “a firm’s social 
network consists of its prior inter-firm ties; it is the informational advantages from such a 
social network than enable a firm to create new ties and enhance the reliability, capabilities 
and trustworthiness of new potential partners”.  
The theory has not been extensively used in corporate governance studies and when 
applied, it is mainly used in order to study how interlocking directorates might shape firm 
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outcomes based on their networks (Gulati and Westphal 1999; Palmer et al., 1993; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1997; Haunschild, 1993). As Gulati and Westphal (1999: 473) claim, 
“the board of directors is a unique formal mechanism linking top managers of large 
corporations; it provides opportunity for leaders to exchange information, observe the 
leadership practices and style of their peers, and witness first hand the consequences of 
those practices”. It is therefore believed that director connections to other organisations 
might have influence on corporate strategy and decision-making. 
2.4.7 Summary  
 
Having discussed the different perspectives/theories, it is realised that some can 
viewed as contradictory (e.g. agency theory and stewardship theory), others as 
complementary (e.g. resource dependence and social network theory) or as non-related 
following a totally different approach (agency theory vs. upper echelons theory). The 
attention is now turning to some other important issues, which are the functions of the 
boards of directors. The following part discusses these functions that give a specific view 
of what boards really do.  
2.5 Board Functions/Roles 
 
In this section the different board functions will be discussed according to the 
existing literature. There has been a wide discussion by researchers over the years that try 
to identify the roles of a board in the organizations. Although many different approaches 
and terms have been found that explain these roles, it seems that boards’ roles are 
monitoring and provision of resources. Forbes and Milliken (1999: 491, 492) put boards 
next to the top management teams (TMTs) and refer to both as the two elite workgroups in 
an organisation. And they argue that as TMTs, boards face complex, multifaceted tasks 
that involve strategic-issue processing. They name these tasks control and service, which 
match to the monitoring and provision of resources functions respectively. In the following 
pages, these roles/functions will be analyzed based on the literature and there will be an 
effort to combine all the different approaches and terms that have been given, under those 
functions (Table 2.2).  
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2.5.1 Monitoring/ Control Function of Boards 
 
The first function that is to be discussed is the monitoring function of the board. 
This function is according to the agency theorists the most crucial function of the board, as 
already discussed in the previous chapter. The theory recognizes the reality, that large 
organisations might have owners that are separated from the managers who are the 
decision makers and that these two sides might have different interests. Thus, it is 
suggested that when there is a separation of ownership and management, control 
mechanisms should be applied to the organization. As stated by Boyd (1994), the control 
mechanisms can be both internal and external, with external including market-based 
measures such as failure of the firm, or a takeover attempt. Internal control, according to 
Eisenhardt (1989: 61), can be achieved by discovering the agent’s behaviour “through 
investment in information systems such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, 
boards of directors, and additional layers of management”. Boyd (1994) suggests, that the 
primary internal control mechanism that aligns the interests of shareholders and managers 
is the board, which serves as a representative of stockholders. This leads to the argument 
that the board of directors should undertake the monitoring role, by observing the 
management of the company in order to protect the owners’ interests. In other words, 
residual claimants (owners) assign internal control to a board of directors. The above has 
been adequately described by Fama and Jensen (1983: 313) stating that “the board then 
delegates most decision management functions and many decision control functions to 
internal agents, but it retains ultimate control over internal agents—including rights to 
ratify and monitor major policy initiatives and to hire, fire and set the compensation of top 
level decision managers”.  
As stated in the introduction of this section, Forbes and Milliken (1999: 492) have 
associated boards with TMTs, as both being elite workgroups with a major role in the 
firm’s decision control system. However, an important difference is that boards are 
responsible only for monitoring and influencing strategy, not for initiating and 
implementing strategy. In addition, boards have the responsibility to monitor the 
management of the organisations, in other words the CEO and members of the TMT.  
The main activities of the monitoring function, as stated by (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), 
are monitoring the CEO, monitoring strategy implementation, planning CEO succession 
and evaluating and rewarding the CEO/top managers of the firm. What these activities 
have in common is that their driver is the obligation to ensure that management operates at 
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the interest of the shareholders. Various authors refer to this function of the board as 
monitoring (Boyd, 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McLean Parks and Conlon, 1995; 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989), while others define it as control function (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Boyd, 1994; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). By 
examining the different definitions discussed under those two terms, it is realised that 
although at a conceptual level the two words differ, both are used with the same meaning.  
For example, the term control seems to derive from the article of Fama and Jensen 
(1983), who discussed the decision making process and its four steps (initiate, ratify, 
implement, monitor) and argued that these tasks have to be performed by different agents. 
Specifically, they suggested that initiation and implementation should be grouped together 
under the term management decision and be allocated to one group of agents (i.e. top 
management team), whereas ratification and monitoring steps should be included under the 
management control term and be allocated to a different group of agents (i.e. board of 
directors). Control in this case, focuses on the two steps of the decision-making process 
that are ratification and monitoring. Therefore, the centre of the management control in 
that case is at the decision making process regarding the strategic direction of the 
organisation. However, Fama and Jensen (1983: 311) continue by describing the decision 
control rights of the board as “the power to hire, fire, and compensate the top-level 
decision managers and to ratify and monitor important decisions”. In this further 
explanation, they have added the duty of controlling the executives by exerting power over 
them, apart from just controlling their decisions. Along the same lines, Forbes and 
Milliken (1999: 492), by using the term control, they refer to tasks that “include decisions 
regarding the hiring, compensation and replacement of the firm’s most senior managers, as 
well as the approval of major initiatives proposed by management”. This view seems to be 
identical to the view of the researchers describing the monitoring function and its 
activities, so from now on both terms will be used referring to the same function. This 
approach is in agreement with other scholars using both terms in their studies (Conyon and 
Peck, 1998; Johnson et al., 1996, Pearce and Zahra, 1991, Machold and Farquhar, 2013). 
Nevertheless, some comments should be made, as although both terms are used 
extensively under the same function, the essence of these words (monitor and control) is 
different. So, we would say that there are tasks better explained by the term monitoring, 
like monitoring the CEO and strategy implementation, and other tasks like evaluating and 
rewarding the CEO/top managers or planning the succession of CEO are better described 
as control tasks. 
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Table 2.2: Board Roles as Identified in the Corporate Governance Literature  
 Agency Theory Resource Dependence 
Theory 
 
Journal Articles Monitor Control Resource 
Provision 
Service Resource 
Depen. 
Strategy 
Beatty and Zajac (1994)       
Boyd (1990)       
Boyd (1994)       
Daily and Dalton (1994)       
Daily et al. (2003)       
Demb and Neubauer (1992)       
Fama and Jensen (1983)       
Forbes and Milliken (1999)       
Hillman and Dalziel (2003)       
Hillman et al. (2000)       
Hillman et al. (2008)       
Jensen and Meckling (1976)       
Johnson et al. (1996)       
Judge and Zeithmal (1992)       
Khanna et al. (2014)       
Knockaert and Ucbasaran 
(2013) 
     
Lester et al. (2008)       
Li et al. (2012)       
Lin et al. (2014)       
McDonald and Westphal 
(2010) 
      
McDonald et al. (2008)       
McLean Parks and Conlon 
(1995) 
      
Pearce and Zahra (1992)       
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)       
Stephens (2004)       
Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
(2003) 
      
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 
(1989) 
      
Wan and Ong (2005)       
Westphal (1999)       
Yoshikawa et al. (2014)      
Zahra and Pearce (1989)       
Zajac and Westphal (1994)       
Zona et al. (2013)       
Source: Author 
2.5.2 Provision of Resources/ Service Function of Boards 
 
The second function of the board that is to be discussed is the provision of 
resources. This function is important to the followers of the resource dependence theory, in 
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contrast to the agency theorists, who claim that the most important function is to control 
the management of the firm. Resource dependence theory suggests that organisations are 
open systems, inescapably bound up with the conditions of their environment, so they 
depend on external contingencies and actions need to be taken in order to control them 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  As mentioned in the relevant section discussing RDT, five 
mechanisms are available for an organization to minimize these dependencies that are, 
mergers/vertical integration, joint ventures, boards of directors, political action and 
executive succession. Our focus will be on the boards of directors and how these groups 
can act, in order to reduce environmental uncertainty. Pfeffer (1972: 219) stated that “it 
can be shown that corporate boards are used as if they were instruments with which to deal 
with the environment”. It is suggested that this can be achieved through the provision of 
resources that describes the role of the board to provide resources to the firm through their 
capital, what is often called as board capital. 
The activities of the board related to the provision of resources according to 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) include, providing legitimacy/bolstering the public image of 
the firm, providing expertise, administering advice and counsel, linking the firm to 
important stakeholders or other important entities, facilitating access to resources such as 
capital, building external relations, diffusing innovation, and aiding in the formulation of 
strategy or other important firm decisions. The common aspect of all these activities is that 
they all concentrate on the role of the board to provide resources to the firm, rather than to 
control the management and decision making process.  
However, although for the function of monitoring the term control has been used to 
describe more or less the same activities and is used in a quite similar way, in the case of 
the provision of resources function, the literature does not seem to be that clear. So, apart 
from the monitoring or control function of the board, there are authors arguing that there is 
one more function of the board that is to provide resources to the firm (Boyd, 1990; Daily 
et al., 2003; Daily and Dalton, 1994; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2000; 
Lester et al., 2008; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These authors agree on the fact that an 
organization is dependent on external contingencies and it is a duty of the board members 
to provide resources to the firm that will help to minimize this dependence to the 
environment. Nevertheless, although all of them seem to share the same view, some refer 
to this role as resource dependence role, deriving from the relevant perspective that 
explains this function of the board (Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al., 2000) and some others 
label this role as service (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). For 
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example, Forbes and Milliken (1999: 492) portray the service role in similar lines to the 
provision of resources by saying that it is the board’s responsibility to provide advice and 
counsel to the CEO and other top managers and to participate actively in the formulation of 
strategy. However, this captures only part of the board’s responsibility to provide resources 
to the company.  
Furthermore, Johnson et al. (1996: 411) have suggested two roles further to the 
controlling/monitoring, which are resource dependence role and service role. According to 
their view resource dependence role is the duty of the board to facilitate access to 
resources. The service role then is defined as the duty of the directors to provide advice 
and counsel to the firm’s management. This classification made by Johnson et al. can be 
combined under the resource provision role, as both roles seem to agree to what was earlier 
discussed to be provision of resources. 
2.5.3 Directors’ Responsibility to Strategic Direction: A Separate Role? 
 
Interestingly, Zahra and Pearce (1989), who examine the board’s roles from four 
different perspectives (legalistic, resource dependence, class hegemony and agency), argue 
that from the legalistic or class hegemony perspective, the board roles are to control and 
service. But when they examined the board’s functions from a resource dependence or 
agency theory perspective, they introduced a third role; that is the strategic role. Moreover, 
in an attempt to integrate these four approaches (different perspectives), they conclude that 
there are three board roles: control, service and strategy. By looking at the responsibilities 
of service and strategy, one could say that this is a broader approach to the roles and that 
there has been a division of the role of the board members to provide resources into two 
roles.  
Therefore, Zahra and Pearce (1989: 292) suggest that service role involves 
“enhancing company reputation, establishing contacts with the external environment, and 
giving counsel and advice to executives”. Conversely, the strategy role is described by the 
actual involvement of the directors in the strategic arena through counsel and advice to the 
CEO, by initiating their own analyses, or by suggesting alternatives (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989: 298). It is also made clear that development or execution of strategies is not part of 
the role, as this is within the responsibility of the CEO. 
Nevertheless, although strategy role clearly differentiates from service role in the 
sense that strategy describes the involvement of the directors in the strategy process, there 
 28 
is not a clear distinction in terms of the activities encompassed in each case. For example, 
both roles require advice and counsel to the CEO or/and executives and it is not clear how 
this can be different in each of the two roles. In addition, while some authors (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Judge and Zeithmal, 1992) discuss strategy role as the actual involvement of 
directors in the strategy process, Forbes and Milliken (1999) discuss participation of board 
members in the formulation of strategy under the service role.  
Summarizing, it is argued that the second important function of the board is the 
provision of resources, with service and resource dependence functions falling within the 
same description. However, the proposition for a strategy role is more complicated, as 
although it seems correct to some extent to be discussed as a separate function, it is 
important to pose some unclear arguments that exist in the literature.  
By examining the duties of directors under the control and resource provision roles, it is 
evident that both of these roles include activities that are related to the strategic 
responsibility of the directors. There are authors that have incorporated the strategy role 
into the resource provision role, as for example Hillman and Dalziel (2003: 386) state that 
part of the resource provision is “aiding in the formulation of strategy or other important 
firm decisions”. Similarly, Forbes and Milliken (1999: 492) argue that directors 
“participate actively in the formulation of strategy”, when discussing the service role.  
On the other hand, the same authors also state that part of the control role is to 
approve major initiatives proposed by management making the strategic involvement part 
of the control role. Thus, it is suggested that directors’ involvement in the strategic arena is 
related to both the monitoring and resource provision roles. Taking this idea further, it is 
suggested that strategy should not be discussed as a separate role, but as part of the two 
roles mentioned above, depending on the nature of activity, which can be either advisory 
or controlling. 
2.6 Board Characteristics 
 
The following sections will present and discuss various antecedents to the functions 
of the boards. According to the literature, the success of the directors to fulfil their 
responsibilities can be influenced by several factors including board size, leadership 
structure, board capital, board dependence, and director compensation. 
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2.6.1 Board Size 
 
Board Size is an element of board structure (Daily and Dalton, 1992); it can range 
from very small (5) to very large (30 plus) (Chaganti et al., 1985). Studies over the past 50 
and more years found the average size being from 12 to 14 members (Conference Board, 
1962, 1967; Gordon, 1945). As board size increases, expertise and critical resources of a 
firm are enhanced (Pfeffer, 1973). Larger boards prevent the CEO from taking actions 
against shareholders’ interests (Singh and Harianto, 1989). However, increased board size 
hinders initiative and strategic actions (Goodstein et al., 1994) while unproductive 
interactions may develop as well (O’Reilly et al., 1989).  
On the contrary, a smaller board has the ability to adopt and exercise a controlling 
role (Chaganti et al., 1985), while a smaller group size allows for increased participation 
and social cohesion (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and due to that it increases board’s 
performance (Koufopoulos et al., 2008).  
2.6.2 Board Leadership Structure 
 
Another important issue is CEO duality, which occurs when the same individual 
holds both the CEO and Chairperson’s positions in a corporation (Rechner and Dalton, 
1991). There are previous studies (Weir and Laing, 2001) that have identified the 
Chairpersons’ capabilities, including time to devote to running the board, knowledge of the 
industry and willingness to play a behind-the-scenes role. The Chairperson should also 
ensure that the directors have all the information needed and that there is an effective 
communication with shareholders. Finally, it arranges regular evaluation of the board and 
its members, committees and manages the relations between executive and non-executive 
directors.  
On the other hand, CEOs are responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
company, including the implementation of board decisions. While an individual is serving 
as CEO and Chairperson at the same time, he/she has greater stature and influence among 
board members (Harrison et al., 1988) but hampers the board’s ‘monitoring’ capacity 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1994).  
Agency theorists support a separation of jobs/roles of CEO and Chairperson. As 
they claim, performance will be improved when the board can better monitor the CEO 
(Harris and Helfat, 1998). They also state that if a company combines the above roles 
much power is concentrated to one individual who is able to make decisions that do not 
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maximise shareholders’ wealth (Higgs Review, 2003; Mallete and Fowell, 1992).  This 
separation of CEO and Chairperson’s roles is considered a condition for avoiding a conflict 
of interest between corporate constituencies and management, and due to that it improves 
the boards’ ability to govern (OECD, 2004). 
 
2.6.3 Board Capital 
 
Board capital is the capital that the members of the board bring to the firm. This 
capital is often divided into two categories the human and social capital. As stated by 
Lester et al. (2008: 999) “the resources that individual directors bring to corporate boards 
are largely a function of their human and social capital”.  
By the term human capital we mean the expertise, experience, knowledge, 
reputation and skills that the directors offer to the organisation (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). Similarly, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue that human capital is the acquired 
knowledge, skills and capabilities that enable persons to act in new ways. However, in 
their study they focus on knowledge and knowing capability, which they define as 
intellectual capital and they argue that is not the same but in parallel with the concept of 
human capital. 
On the other hand, social capital refers to “the sum of actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 243). Other 
scholars refer to social capital also as relational capital (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman et al., 2007). Nevertheless, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 244) use the term 
relational differently, as they describe it as one of three dimensions of the social capital, 
with the other two being structural and cognitive. They further define as structural “the 
properties of the social system and of the network of relations as a whole”, whereas 
relational describes “the kind of personal relationships people have developed with each 
other through a history of interactions”. Finally cognitive dimension of social capital 
“refers to those resources providing shared representations, interpretations, and systems of 
meaning among parties”. From now on, for the purpose of this thesis, board capital will be 
used and it will refer to the human and social capital. 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) claim that board capital has been positively associated 
with the four benefits that result from the provision of resources and were initially 
identified by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). However, it is important to say that Pfeffer and 
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Salancik discussed these four benefits under the specific condition where directors have 
linkages to other organizations. The first benefit that is related to board capital is the 
provision of advice and counsel that all directors facilitate through their knowledge, 
experience and expertise. Baysinger and Butler (1985: 111) identified 13 different 
categories of directors, showing the diversity that might exist within a board with each 
director bringing different skills to the board. Among these categories they listed lawyers, 
financial representatives, former government officials, top management of other firms and 
other directors and each of these categories can offer advice and counsel by using their 
sophisticated knowledge. The second benefit that directors provide to the firm and is 
associated to their board capital is legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 296) and reputation 
(Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983: 211; Certo et al., 2001: 37; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 
145). Galaskiewicz (1985: 296) argues that “one interorganizational strategy to enhance 
legitimacy is to have the organization identified with cultural symbols and/ or legitimate 
power figures in the environment”, and he suggested that one way to achieve that is to 
recruit prestigious people to the organization’s board of directors. Third, the board capital 
provides channels of communication and information between the firms and other external 
organisations and this is mainly achieved with directors’ external ties, which is an element 
of their social capital (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983: 211). Often these external ties 
exist because of multiple appointments of directors in different organisations, which are 
described in the literature as interlocking directorates. Finally, board capital can help in 
accessing critical resources from the outside, such as influence in financial capital, 
influence with political bodies, or any other important stakeholder group (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985: 108; D’Aveni, 1990: 121; Pfeffer, 1972: 222). 
From the above, it seems that an association of board capital to the function of 
resource provision is clear, as the higher the capital is, the more resources are provided to 
the firm. However, although there is a linkage of board capital with the provision of 
resources, there has not been an extensive research on the possible relation of board capital 
with the monitoring function as stated by Hillman and Dalziel (2003). It is argued that the 
main focus has been on the incentives (i.e. directors’ compensation) as an antecedent for 
the monitoring function, but what is also important to study is the ability of directors to 
monitor, which in great extent can be measured by their capital. Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) believe that the expertise and the skills of the directors can make the difference in 
their ability to monitor the management and strategic direction of the firm. It is suggested 
that knowledge and expertise of directors either from previous experience in other firms, or 
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from current appointment in other boards (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001: 642-643), can 
lead in better monitoring. Based on the arguments above, board capital is expected to have 
impact on the functions on the board. 
 
2.6.4 Board Independence 
 
Board independence is mainly determined by the ratio of inside/outside members of 
the board. An independent board is then characterised as a board that is dominated by 
independent outside members. Thus, the more the inside directors (as a proportion to 
outside) serving a board, the less independent the board is. In simple terms, inside 
members are those that are currently managers/employees of the firm, while outside 
members of the board are all those that do not work for the company (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003).  
However, the issue of independence arises when exploring the status of the outside 
directors, who can be characterized as independent only if they meet specific criteria, 
otherwise they are considered as affiliated. Such criteria have been published in various 
corporate governance practices, codes, laws and recommendations over the years. 
Therefore, the status of independence is not met if the director: a) has been an employee of 
the company within the last five years, b) has or had within the last three years a material 
business relationship with the company, c) receives an additional remuneration from the 
company apart from the director’s fee or is paid based on performance, d) has close family 
ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees, e) holds cross-
directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in other 
companies or bodies, f) represents a significant shareholder, or g) has served on the board 
for more than nine years (Higgs Review, 2003: 37; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010: 
12-13). 
The issue of board independence has largely been discussed and has attracted the 
interest of scholars, professionals and regulatory bodies, since it is strongly argued that 
high participation of independent directors is needed in the board as they can bring 
different attributes to the boardroom. The main purpose of the board is to protect 
shareholders’ interests and according to agency theory discussed earlier, the major role of 
the board members is to monitor the management and the decision process of the 
organization. Dalton et al. (1998: 275) argue that “outside directors may be best able to 
fulfil the control role when they are not encumbered by personal and/or professional 
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relationships with the firm or firm management”. In addition to the agency theory and the 
contribution of independent directors to the monitoring function, the appointment of 
outside directors in a board can also be useful in terms of provision of resources (Hillman 
et al., 2009). Zahra and Pearce (1989: 308) support that boards with a majority of outside 
directors “are in a position to establish viable links with different sectors of the external 
environment”.  In similar lines, Dalton et al. (1998) argue that outside directors may have 
more access to external information and resources than inside directors, who are largely 
employed with their operational responsibilities. They make a further comment by 
distinguishing affiliated from independent directors: “outside directors with personal 
relationships (e.g. family relations) with firm management may be less effective at the 
resource dependence and counseling/expertise roles than outside directors without such 
relationships” (p. 275).  
From all the above, it is apparent that there is a preference for independent boards, 
a prevalent position that is largely found in academic studies, corporate governance 
practices and codes (Boyd, 1994: 338; Daily and Dalton, 1994: 644; Higgs Review, 2003: 
35; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003: 385; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010: 12). 
However, it is important for each company to find a balance of inside/outside directors 
according to its needs, as the presence of inside directors also play an important role in the 
board’s effectiveness. As stated by Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990: 77) “outside directors 
may prefer to maintain an open and subjective relationship with top management, which 
might lead them to lack the amount and quality of information upon which such 
relationships must be based”. They suggest that the presence of inside directors to the 
board appears as a solution, or at least as an attempt to overcome information processing 
which in turn improve the effectiveness of decision control. Another argument that 
supports the dominance of insiders is that of Zahra and Pearce (1989: 315) who support 
that outside directors might not have the requisite time and expertise to do their job well. In 
contrary, inside directors, who are members of the company’s management and devote 
significantly more time in the organization, are expected to have more knowledge and 
information about the processes and strategic direction of the company. 
Despite the debate, it seems that further examination of board composition should 
be done in order to determine if an effective balance between inside and outside members 
exists. 
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2.7 External Environment 
 
The external environment is a main construct of the current thesis and the 
theoretical model suggests that external environment of an organisation, may affect the 
roles undertaken by the board members. This section will present the main aspects of the 
external environment of an organisation, and will continue by focusing on its various 
dimensions as proposed in the existing literature. 
 
2.7.1 Organisation as a System, and its Environment 
 
Before analysing the external environment of an organisation, it is maybe more 
appropriate to explain first what constitutes the organisational environment. The literature 
has consistently distinguished the environment of an organisation in internal and external 
over the last decades (e.g. Duncan, 1972; Gibbs, 1994; Garg et al., 2003; Hall and Fagen, 
1956; Lohrke et al., 2004).  
To understand the difference of these two levels, although the distinction seems self 
explanatory, it is important to understand the boundaries that differentiate between internal 
and external. This idea is well explained in the literature related to systems. Hence, 
organisations are viewed as open systems—also an assumption of the resource dependence 
theory earlier in this chapter—that interact with the environment. Hall and Fagen (1956: 
81) define a system as “a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and 
between their attributes”. The objects are then explained as the parts or components of a 
system and the relationships to which we refer, are those that “tie the system together”. 
Moreover, Hall and Fagen (1956: 83) introduce the notion of environment of systems: 
“For a given system, the environment is the set of all objects a change in 
whose attributes affect the system and also those objects whose attributes are 
changed by the behaviour of the system”. 
 
This definition brings the question of whether an object belongs to the system or to 
the environment. Because based on the above definition, it is reasonable to contend that if 
an object is affected by a change in the system, it should be considered as part of it. 
Subsequently, it is argued that there is no definite answer on this, but it depends on the 
intentions of the researcher. As explained, a system with its environment comprises the 
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universe of all things of interest in a given context. The division of this universe can be 
done in many different ways.  
In the context of business organisations, the system is the organisation and the term 
environment, is used to describe aspects from the inside as well as the outside. Based on 
this, a business organisation is conceptually ‘treated’ as an organic system. According to 
Hall and Fagen (1956: 86) “most organic systems are open, meaning they exchange 
materials, energies, or information with their environments”. In contrast, a closed system 
does not allow any import or export of such materials, energies and information and as 
such no change of its components takes place. Therefore, the organisation that is viewed 
as an open system is affected by factors from its environment. Duncan (1972: 314) gives a 
clear description of what should be considered as environment by saying that it is thought 
of as “the totality of physical and social factors that are taken directly into consideration in 
the decision-making behaviour of individuals in the organization”. Furthermore, he claims 
that if this is a definition for the environment, there are also factors within the boundaries 
of the organization must be considered as part of the environment. This is then the reason 
why there is a need for differentiation of the system's environment into internal and 
external. Consequently, all factors within the boundaries are regarded as internal 
environment and all factors from the outside are regarded as external.   
 
2.7.2 Components and Levels of the Environment 
 
Duncan (1972: 315) proposed a set of components for the internal and the external 
environment (Table 2.3), after interviewing individuals from different organizational 
decision units in 1968. It is important to say that the sample he used was solely based on 
manufacturing firms, therefore the components might not have a perfect match in all 
companies. In short, the internal components focus on the personnel, the numerous 
relationships between functional and staff units and the organisation’s aims, goals and 
general characteristics (e.g. nature of products/ services). The external components refer 
to all these factors outside the boundaries of the organisation that may affect the 
organisation, such as customers, suppliers, competitors, socio-political and technological 
conditions. 
Although most scholars seem to agree that the environment consists of the internal 
and external components, various studies—started appearing from the 60s—have 
attempted to define the environment following different approaches. Verdu and Gomez-
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Gras (2006) for example state, that Mintzberg (1979), generically defined the environment 
as everything that is different to the organisation, while Thompson (1967), included in 
environment all those external agents (stakeholders) that have inter-dependence with the 
organization and can affect it in the accomplishment of its mission and objectives.  
Moreover, the literature suggests that the external environment is realised in two 
different levels. These are the general environment and the task environment (Dill, 1958; 
Bourgeois, 1980; Downey and Slocum, 1975). The general environment is also described 
as remote or macro-environment, while the task environment is also referred to as 
competitive or microenvironment. 
The general or macro-environment is usually explained and analysed under the 
widely used factors, which are Political, Economic, Social and Technological, known as 
the PEST analysis. Later, Environmental and Legal factors were added which lead to the 
PESTEL analysis (Yuksel, 2012). At this point, it is noteworthy to mention that the 
original form of PEST was initially found by Aguilar (1967) as ETPS (i.e. economic, 
technical, political, social). Since then and until today, varieties of forms have been used 
(e.g. STEP, DEEPLIST), although the dominant one seems to be PESTEL.  
On the other hand, the task environment was expressed by Dill (1958), as the part 
of the total environment of management, which is potentially relevant to goal setting and 
goal attainment. Bourgeois (1980) tried to explain the difference of the task environment 
to the general, by discussing different levels of strategies. He claimed that corporate level 
strategies are carried out in the general environment, while business level strategies in the 
task environment. Furthermore, it can be argued that Porter’s work (1979) reflects the 
factors that capture the task environment. His five forces model suggests that the 
competitors, the suppliers, the customers, the substitute products and the threat of new 
entrants are the main factors that need to be taken into account in the competitive (task) 
environment before making any critical business decisions. 
Duncan’s components of external environment discussed and presented earlier, 
seem to combine aspects of both the general (i.e. socio-political and technological) and 
the task (i.e. customer, supplier, competitor) environments. 
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Table 2.3: Factors and Components Comprising the Organisation’s Internal 
and External Environment  
Internal Environment 
(1) Organisational Personnel Component 
A. Educational and technological background and skills 
B. Previous technological and managerial skill 
C. Individual member’s involvement and commitment to attaining 
system’s goals 
D. Interpersonal behaviour styles 
E. Availability of manpower for utilisation within the system 
(2) Organisational functional and staff units component 
A. Technological characteristics of organisational units 
B. Interdependence of organisational units in carrying out their objectives 
C. Intra-unit conflict among organisational functional and staff units 
D. Inter-unit conflict among organisational functional and staff units 
(3) Organisational level component 
A. Organisational objectives and goals 
B. Integrative process integrating individuals and groups into contributing 
maximally to attaining organisational goals 
C. Nature of the organisation’s product service 
External Environment 
(4) Customer component 
A. Distributors of product or service 
B. Actual users of product or service 
(5) Supplier component 
A. New materials suppliers 
B. Equipment suppliers 
C. Product parts suppliers 
D. Labour supply 
(6) Competitor component 
A. Competitors for suppliers 
B. Competitors for customers 
(7) Socio-political component 
A. Government regulatory control over the industry 
B. Public political attitude towards industry and its particular product 
C. Relationship with trade unions with jurisdiction in the organisation 
(8) Technological component 
A. Meeting new technological requirements of own industry and related 
industries in production of product or service 
B. Improving and developing new products by implementing new 
technological advances in the industry 
Source: Duncan (1972: 315) 
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As stated by Castrogiovanni (2002), some descriptions of environmental 
tendencies draw examples at the general environment level (e.g. Toffler, 1970), and other 
descriptions at the task environment level of analysis (e.g. Castrogiovanni, 1991; Dill, 
1958). It should be noted that generalization across those two levels might be 
inappropriate since new task environments are constantly emerging within the general 
environment (Castrogiovanni, 2002: 130).  
This section discussed the different levels of the environment and its components. 
The following section will briefly discuss another important aspect of the environment as 
the literature suggests, that is whether environment is objective or subjective.  
 
2.7.3 Objective versus Perceived Environment and its Dimensions 
 
Another important approach on which the literature offers different views is 
whether the environment should be viewed as objective or subjective.  Bourgeois (1980: 
33) asks a clear question to this issue that he calls a philosophical one: 
 “Which perspective of the construct of ‘environment’ is most relevant to an 
organization's behavior - its managers' perceptions of environmental states, 
or some objective characteristics of its environment?” 
Different scholars over the years have offered contradictory views on which 
approach is more appropriate. According to Verdu and Gomez-Graz (2006: 7), some 
authors are in favour of objective data to measure the environment (e.g. Bourgeois, 1980; 
Starbuck, 1976; Aldrich, 1979), while others are advocates of the subjective data (e.g. 
Duncan, 1972; Child, 1972; Tosi et al., 1973), claiming that only through managers’ 
perceptions the organisation can know its own environment. Although both approaches 
are used by different researchers, it is generally argued that using both objective and 
perceptual measures to assess the environment, might lead to more sophisticated studies 
(Dess and Beard, 1984; Bourgeois, 1980). 
In the previous section, the components and levels of the environment were 
described. This section briefly discussed the two approaches used by researchers to 
conceptualise and measure the environment, i.e. objective and subjective. Nevertheless, it 
is not an aim of this thesis to further discuss these approaches or the components and 
levels of the environment. The focus in the following pages will be to review the literature 
on the different dimensions of the external environment, which are at the centre of this 
study’s interest and part of the theoretical framework. 
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2.7.4 Dimensions of the External Environment 
 
Different terms have been used across the literature to capture environment’s 
dimensions, however the most dominant ones that will also be presented are 
environmental dynamism, complexity and munificence. Previous studies often have 
treated these dimensions as objective, while a fourth dimension—deriving from 
dynamism and complexity according to Duncan, 1972—is solely treated as 
subjective/perceptual (Bourgeois, 1980). 
 
2.7.4.1 Environmental Dynamism 
Dynamism, as a dimension of the organisational environment, started being 
discussed in a slightly abstract way during the 1960s (e.g. Emery and Trist, 1965; 
Terreberry, 1968, Thompson, 1967), but it was during the 1970s when it began taking its 
shape and becoming a more concrete concept (e.g. Duncan, 1972; Child, 1972). Duncan 
(1972: 316), who in my opinion conceptualised and explained the dimension in a clear 
manner, named the two poles of the dimension as static and dynamic. According to the 
him, “the static-dynamic dimension indicates the degree to which the factors of the 
decision unit’s internal and external environment remain basically the same over time or 
are in a continual process of change”. By further explaining the dimension, Duncan 
(1972) claimed that dynamism is divided into two sub-dimensions: a) the frequency of 
change for the factors that are identified as important to the decision making of the 
specific decision unit and b) the frequency with which the decision makers take into 
account new and different (environmental) factors in the decision making process. This 
means that, in a dynamic environment, a) there will be frequent changes to the factors 
considered as important and b) the managers will need to re-examine which factors are 
important regularly. The opposite would apply in a case of a static environment. 
In very similar lines other authors have viewed environmental dynamism as the 
degree, frequency and unpredictability (or irregularity) of change among environmental 
factors relevant to an organisation’s operations (e.g. Child 1972: 3; Castrogiovanni, 2002: 
132). However, the term used by Child (1972) to describe the dimension is variability, 
although its variables converge with Duncan’s and as such it is considered to be the same. 
Dess and Beard (1984: 56) state that based on some authors (i.e. Miles et al., 1974 and 
Jurkovich, 1974) it is important to differentiate between the rate of change and its 
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unpredictability. Child (1972) did not distinguish between these two, but Miles et al. 
(1974: 248) argue that it is possible to have rapid but largely predictable change in the 
environment, which would not be a serious challenge.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that while the work of these authors in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s is widely followed until today, there are different terms that have been used to 
describe environmental dynamism. These terms include volatility, instability, movement, 
velocity, turbulence and variability. 
 
2.7.4.2 Environmental Complexity 
The second largely discussed dimension of the environment is its complexity. 
Following again the description from Duncan (1972), who termed it as simple-complex 
dimension, it is whether the factors in the decision unit’s environment are few or many in 
number and whether they are similar to each other, in that they are part of the same 
components. Hence, in a simple environment there would be only few factors involved in 
the decision unit which would also be similar to each other, while in a complex 
environment there would be a large number of factors considered as important to the 
decision unit and would also be heterogeneous. Similarly, Child (1972: 3) and Tung (1979: 
675) argue that environmental complexity refers to the number and heterogeneity/diversity 
of factors and components (or activities) that the focal unit has to contend with, in decision 
making.  
Nevertheless, when Duncan tried to provide a typology of components and factors 
of the environment, he took into account both the internal and the external environment. At 
this point, it is important to mention Tung’s critique on the definition of the dimension. 
Tung (1979: 680), after reviewing La Porte’s (1971) definition of the complexity 
dimension, claimed that Duncan’s definition (1972) was inadequate. According to Tung 
(1979), there is one more aspect that should be taken into account when measuring 
complexity, apart from the number of factors and their heterogeneity; that is the 
manageability of the factors. The manageability is described as the extent to which the 
CEO of a company can handle the factors and components of the environment. Moreover, 
Tung (1979: 681) argues that this largely depends on whether the factors and components 
were located in the internal or external environment. If the majority of factors and 
components are found in the internal environment the expected complexity would be much 
lower than that for an organisation whose factors and components are primarily found in 
the external environment. To my opinion, this is an important omission from Duncan 
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(1972) and Child (1972), as when discussed the environment’s dimensions, they neglected 
to distinguish the internal from the external environment. 
Finally, Dess and Beard (1984) operationalized complexity dimension with two 
sub-dimensions, following Aldrich’s (1979) codification. The one is called homogeneity-
heterogeneity and is the same with what discussed above, and the other one is called 
concentration-dispersion. Dess and Beard (1984: 57), suggest that apart from the number 
and heterogeneity of factors, the dispersion is also an important aspect of complexity. They 
give the example of an organisation expanding through diversification into new markets, 
arguing that complexity will be increased having more requirements both in the 
operational level and—most important—in the administrative control.  
 
2.7.4.3 Environmental Munificence 
Staw and Szwajkowski (1975: 346) argued that although the most discussed and 
researched dimension is uncertainty, which according to Duncan (1972) and Child (1972) 
combines dynamism and complexity, another important dimension of the environment is 
that of munificence. They also claimed that the very first study incorporating the 
dimension clearly into a theoretical model is possibly that of March and Simon (1958). 
Environmental munificence has been defined as the scarcity or abundance of resources 
needed by firms operating within an environment (Castrogiovanni, 1991; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975; Bradley et al., 2011). Moreover, Dess and 
Beard (1984) suggested that munificence is “the extent to which the environment can 
support sustained growth” which is similar to Aldrich’s (1979) concept of environmental 
capacity.  Furthermore, the extent of resources that are available within an environment, do 
not only affect the survival and growth of companies operating in this environment, but 
also any firms that may attempt to enter (Castrogiovanni, 1991: 543).  
Furthermore, Bradley et al. (2011: 1077), argue that as resource availability 
increases, there are less selective pressures in the environment, which increases 
opportunity by allowing a greater diversity of goals, strategies, and organizational 
structures. On the other hand, they suggest that low munificence—or high environmental 
hostility—reflect lower market growth and higher competition for the reduced available 
resources. Subsequently, they claim that limited outside resources make it necessary for 
companies to depend more on their internal resources to develop opportunities. 
Interestingly, higher level of internal resources is associated with higher levels of 
innovation. 
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2.7.4.4 Environmental Uncertainty 
The concept of uncertainty has been discussed in various ways, depending each 
time on the approach used by each researcher. Duncan (1972) for example, argued that 
uncertainty definitions were developed by information as well as decision theorists. 
However, Duncan (1972) who reviewed different studies that tried to define uncertainty 
claims that some failed to provide clarity in definition (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), 
while others gave narrower definitions by focusing on the more mathematical aspects of 
uncertainty such as the individuals’ ability to assign probabilities to events (e.g. Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957; Garner, 1962). However, even in the case of these narrower definitions, it 
was believed that they were too abstract for managers to respond too. As such, after careful 
consideration of previous works and by taking into account the views of eighteen 
individuals, Duncan (1972) identified three components that are appropriate for capturing 
uncertainty: 
1. The lack of information regarding the environmental factors associated with a 
given decision-making situation, 
2. Not knowing the outcome of a specific decision in terms of how much the 
organisation would lose if the decision were incorrect, 
3. Inability to assign probabilities with any degree of confidence with regard to how 
environmental factors are going to affect the success or failure of the decision unit 
in performing its function. 
Duncan (1972) interestingly argues that these three components can be captured 
with the measurement of dynamism and complexity that had earlier defined in his article. 
In addition, he claims that dynamism is considered as a more significant factor than 
complexity, when measuring uncertainty. In brief, Duncan (1972: 325) states that 
“decision-units with dynamic environments always experience significantly more 
uncertainty in decision making regardless of whether their environment is simple or 
complex”. Similarly, the difference in perceived uncertainty between simple and complex 
environments is not significant, unless the environment is also dynamic. By connecting 
this argument with the earlier conceptualisation and breaking down of the dynamism and 
complexity dimensions, the following statement can be established: A large number of 
factors affecting decisions, that are also heterogeneous (i.e. complexity) are not considered 
as strong contributors to uncertainty, if there is not high frequency of change and 
unpredictability for these factors.  
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Returning to the discussion of whether environmental dimensions should be 
measured objectively or subjectively, environmental uncertainty is a dimension that is 
widely considered as subjective, i.e. based on the perceptions of the executives (e.g. 
Duncan, 1972; Downey and Slocum, 1975; Bourgeois, 1980; Milliken, 1987; Priem et al., 
2002; Oreja-Rodriguez and Yanes-Estevez, 2007; Qi et al., 2011; Srinivasan et al., 2011). 
However, Bourgeois (1980) insists, that both objective and subjective measures are needed 
to provide a more accurate view of the environment and that the perceptions of managers 
should definitely not be treated as objective. 
  Furthermore, an interesting approach by Milliken (1987: 136), divided the 
uncertainty dimension into three types of uncertainty namely state, effect and response 
uncertainty. State uncertainty occurs, when the managers perceive the environment or a 
component of the environment as unpredictable. Effect uncertainty is then defined as the 
inability to predict the nature of the impact of a future state of the environment on the 
organisation (example given is that of a hurricane approaching a house; although the 
danger is realised, the exact effect cannot be predicted). Finally response uncertainty is 
defined as the lack of knowledge of response option(s) or the consequences of a response 
choice. 
Table 2.4 below, lists a number of studies that have conceptualised and examined 
the environmental dimensions over the decades. Notably, in some cases, different terms 
have been used from different authors to describe similar dimensions, which have been 
provided under the corresponding dimensions. 
 
Table 2.4: Environmental Dimensions Identified in the Organisational 
Literature 
Journal Article Dynamism Complexity Munificence Uncertainty 
Baum et al. (2001) Dynamism Complexity Munificence  
Bourgeois (1980) Dynamism/ 
volatility/ 
turbulence 
Complexity/ 
heterogeneity 
 Uncertainty 
Boyd (1990) Dynamism Complexity Munificence  
Boyd (1995) Dynamism Complexity Munificence  
Bradley et al. 
(2011) 
Dynamism  Munificence  
Carpenter and 
Fredrickson (2001) 
   Uncertainty 
Castrogiovanni 
(1991) 
  Munificence  
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Castrogiovanni 
(2002) 
Dynamism Complexity Munificence  
Child (1972) Variability Complexity Illiberability  
Dess and Beard 
(1984) 
Dynamism Complexity Munificence  
Downey and 
Slocum (1975) 
   Uncertainty 
Duncan (1972) Static-
dynamic 
Simple- 
complex 
 Uncertainty 
Emery and Trist 
(1965) 
Dynamism/ 
Turbulence 
Complexity   
Harrington and 
Kendall (2005) 
Dynamism Complexity   
Jurkovich (1974) Movement Complexity   
Li and Atuahene-
Gima (2001) 
Turbulence    
Lang and Lockhart 
(1990) 
   Uncertainty 
Miller (1983) Dynamism Heterogeneity Hostility  
Miller (1988)  Heterogeneity  Uncertainty 
(unpredictabil
ity & 
dynamism) 
Milliken (1987)    Uncertainty 
Mitchell et al. 
(2011) 
Dynamism  Hostility  
Oke et al. (2012)    Uncertainty 
Oreja-Rodriguez 
and Yanes-Estevez 
(2007) 
   Uncertainty 
Priem et al. (2002)    Uncertainty 
Qi et al. (2011)    Uncertainty 
Srinivasan et al. 
(2011) 
   Uncertainty 
Staw and 
Szwajkowski 
(1975) 
  Scarcity- 
munificence 
 
Sutcliffe (1994) Instability  Munificence  
Terreberry (1968)  Turbulence    
Thompson (1967) Dynamism- 
stability 
Heterogeneity
- 
homogeneity 
  
Tung (1979) Movement Complexity 
& routineness 
  
Waldman et al. 
(2001) 
   Uncertainty 
Zahra et al. (2005) Dynamism Heterogeneity Hostility  
Source: Author 
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2.8 Summary 
 
This chapter was introduced by presenting some general issues about corporate 
governance and then continued with the discussion of the main theoretical perspectives 
that are found and used in the corporate governance literature (i.e. agency theory, resource 
dependence theory, upper echelons theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory, social 
network theory). Moreover, the chapter presented the roles of board members, which is a 
main construct of the thesis. Subsequently, several board characteristics that are assumed 
to affect the roles were described, although for the purpose of the thesis only some will be 
studied (i.e. board size, leadership structure, board dependence). Finally, the last section of 
the chapter discussed the second main construct of this thesis, which is the external 
environment of organisations. The following chapter will cover issues related to the 
measurement of constructs and the developed hypotheses. 
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Chapter 3: Measurements and Hypotheses
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3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on reviewing the literature on the different aspects 
that this study is interested. A number of theories that are related to corporate governance 
and the boards were reviewed. Then the major constructs of the study, as well as some 
closely related variables were discussed. This chapter will firstly focus on providing a 
review of the different measurements that have been used in the literature to capture the 
relevant constructs. Secondly, the chapter will proceed by developing various hypotheses 
to be tested, deriving from the possible relationship of the constructs and variables as 
argued in the literature.  
Hence, the following pages will review and present different measurements of each 
construct and then the hypotheses of the study will be provided. 
3.2 Measurements of the Study 
The following sections will explain and present in detail, all the 
questions/measurements found in the literature to capture the main constructs related to the 
theoretical model. 
3.2.1 Measurements of the Board Roles 
 
In the previous chapter the focus was on reviewing the different roles that board 
directors undertake, based on the literature. The relevant sections also highlighted the 
different approaches taken by various authors to describe the roles, however, monitor, 
service and strategy seem to be the three dominant roles. This section will present a few of 
the approaches that have been adopted by different authors to measure the roles, which 
also helped in designing the measures for the present thesis. 
3.2.1.1 Measurement of the Monitoring Role 
 
Monitoring role of the board is widely discussed in the literature (mainly linking it 
with the agency theory) and there are various authors that have proposed and used different 
items trying to capture this function of the board members. Table 3.1 outlines some of 
these articles and although most of them capture similar activities the terms monitoring and 
control are used interchangeably (i.e. McDonald and Westphal, 2010; Hillman et al., 2008; 
McDonald et al., 2008; Wan and Ong, 2005; Stephens et al., 2004; Hillman and Dalziel, 
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2003; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1994).  
Nevertheless, although most studies have used items that seem to capture the 
monitoring role effectively, there are authors that have used items that to my opinion can 
be considered as proxy variables. For example, Beatty and Zajac (1994) and Zajac and 
Westphal (1994) have used the ratio of outside directors to total directors as an item to 
measure the monitoring function. Although this might be a good indication—based on 
agency theory, monitoring is mostly performed by outside members—it does not refer to 
any specific activity that directors perform. Similarly, the issue of duality (i.e. CEO also 
holding the Chairperson position) is used as evidence of the monitoring function. Finally, 
the abovementioned authors use items related to ownership presence and venture-backed 
funding to determine the level of monitoring functioning. As stated earlier in this 
paragraph, all these items are considered as relevant indicators, but they are not regarded 
as appropriate measures for this thesis.  
Table 3.1: Monitoring/Control Role Measurements in the Literature  
Authors Items 
Beatty and Zajac 
(1994) 
1.     Ratio of outside directors to total directors 
2.     Proportion of outside owner-directors to total directors 
3.     Presence of a shareholder with large equity holdings who is not on the 
board 
4.     Whether the IPO firm is venture-backed  
5.     CEO/Chairman split 
Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) 
1.     To what extent does the board monitor top management strategic decision 
making? 
2.     To what extent does the board formally evaluate [the CEO’s] 
performance? 
3.     To what extent does the board defer to [the CEO’s] judgment on final 
strategic decisions? 
Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) 
1. Monitoring the CEO 
2. Monitoring Strategy Implementation 
3. Planning Succession 
4. Evaluating and Rewarding the CEO/top managers of the firm 
Hillman, Nicholson 
and Shrosphire (2008) 
1.     Monitoring the CEO {{decisions by CEO}} 
2.     Strategy Implementation 
3.     Planning for CEO succession 
4.     Evaluating and rewarding the CEO/top managers 
Judge and Zeithaml 
(1992) 
1.     The board usually collects its own information about the progress of the 
strategic decision in addition to top management reports. 
McDonald and 
Westphal (2010) 
1.     Over the past twelve months, to what extent has the board exerted control 
over strategic decision making by management? 
2.     To what extent has the board requested information from the CEO or 
another inside director for the purpose of evaluating management’s progress in 
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implementing the firm’s corporate strategy? 
3.     Over the past twelve months, how many times did the board call for 
revisions to a strategic proposal put forth by management for approval? 
4.     How many times did members of the board constructively criticize a 
strategic proposal put forth by management [for approval]? 
5.     On how many occasions did the board seek information from the CEO or 
another inside director for the purpose of evaluating the performance of top 
management? 
McDonald, Khanna 
and Westphal (2008) 
1.     To what extent does the board monitor the CEO’s strategic decision 
making? 
2.     To what extent does the board formally evaluate the CEO’s performance? 
3.     To what extent does the board defer to the CEO’s judgment on final 
strategic decisions? 
4.     Over the past year, how many times did one or more members of the board 
constructively criticize a strategic proposal put forth by the CEO for approval? 
5.     How many times during the past year have one or more members of the 
board requested information from the CEO or another inside director for the 
purpose of evaluating the CEO’s strategic decision making? 
Stephens et al. (2004) 
1.     The board seems to be satisfied with the performance of the chamber’ 
president/CEO/executive director. (Control) 
2.     The board seems to be satisfied with our president/CEO/executive 
director’s performance. (Control) 
3.     The president/CEO/executive director’s performance is outstanding. 
(Control) 
Stiles (2001) 1.     Hire, appraise and fire executives 
Van Den Heuvel, Van 
Gils and Voordeckers 
(2006) 
1. Select new managers 
2. Determine salary/ compensation of management 
3. Evaluate/ Control management performance 
4. Direct succession problems 
Wan and Ong (2005) 
1.     Monitor top management in decision-making 
2.     Evaluate performance of top executives 
3.     Has internal mechanism to evaluate performance yearly 
4.     Member formally evaluated by others 
5.     Analyse budget allocation vs. performance 
6.     Require information showing progress 
7.     Review performance against strategic plan 
8.     Review financial information for important issues/trends 
9.     Engage in succession planning for CEO 
10. Engage in succession planning for top managers besides CEO 
Westphal (1999) 
1.     To what extent does the board monitor top management strategic decision 
making? 
2.     To what extent does the board formally evaluate your performance? 
3.     To what extent does the board defer to your judgment on final strategic 
decisions? 
Zajac and Westphal 
(1994) 
1.     Outsider ratio 
2.     Outside directors’ stock ownership (as a % of common stock) 
3.     Presence of a nondirector blockholder 
4.     CEO/Chairman split (duality) 
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3.2.1.2 Measurement of the Provision of Resources/ Service Role 
 
The second role of the board largely discussed and examined in the literature is the 
service role. The service role is usually described under the resource dependence 
perspective, arguing that the board members should provide service, which in turn helps 
the organization to control external dependencies and become more independent to the 
environment.  
The discussion of the service role in the literature is more diverse in the terms that 
have been used to describe more or less the same activities. Apart from the term service 
(e.g. Van Den Heuvel et al., 2006), other terms include: advice and counsel (e.g. Carpenter 
and Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999), resource provision (e.g. Hillman et al., 2008; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and resource dependence role (e.g. Stephens et al., 2004). In 
addition, it seems that Wan and Ong (2005) have broken down the role into two elements, 
which are service and resource dependence. 
 In some studies, there are variables used to capture the service role, but it would 
perhaps be more appropriate to use them as proxy variables. For example, Stephens et al. 
(2004) use the number of quality contacts that a board member has, as an item for 
measuring the service role; although the variable/item seems relevant, as it shows the 
ability of the director to link with outside resources, it does not reflect an activity. As such, 
it is maybe better for this quantifiable characteristic to serve as a proxy to the service role. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the different terms used at the construct level, it seems 
that in their vast majority scholars share similar understanding about this role of the board 
members that is to offer their services to the company, either in a form of expertise and 
knowledge through advice, or in a form of networking (i.e. controlling external 
dependencies).  
To my opinion, both cases are properly portrayed with the terms service or resource 
provision. The following Table (3.2) presents the items that have been used to capture the 
service role of the board. 
 
Table 3.2: Provision of Resources/Service Role Measurements in the 
Literature 
Authors Items 
Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) 
1.     The extent that [the CEO] solicits board assistance in the formulation of 
corporate strategy 
2.     The extent that outside directors are a "sounding board" on strategic issues 
3.     [In the past twelve months:] The frequency of providing advice and 
counsel to the CEO on strategic issues? (_____Times) 
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Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) 
1. Providing legitimacy/bolstering the public image of the firm 
2. Providing expertise 
3. Administering advice and counsel 
4. Linking the firm to important stakeholders or other important entities 
5. Facilitating access to resources such as capital 
6. Building external relations 
7. Diffusing innovation 
8. Aiding in the formulation of strategy or other important firm decisions 
Hillman, Nicholson 
and Shrosphire (2008) 
1.     Providing legitimacy/bolstering the image of the firm 
2.     Providing expertise and advice 
3.     Linking the firm to important stakeholders 
4.     Facilitating access to resources such as capital 
5.     Diffusing innovation 
6.     Aiding in the formation of strategy or other important decisions 
Stephens et al. (2004) 
1.     Are you currently serving in an elected leadership role on the chamber 
board? (Service) 
2.     Number of Quality Contacts that are useful to the board. (Resource 
Dependence) 
3.     Contributions of resources other than times to further the objectives of this 
chamber. (Resource Dependence) 
Stiles (2001) 
1.     Involvement in Strategy 
2.     Converse with shareholders/stakeholders 
3.     Ensure corporate renewal 
4.     Ensure corporate survival 
5.     Determine risk position 
6.     Lead strategic change 
7.     Review social responsibilities 
8.     Act as ambassadors for the firm 
9.     Understand current and forthcoming legislation 
Van Den Heuvel, Van 
Gils and Voordeckers 
(2006) 
1. Building Organisational reputation 
2. Formulate/ Ratify organizational strategy 
3. Taking Care of access to extra resources 
4. Advising Management 
5. Networking and maintain relations 
Wan and Ong (2005) 
1.     Provide advice and counsel to top managers 
2.     Top managers solicit board assistance 
3.     Ensure communications with stakeholders/public is effective 
4.     Take into account interests of stakeholders 
5.     Promote goodwill/support of stakeholders 
6.     Debate on Strategic Plan 
7.     Comprises outside directors with skills relevant to company 
8.     Outside directors provide alternative viewpoints 
9.     Members chosen for influence in community 
10.     Provide channels of communications between firms 
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11.     Serve as a link to government agencies 
Westphal (1999) 
1.     The extent of soliciting board assistance in the formulation of corporate 
strategy 
2.     The extent that outside directors are a "sounding board" on strategic issues 
3.     The frequency that directors provided advice and counsel in discussions 
outside of board/committee meetings (by telephone or in person)? _____Times 
 
3.2.1.3 Measurement of the Strategy Role 
 
The case of the strategy role is not that clear in the literature and although there are 
few studies that have attempted to measure the board functioning related to the strategic 
direction of the organisation, it seems that most of the times, the measurements used often 
fall under the monitoring (e.g. monitoring the process of strategic decisions and asking 
probing questions to the top management team), or the service role (e.g. ratifying strategic 
proposals and involve in mission articulation).  
Table 3.3 presents two studies that have proposed measurements for the strategic 
role of the board, although after careful examination it was concluded, that some of these 
items are conceptually also present under the monitoring and service role. 
 
Table 3.3: Strategy Role Measurements in the Literature  
Authors Items 
Judge and Zeithaml 
(1992) 
1.     The board is usually not involved with the formation of strategic decisions. 
2.     The board usually ratifies strategic proposals that are formed solely by top 
management. 
3.     The board usually asks probing questions and then ratifies strategic 
proposals that are formed primarily by top management. 
4.     The board usually asks probing questions which lead to revisions of 
strategic proposals that are formed by top management. 
5.     The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with top management 
in board meetings. 
6.     The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with top management 
within and between board meetings. 
7.     The board usually forms strategic decisions separate from top 
management. 
8.     The board is usually not involved with monitoring the progress of strategic 
decisions. 
9.     The board usually accepts the evaluation given to it by top management 
without asking probing questions. 
10.     The board usually accepts the evaluation given to it by top management 
after asking probing questions. 
11.     The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation, but 
that information is supplied by top management and it is rarely challenged by 
the board. 
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12.     The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation, but 
that information is supplied by top management and it is often challenged by 
the board. 
13.     The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation and it 
often requests additional information after receiving the progress report from 
top management. 
Wan and Ong (2005) 
1.     Aware of environmental trends 
2.     Benchmark strategic plan with industry data 
3.     Receive plan for strategy implementation from CEO 
4.     Involve in mission articulation 
5.     Identify strategic direction for company yearly 
 
3.2.1.4 Summary on Board Role Measurements 
 
For the purpose of this study, a mix of items from various studies was used to 
measure the roles of board members. The list of measurements that was decided to be used 
in the current thesis as well as the justification of that selection are presented in the 
following chapter.  
3.2.2 Measurements of the External Environment 
 
Similar to the previous section that discussed the board roles, this section will 
present and discuss the measurements found in the literature regarding the external 
environment. In this section, the different dimensions of the environment will be presented 
separately and subsequently, the chosen items that will be used for this study will be 
described. However, it is important to say that the measurements that are reviewed and will 
be discussed in this section are both objective and subjective, but for the purpose of this 
study subjective measures will be uses, since board members will be approached to assess 
the environment based on their perception. The dimensions that will be presented in the 
following pages are, dynamism, complexity and munificence. 
3.2.2.1 Measurement of Environmental Dynamism 
 
As already stated in the literature review, there are different terms used to describe 
similar dimensions/ concepts of the organisational environment. For example, while Davis 
et al. (2009) argue that they discuss and measure the dynamism aspect of the environment, 
by looking at the measures used it is clear that the term dynamism is used to capture all 
attributes of the environment. Hence, by looking into the details of the measures, they have 
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used the term velocity to capture “the speed of rate at which new opportunities emerge” 
(Davis et al., 2009: 423), i.e. the sense of dynamism. 
Dynamism has been conceptualised by Duncan (1972) as the degree of change of 
the decision units’ environmental elements. In particular, he captured dynamism by using 
two sub-dimensions as stated in the previous chapter, which were measured with two 5-
point scale questions. The first asked the respondents how often each of the factors that 
they identified as being important in decision making change. The second sub-dimension 
asked the respondents about the frequency with which decision unit members take into 
account new and different environmental factors in the decision making process. He then 
suggested that the scores of the two questions can be added to form an index capturing 
dynamism. 
Moreover, there are researchers that have attempted to capture dynamism using 
objective measures (e.g. Revilla and Fernandez, 2013). For instance, Castrogiovanni 
(2002) measured dynamism (Table 3.4), by using the variables found in the work of Dess 
and Beard (1984), being consistent with the approach of previous researchers (e.g. Child, 
1974; Tosi et al., 1973).  
 
Table 3.4: Dynamism Measures from Castrogiovanni (2002: 139)  
Items Measure 
Instability of sales For annual value of shipments assessed over 5 years, the 
standard error of the regression slope coefficient divided by 
the mean value. 
Instability of employment For total employment assessed over 5 years, the standard 
error of the regression slope coefficient divided by the mean 
value 
Instability of value added For value added by manufacture assessed over 5 years, the 
standard error of the regression slope coefficient divided by 
the mean value. 
Instability of price-cost 
margin 
For value added by manufacture minus total wages assessed 
over 5 years, the standard error of the regression slope 
coefficient divided by the mean value. 
 
Moreover, Miller and Friesen (1983: 233) and Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001) 
measured the dynamism dimension with three 7-point scale questions asking about the 
unpredictability of change in a) customer tastes, b) production or service technologies and 
c) the modes of competition in the firm’s principal industries. The two ends of the scale 
were “much less than other firms” and “much greater than other firms”. 
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Miller and Droge (1986: 557) measured the dynamism dimension by asking the 
respondents how rapid or intense the following 7-point scale items are in the company: 
 
Our business unit must rarely change its 
marketing practices to keep up with the 
market and competitors 
 
Our business unit must change its 
marketing practices extremely 
frequently 
The rate at which products/ services are 
becoming obsolete in the industry is very 
slow 
 
The rate of obsolescence is very high 
Actions of competitors are quite easy to 
predict 
 
Actions of competitors are 
unpredictable 
Demand and consumer tastes are fairly 
easy to forecast 
 
Demand and tastes are almost 
unpredictable 
The production/service technology is not 
subject to very much change and is well 
established 
The models of production/service 
change often and in a major way 
 
Furthermore, Judge and Miller (1991) rated dynamism with industry growth (i.e. 
change in employment and sales), coupled with one item asking perception of managers 
about the technological change in their industries. 
In another study, Nadkarni and Barr (2008: 1407) used three items to capture 
dynamism (referred to as velocity) which were a) number of new products introduced, b) 
time span (number of years) between new products introduced and c) depreciation of 
capital equipment; other authors have also used these measures (Fines, 1998; Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Mendelson and Pillai, 1999; Nerkar and Roberts, 
2004). 
Mitchell et al. (2011: 704) have used a 7-point scale to measure the level of 
agreement on the following six items, which were a variant of the Miller and Friesen 
(1982: 17-18) scale, similar to the one used by Green et al. (2008: 378-379). 
 My business unit must rarely change its marketing practices to keep up with 
competitors. 
 The rate at which products are becoming obsolete in my industry is very slow. 
 Actions of competitors are quite easy to predict. 
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 The set of competitors in my industry has remained relatively constant over the last 
3 years. 
 Product demand is easy to forecast. 
 Customer requirements/preferences are easy to forecast. 
After carefully considering the above options and measures found in the literature, 
it was decided to use the measurements from Miller and Droge (1986) to capture the 
dynamism dimension, which have been also found in other studies (Miller et al., 1988: 
554; Miller, 1988: 307; Priem et al., 1995; Droge et al., 2008; Wu, 2010; Li and Liu, 
2014). 
3.2.2.2 Measurement of Environmental Complexity 
 
Complexity is another widely researched and measured dimension of the 
environment. Other terms like heterogeneity or routineness have been used to describe the 
dimension, but as discussed in the literature, they have been used to capture the same 
concept, which in simple terms is the number of factors involved in the decision unit’s 
environment. 
Duncan (1972) used again two criteria to measure the simple-complex dimension 
by creating an index. The one criterion is the number of factors involving in the decision 
unit. The second criterion trying to capture the heterogeneity of the environment, which 
appears to be a sub-dimension of the complexity dimension, is the number of components 
(discussed in the literature review chapter) where the factors are found. The index is then 
calculated with F x (C)
2
. Therefore a decision unit with three factors in one component (3 x 
1
2
= 3) would be different to three factors in three components (3 x 3
2
= 27). The same 
approach to measure complexity has been used by other scholars (e.g. Gibbs, 1994; Tung, 
1979) 
Moreover, Dess and Beard (1984: 58) captured the complexity dimension 
objectively, in a conceptually similar way to the one used by Duncan (1972). Their 
approach uses the resource dependence perspective, arguing that the environment is 
considered as more complex for organisations operating in industries that require more 
different inputs (i.e. resources) and produce more different outputs. Their 
operationalization consisted of eight variables used to capture the dimension of 
complexity—which they divide to homogeneity-heterogeneity and concentration-
dispersion as seen in Table 3.5 below. Different researchers have used this approach in 
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their attempt to capture the complexity dimension (e.g. Boyd et al., 1993; Lawless and 
Finch, 1989). 
 
Table 3.5: Complexity Measures from Dess and Beard (1984: 71) 
Items Definition Measure 
Heterogeneity-
homogeneity 
Concentration of industry inputs 
(sources of supply)  
 
Function of the dollar volume of 
inputs and the number of industries 
supplying the inputs 
Concentration of industry 
outputs (customer groups)  
 
Function of the dollar volume of 
outputs and the number of industries 
to which outputs are supplied 
Diversity of industry products 
(breadth of product line, in 
different industries) 
Function of the number of product 
codes and dollar volumes 
Specialization ratio (degree to 
which firms in the industry are 
concentrated in one industry)  
 
Ratio of primary product shipments to 
total product shipments for all 
establishments classified in the 
industry 
Concentration-
dispersion 
Geographical concentration of 
sales  
Function of dollar volume of industry 
sales and number of census divisions 
Geographical concentration of 
value added by manufacturers 
 
Function of dollar volume of industry 
value added and number of census 
divisions 
Geographical concentration of 
total employment  
Function of total industry employment 
and number of census divisions 
Geographical concentration of 
total establishments  
Function of total establishments and 
the number of census divisions 
Source: Cannon and John (2007) 
 
Kukalis (1988) used subjective approach to measure complexity with 5-point Likert 
scale, even though the measurements seem to also contain variables that capture 
dynamism. For instance, questions 2-4 found in Table 3.6 below measure rate and 
frequency of change, which are elements of the dynamism dimension.  
 
Table 3.6: Complexity Measures from Kukalis (1988: 403-404) 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 
The primary markets that you serve 
are generally 
Not competitive  Very competitive 
The degree of market growth rate in 
your primary business is: 
Declining  Fast growing 
In the primary industry (or 
industries) that you compete in, the 
frequency of new product 
introductions is generally 
Very low  Very high 
In the primary industry (or Infrequent  Frequent 
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industries), your company's 
competing in technological 
innovations is generally 
In the primary industry (or 
industries) that your company serves, 
the frequency of unpredictable 
changes in demand is 
Very low  Very High 
The markets that you serve are Very homogeneous (e.g. 
a single undifferentiated 
market and very similar 
customers) 
 Very heterogeneous (e.g. a 
great diversity of markets, 
mixed types of customers) 
The production and marketing 
operations of your company are 
geographically 
Very concentrated (e.g. 
in a single region of the 
US) 
 Very widely dispersed (e.g. 
global both in production 
and marketing) 
Existing relationships with major 
suppliers and subcontractors impose 
Very minor constraints 
on future plans 
 Very restrictive constraints 
on future plans 
Existing relationships with major 
distributors and customers impose 
Very minor constraints 
on future plans 
 Very restrictive constraints 
on future plans 
The impact of government 
regulations and policies on your 
company's primary business produce 
Very minor constraints 
on future plans 
 Very restrictive constraints 
on future plans 
 
Furthermore, Miller (1988: 308) used three variables to measure the dimension of 
complexity/heterogeneity, by asking about the differences among products or services 
offered in “customers’ buying habits”, “the nature of the competition” and “required 
methods of production or service”. Specifically, a 7-point scale for the question was used 
(1= about the same for all products, 7= varies a great deal from one line to another).  
With careful consideration of the above difference approaches in measuring the 
complexity dimension, it was decided to use the questions found in Miller (1988). The 
measurements were also found to be adopted by other researchers (e.g. Lumpkin and Dess, 
1995; Arregle et al., 2012). 
3.2.2.3 Measurement of Environmental Munificence 
 
Munificence is also found in the literature with different terms like capacity or 
hostility and it refers to “scarcity or abundance of critical resources needed by firms 
operating within an environment” (Castrogiovanni, 1991: 542). The following lines 
provide some of the measurements found in the existing literature to capture the 
dimension. 
Mitchell et al. (2011: 704) have used a 7-point scale to measure the level of 
agreement on six items, which were adopted from Slevin and Covin (1997: 205-206) and 
were also used by Green et al. (2008: 378-379). 
 The failure rate of firms in my industry is high. 
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 My industry is very risky, such that one bad decision could easily threaten the 
viability of my business unit. 
 Competitive intensity is high in my industry. 
 Customer loyalty is low in my industry. 
 Severe price wars are characteristic of my industry. 
 Low profit margins are characteristic of my industry. 
Miller and Friesen (1983: 233)—who used the term hostility—attempted to capture 
the dimension with eight variables, asking respondents to indicate the extent that their 
firms faces intense competition in different areas/issues. These included price, product, 
technology, distribution, shortages of labour, shortages of raw material, unfavourable 
demographic trends and severe regulatory restrictions. 
In addition, Dess and Beard (1984: 58) have used six objective measures to capture 
the dimension, which are growth in total sales, growth in price-cost margin, growth in total 
employment, growth in value added, growth in the number of establishments and industry 
sales concentration. Other scholars have also used this approach (e.g. Nadkarni and Barr, 
2008; Bradley et al., 2011; Castrogiovanni, 2002). 
For the purpose of this thesis, it was decided to use the measures proposed by 
Miller and Friesen (1983). 
 
3.3 Propositions and Hypotheses 
 
Various scholars have paid significant attention to what constitutes a theory, which 
will be discussed to some extent in the following chapter. However, due to the purpose of 
this section, it is noteworthy to refer to the following description: “a theory may be viewed 
as a system of constructs and variables in which the constructs are related to each other by 
propositions and the variables are related to each other by hypotheses” (Bacharach, 1989: 
498). 
In the following pages the propositions resulting from the constructs discussed in 
the literature review will be presented, along with the hypotheses developed between 
variables deriving from the methodology design of the thesis. 
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3.3.1 Propositions and Hypotheses on Control Role 
 
The literature review chapter provided description of the control/monitor role of the 
board, mainly linked to the agency theory. According to the theory, control is needed in 
order to ensure that management acts in the best interest of the owners (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  
Based on the above general inference, it is expected that in dynamic, complex and 
hostile environments the control function becomes harder, while directors’ role will 
become more challenging and demanding. 
According to Johnson et al. (2011: 1788) complexity increases the difficulty of the 
control role because of high information asymmetry. However, they also state, that 
increased complexity is often found in larger firms with wider environment. These 
companies have greater number of buyers, suppliers and partners, which results in higher 
external exposure of the directors. These directors have more difficult jobs in which they 
might strive for positive performance as they are highly exposed. By performing their 
control role successfully, they can enhance their reputation. So, it is expected that in 
complex environments, the controlling function of the board members will be increased. 
Furthermore, it is argued that complex and dynamic environments lead to 
information asymmetries between managers and investors (Liu and Lai, 2012: 354). This 
in turn, signals a need for high quality auditors that will reduce these asymmetries. While 
the number of factors and components involved in the decision-making typically explains 
complexity, dynamism is linked to the rate of change and unpredictability of these factors. 
Hence, it can be argued that the need for internal information is higher in more complex 
and dynamic environments. In similar lines, Pirson and Turnbull (2011: 463) argue that 
more information processing is needed in complex environments to adequately manage 
risk. 
Similarly, environmental hostility can have indirect effects on managerial action 
and behaviour. As stated by Zahra et al. (2005: 811) a rise of hostility that might harm 
organisational performance, will lead managers to restrict communication about the firm’s 
financial position or performance. This makes it difficult for outsiders to gain internal 
information. In turn, it is expected that the board will stronger seek for internal information 
by controlling the executives and their decisions.   
Based on the above, the following propositions and hypotheses are developed: 
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PA1: Board Control is related to environmental complexity. 
 HA1a: Controlling CEO is positively related to environmental complexity. 
 HA1b: Controlling TMT is positively related to environmental complexity. 
 HA1c: Seeking internal information is positively related to environmental 
complexity. 
PA2: Board Control is related to environmental dynamism. 
 HA2a: Controlling CEO is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
 HA2b: Controlling TMT is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
 HA2c: Seeking internal information is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
PA3: Board Control is related to environmental munificence. 
 HA3a: Controlling CEO is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
 HA3b: Controlling TMT is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
 HA3c: Seeking internal information is positively related to macro-environmental 
hostility. 
 HA3d: Controlling CEO is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 HA3e: Controlling TMT is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 HA3f: Seeking internal information is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 
In parallel to the effect of the external environment to the control role of an 
organization, there are certain board characteristics that are assumed to affect the extent 
that the role is undertaken in the board.  
Specifically, Jensen (1993: 865) argues that smaller boards can improve the overall 
performance, as large boards cannot function effectively and it becomes easier for the CEO 
to control them. While more members can offer greater resources, the problem according 
to Jensen (1993: 865) appears when boards have more than seven or eight members. This 
leads to the assumption that larger boards will be weaker monitors of the managerial 
performance. Similarly, based on Upadhyay and Sriram (2011: 1239), larger boards may 
lead to information asymmetry due to the increased control of the CEO and this lack of 
transparency may increase the need for seeking internal information.  
Additionally, it is suggested that when there is a leader of the board (i.e. 
Chairperson) separate from the CEO, the control function of the board can be enhanced, as 
there is less power concentrated to the CEO, as with CEO duality it is harder for board 
members to challenge and monitor the management (Daily and Dalton, 1994: 1605; 
Lohrke et al., 2004: 75, Boyd, 1995: 303). According to Lorsch (1989: 185), a separate 
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chairperson gives a stronger voice in setting the agenda and in selecting directors and also 
controls the meeting process, which encourages more open discussion. For the same 
reasons, it is expected that the board members stronger seek for internal information, when 
the two roles are separate. 
Based on the above, various relationships are expected, expressed with the 
following proposition and hypotheses: 
 
PA4: Board Control is related to various board characteristics. 
 HA4a: Controlling CEO is negatively related to board size. 
 HA4b: Controlling TMT is negatively related to board size. 
 HA4c: Seeking internal information is positively related to board size. 
 HA4d: Controlling CEO is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HA4e: Controlling TMT is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HA4f: Seeking internal information is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 
The independent directors are expected to contribute in the overall performance of 
the company, through their monitoring and controlling of management, which is 
emphasized under agency theory (Zona et al., 2013; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Daily et al., 
2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, the qualitative findings of Long et al (2005: 
669) showed that non-executives in unlisted firms involve more in financial monitoring 
than non-executives in listed firms, which is a factor that should be taken into 
consideration. As argued by Giraldez and Hurtado (2014: 94), the presence of independent 
directors in the board, is believed to serve as the guarantor and defender of the 
shareholders’ interests. This leads to the assumption that increased ratio of independent 
directors will intensify the control function of the board. 
Moreover, it is suggested that low attendance in meetings due to overly busy 
directors holding many seats, could prevent them from monitoring the management of 
these companies (Lin et al., 2014: 267; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006: 722). From this, it can 
be argued, that directors who spend more time in a company’s activities—through board 
meetings—are better able to monitor the CEO and other executives of the company. 
Thus the following relationships are hypothesised: 
 
 HA4g: Controlling CEO is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
 HA4h: Controlling TMT is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
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 HA4i: Seeking internal information is positively related to the ratio of independent 
directors. 
 HA4j: Controlling CEO is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 HA4k: Controlling TMT is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 HA4l: Seeking internal information is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
  
Furthermore, it is expected that respondents’ status affects the control role they 
operate in the board. Firstly, the independent directors—as suggested earlier—are 
supposed to act as monitors of the management, a role that is mainly if not solely 
performed by them, based on agency theory literature (Zona et al., 2013; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Daily et al., 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
Secondly, as argued by Khanna et al. (2014: 559) the experience of directors in the 
board is likely to improve their ability to perform their monitoring function. They suggest 
that, the role of a director is more than just reading financial statements or setting 
compensation packages. An important part of their job is to understand and evaluate the 
actions of top managers and how those actions will affect the organisation. Directors are 
highly involved with the organisation, so the prior experience acquired by directors should 
be valuable. Hence, it is assumed that higher tenure of the respondent will increase the 
board control function.  
Based on the above, the following proposition and hypotheses are developed: 
 
PA5: Board Control is related to respondent’s status in board. 
 HA5a: Controlling CEO is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
 HA5b: Controlling TMT is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
 HA5c: Seeking internal information is higher when respondent’s status is 
independent. 
 HA5d: Controlling CEO is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
 HA5e: Controlling TMT is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
 HA5f: Seeking internal information is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in 
board. 
 
3.3.2 Propositions and Hypotheses on Resource Provision Role 
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Similar to the above propositions, external environment is assumed to affect the 
resource provision role of the company. Based on resource dependence perspective, an 
organization is an open system, dependent on external contingencies that need to be 
controlled. One of the ways to control these dependencies is through the board of directors 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As a result, it is expected that the more dynamic, complex 
and hostile the environment is, the higher the need of the board to provide resources. This 
can be achieved with board members that provide resources, that is either in the form of 
service or in the form of linkages with other organisations (Lang and Lockhart, 1990: 107). 
It is argued that these linkages reduce both vertical and horizontal external constraints 
through facilitating cooperation with regulatory agencies, customers, suppliers and 
competitors.   
As suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 168) “one would expect that as the 
potential environment pressures confronting the organisation increase, the need for outside 
support would increase as well, leading to a larger proportion of outside directors on the 
board”. In similar lines, Hillman et al. (2000: 242) claim that—based on resource 
dependence theory—as a firm’s organisational environment changes, so does the need for 
linkages with that environment. This can lead to the assumption that the environmental 
pressures will require further resource provision of the board members in the form of 
service or external linkages (Boyd, 1990: 421). Likewise, an organisation facing 
difficulties—from the environment—should keep receiving support from its members and 
maintain the exchange relationships with its external constituencies (Sutton and Callahan, 
1987: 406; Daily and Dalton, 1994: 1606). 
Considering the above, it is suggested that: 
 
PB1: Resource Provision is related to environmental complexity 
 HB1a: Providing Service is positively related to environmental complexity. 
 HB1b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to environmental 
complexity. 
PB2: Resource Provision is related to environmental dynamism 
 HB2a: Providing Service is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
 HB2b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to environmental 
dynamism. 
PB3: Resource Provision is related to environmental munificence. 
 HB3a: Providing Service is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
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 HB3b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to macro-
environmental hostility. 
 HB3c: Providing Service is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 HB3d: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to competitive 
hostility. 
 
It is expected that as board size increases, the ability of the board to provide 
resources would increase too, by adding up each member’s human and social capital. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 168) suggest that board size would depend on the needs of the 
organisation for access to resources and that the greater the needs, the larger the size. 
Therefore, it is expected that a greater number of directors will lead to increased supply of 
resources.  
Moreover, Daily and Dalton (1994: 1606) suggest that—in accordance to the 
resource dependence perspective—many external representatives are needed on a board, as 
they provide access to valued resources and information, facilitate inter-firm commitments 
and help in providing legitimacy. This is critical to the continuation—especially in crisis 
periods—of exchange relationships between a corporation and its critical constituencies, 
which can also find support from the social network theory; the theory tries to understand 
how external ties may affect firm behaviour (Boyd et al., 2011: 1896). 
Additionally, Zahra and Pearce (1990: 166) claim that increased representation of 
non-executives widens the expertise and in turn it improves the level of counseling to the 
CEO. Therefore, it may be argued that boards with increased number of externals can 
provide more resources through networking or direct service provision.  
In similar lines, it can be argued that CEO duality could affect the level of resource 
provision to the board. When the chairperson and the CEO positions are separated, it is 
assumed that directors feel more responsibility and as a result they might provide more 
resources, because the power is not concentrated to the CEO (Zahra and Pearce, 1990: 
167). As stated by Boyd (1995: 305), having a single leader, which is translated as 
concentrated power, allows faster and more unified decisions, which can be positive in 
periods of turbulence. However, this means reduced contribution of resources by the board. 
Moreover, it is expected that directors’ function to provide resources will be 
affected by the frequency of meetings. As Vafeas (1999: 114) claims, the common 
problem that directors face is the lack of time to carry out their duties and that the meeting 
time of directors is an important resource that improves the effectiveness of the board. 
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Logically, it may be proposed, that the more time the members have available for meeting, 
the more resources they will be able to provide. 
Based on all the above, the following proposition and hypotheses are formed: 
 
PB4: Resource Provision is related to various board characteristics. 
 HB4a: Providing Service is positively related to board size. 
 HB4b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to board size. 
 HB4c: Providing Service is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HB4d: Controlling external contingencies lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HB4e: Providing Service is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
 HB4f: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to the ratio of 
independent directors. 
 HB4g: Providing Service is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 HB4h: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to frequency of 
meetings. 
 
Since it is argued above that increased number of independent directors may 
provide more resources to the board, either through direct advice and counsel or by giving 
access to outside resources and information (Daily and Dalton, 1994: 1606; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1990: 166). Therefore, a director having an independent status is expected to 
provide more resources to the board. 
 
 
PB5: Resource Provision is related to respondent’s status in board. 
 HB5a: Providing Service is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
 HB5b: Controlling external contingencies is higher when respondent’s status is 
independent. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that experienced directors can make faster decisions than 
inexperienced directors (Judge and Miller, 1991: 450).  This happens as directors have 
greater knowledge about their industry and organisation, which assists in making decisions 
more quickly. As a result, it can be argued that longer tenure results in higher service 
provision and controlling of external contingencies. 
Following the above arguments, the following hypotheses are developed: 
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 HB5c: Providing Service is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
 HB5d: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to the respondent’s 
tenure in board. 
 
3.3.3 Propositions and Hypotheses on Strategy Role 
 
It is generally argued that organisations with changes in their environment respond 
by initiating strategic changes (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991: 308; Hillman et al., 2000: 
242; Child 1972: 15). Change in regulations or in technology, for example, motivates 
action for strategic change. As discussed in earlier chapters, a role of the board members is 
to involve in the strategic direction of the organisation. Walrave et al. (2011: 1731) argue 
that the second most important entity affecting a company’s strategy is the board. They 
give an example by saying that, particularly in times of decline—i.e. environmental change 
or dynamism—the board is able to affect the level of investments considered necessary by 
the top management team.  
Hillman et al. (2000: 243) suggest that regulation or deregulation of a market could 
be an indicator of an industry’s dynamics and claimed that in deregulated markets there is 
a need for strategic change. This need for change could lead to greater involvement of the 
board into the strategy of the firm. It can be argued that the regulation/deregulation of a 
market is depicted under the munificence dimension of the environment. 
Finally, Judge and Zeithaml (1992: 786) argue that increased environmental 
complexity requires more thought and discussion; as a result the board members become 
more responsive and strategically adaptive. 
Therefore, it is logical to assume that board members will involve more in strategy, 
in periods of environmental change. 
 
PC1: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental complexity 
HC1a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to environmental complexity 
PC2: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental dynamism 
HC2a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to environmental dynamism 
PC3: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental munificence. 
HC3a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
HC3b: Strategic Involvement is positively related to competitive hostility. 
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Goodstein and Boeker (1991) argued that the composition of a board of directors 
could motivate management toward the adoption of specific strategies. Various board 
characteristics are considered important to the extent the board involves in strategy. For 
example, it is assumed that larger boards involve less in the strategy and decision-making, 
an argument deriving from the group dynamics literature. More specifically, Judge and 
Zeithaml (1992: 785) advocate that when boards become very large, effective debate, 
discussion and the level of board involvement in strategy may decrease. In addition, as 
proposed by Cheng (2008: 159) and Zona et al. (2013: 303), as board size increases—to 
more than seven or eight directors according to Jensen (1993: 865)—
communication/coordination becomes more difficult which results in less efficient and 
slower decision-making that can be interpreted as lower strategic involvement. Not only 
the communication becomes harder in large boards, but it is also expected that more 
compromise is needed in order to reach a final decision (Cheng, 2008: 159). 
In addition, Judge and Zeithaml (1992: 785) found that greater proportion of 
independent directors result in greater strategic involvement, in similar lines to the findings 
of Roberts et al. (2005: 21) who found that higher strategic involvement of independent 
directors allows them to also perform their monitoring function more efficiently. 
Additionally, the qualitative study of Long et al. (2005: 669) found that non-executives 
serving on unlisted boards have greater involvement in strategy than on listed boards. 
However, most studies have supported that higher representation of executives in the board 
lead to greater board strategic involvement (Ford, 1988: 54; Zahra and Pearce, 1990: 171; 
Ruigrok et al., 2006: 1207) and strategic change (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991: 326), 
probably due to the better information flows and better knowledge of the company.  
Furthermore, Ruigrok et al. (2006: 1208) proposed and found that CEO duality has 
a negative effect on strategic involvement. They claim that both duality and separation or 
the two roles may be supported, depending on the theoretical approach, but they concluded 
that separation enhances board involvement in strategy. In specific, Ruigrok et al. (2006: 
1208) argue that on one hand, stewardship theory would be in favour of the dual structure, 
since the executives are supposed to act in the best interest of shareholders. As a result, the 
concentrated power into an individual acting—as a steward—in the best interest of the 
owners, would remove ambiguities of processes and responsibilities and any potential 
conflicts between corporate leaders.  
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On the other hand, agency perspective is in favour of separation, as the two roles 
have different responsibilities, which should be kept separated. For example, the 
chairperson is responsible for organising the board meetings, but with duality the CEO 
would have strong influence on the meeting agenda and the information provided to 
directors (Ruigrok et al., 2006: 1208; Golden and Zajac, 2001; 1089). Therefore, according 
to agency theory, a separate leadership structure is preferred, which would allow the board 
to higher involve in strategic decision-making. 
Furthermore, Zahra and Pearce (1990: 171) found that increased frequency of 
meetings enhances the strategic involvement. They argue that the efficiency of the board 
operations influencing its decision making process is improved with more frequent 
meetings. 
Therefore the following relationships are hypothesised:  
 
PC4: Strategic Involvement is related to various board characteristics. 
HC4a: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-U relationship with board size. 
HC4b: Strategic Involvement is lower when there is CEO duality. 
HC4c: Strategic Involvement is negatively related to the ratio of independent 
directors. 
HC4d: Strategic Involvement is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 
 
Furthermore, as also stated earlier, increased independence of directors is possible 
to increase the strategic involvement because directors feel higher responsibility for the 
outcome of their decision making (Zahra and Pearce, 1990: 167).  
Judge and Miller (1991: 456) argue that tenure, in the sense of industry familiarity, 
can lead to higher involvement of a board to the strategic decision process. In addition, the 
increased confidence and experience of older board members might help in strategic 
change of the company. Also, business, organisational, leadership and any other skills 
accumulate over time, which is essential for the strategy of a firm. However, boards with 
higher average tenure, are likely to be more risk averse and stronger committed to the 
existing strategic status quo, which implies higher resistance to change (Golden and Zajac, 
2001: 1090). The above arguments suggest that nonlinearity exists in the relationship 
between strategic involvement and directors’ tenure.  
Thus, from the above the following proposition and hypotheses are developed: 
 70 
 
 
PC5: Strategic Involvement is related to respondent’s status in board. 
HC5a: Strategic Involvement is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
HC5b: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-U relationship with the respondent’s 
tenure in board. 
 
In summary, Figure 3.1 shows the proposed relationships of the study’s theoretical 
framework. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Theoretical Model of the Thesis  
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will go through the research design and methodology of the study. 
Taking into account the nature of this research, which mainly aims to identify causal 
relationships among variables, the research design and methodology of this research is 
predominantly quantitative. Since quantitative study is theory-driven, and thus accounted 
as deductive, reviewing theories, constructs and models is of critical importance.  Also, 
any propositions or/and hypotheses developed, should be based on strong theoretical and 
conceptual foundations. Previous chapters have attempted to cover these requirements, 
with an extensive literature review, analysis of theories and constructs and development of 
hypotheses. But before analysing the research design and methodology followed in this 
study, it is considered important, to discuss some general philosophical and 
methodological issues.  
More specifically, this chapter will start by discussing some important aspects of 
philosophy of science. Then, several research design approaches will be covered and there 
will be an effort to explain the aims of a research design. Thirdly, the design of the survey 
will be explained in detail. Fourthly, the description of the study’s sample and any sample 
issues will follow. Last but not least, the methodology that was used for the study’s data 
analysis will be described.  
4.2 Philosophical Underpinnings to Business Research  
This section discusses some general philosophical issues, important to be taken 
into account before conducting any research project, academic or business-related.   
The section starts by discussing the perspective under which, in different historical 
periods social sciences were approached. As Hughes claims (1990: 2), while trying to 
justify the relation of social sciences with philosophy, a historical connection exists which 
goes back to the days of Plato. It is argued that when Plato tried to speak about society and 
its elements (i.e. collective and individual members), he used a different approach to the 
relatively recent major theorists like Marx and Weber, as between these two distant 
periods, there have been centuries of development and big successes of the natural 
sciences. And the main argument is that the enormous progress of natural sciences, has 
significantly influenced our way of thinking, if not guided social scientists to establish 
their intellectual background. Nevertheless, we should not forget, as Hughes (1990: 35) 
 74 
argues, that although the social sciences used the natural sciences as their yardstick, they 
did so with respect to particular philosophical interpretations of natural science; positivism 
was the major one and will be discussed in the following section. For there was a long 
philosophical debate—of continuing importance—on whether the study of social life could 
be like the study of nature. This is an important idea to consider, but not a question that can 
be addressed in these pages, as this would not serve the aim of the dissertation. Therefore, 
in the following paragraphs, there is a focus on issues closer related to the business 
research. 
Business research, being part of the social sciences, is connected to some 
philosophical issues that need to be considered before conducting a research project in any 
business or management topic. As stated by Popper (1959), in science, either theoretical or 
experimental, the researcher puts forward statements, and tests them step-by-step. More 
specifically, in the field of the empirical sciences, the researcher constructs hypotheses, or 
systems of theories and tests them against experience by observation and experiment. 
Although this seems to be an easily comprehended process, there are several philosophical 
concerns that need to be taken into consideration; the field under which, these issues are 
discussed is called Epistemology or Philosophy of Science (i.e. branch of Philosophy) and 
is closely related to social research, as it is with all forms of research. Epistemology is 
concerned with approach to knowledge acquisition, but also tries to define and explain the 
nature of knowledge and answer questions like what knowledge is. As Hughes (1990: 5) 
argues, “Epistemology is concerned with philosophical claims about the way in which the 
world is known to us or can be known to us and, as such, clearly involves issues about the 
nature of knowledge itself”.  
Although the aim of this thesis is not to examine in depth all the epistemological 
issues related to knowledge and knowledge acquisition, it is considered essential to discuss 
some general aspects that are related to the approach used in this study, which will 
constitute the basis before analysing the research design and methodology used.  
 4.2.1 Issues on Philosophical Approaches 
Social scientists, as all scientists, try to advance knowledge on something; this is 
attempted through research projects. The way that we think about the development of 
knowledge is discussed under the different research philosophies. The two main views that 
dominate the literature and which a researcher can follow are, positivism and 
interpretivism. Before showing the main characteristics of the two views, it is important to 
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say that among all the existing philosophical views, it was positivism that set the lines of 
debate about the nature of the social sciences. As explained by Hughes (1990: 35), this did 
not mean that its doctrines were unanimously agreed, but that it was positivist philosophy 
of social science that had to be argued against. This simply means that all other views were 
developed, using positivism as a starting point. To proceed, the main grounds of the two 
views are depicted in the following table (4.1): 
 
Table 4.1: Comparison of Positivism with Interpretivism  
 Positivism Interpretivism 
Basic Principles 
View of the world External and Objective Socially constructed and 
subjective 
Involvement of 
researcher 
Researcher is independent Researcher is part of what is 
observed and sometimes even 
actively collaborates 
Researcher’s 
influence 
Researcher is value-free Researcher is driven by human 
interests 
Assumptions 
What is observed? Objective, often 
quantitative, facts 
Subjective Interpretations of 
meanings 
How is knowledge 
developed? 
Reducing phenomena to 
simple elements 
representing general laws 
Taking a broad total view of 
phenomena to detect 
explanations beyond the current 
knowledge 
Source: Blumberg et al. (2008: 23) 
One important concept related to the positivist view is that of falsifiability—or 
refutability—firstly popularized by Popper in the 1930’s. The idea that Popper discussed 
(1959; 1963) in simplified terms is that, any theory (or hypothesis) needs to have the 
quality of falsifiability, in order to be scientific. This means that a theory should be 
formulated in a way that by testing it, through observation or experiment, it could be 
rejected or found to be false. This quality makes a theory testable which is a requirement 
for a theory. Popper (1959: 18) claims that a theory can be never empirically verified. 
Because this would mean that we would accept to verify a theory from a singular statement 
(observation or experiment). And there is an example widely used by Popper to explain 
this argument: “no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this 
does not justify that all swans are white” (1959:4). Therefore, it is suggested that since 
there are statements that cannot be verified, another criterion should be used as a criterion 
of demarcation (distinguishing between scientific and non-scientific), i.e. falsifiability. 
More specifically, Popper states:  
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“I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being 
singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its 
logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical 
tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific 
system to be refuted by experience” (1959:18). 
 
  Nevertheless, other philosophers have criticized Popper’s falsification doctrine over 
the years (e.g. Jeffrey, 1975; Hansson, 2006) however, the falsification doctrine has not yet 
been rejected. The criticisms mainly focus on the difficulty to have the needed conditions 
to falsify (i.e. study that is not explorative and provides hypotheses with binary structure). 
The main argument is that more and more explorative studies are conducted, which have 
no specific hypotheses to be rejected (Jeffrey, 1975; Hansson, 2006). To my opinion, 
Popper suggested the falsification doctrine as opposed to verification, to powerfully 
support the idea—to which I am agreeable—that we can never be sure about the absolute 
truth; an idea that was initially developed by the pre-Socratic philosophers. “Our belief in 
any particular natural law cannot have a safer basis than our unsuccessful critical attempts 
to refute it” (Popper, 1963: 75). 
This was a major contribution of Popper to the positivists’ view (who started 
shaping in Vienna during 1920s, when the so called Vienna Circle was developed), to 
whom the main criterion of demarcation until then was that of verification. As stated by 
Hughes (1990:39), the main assumptions of the positivists were the following: 
“The world, whether natural or social, operated according to strict laws and 
therefore possessed a deterministic structure which it was the business of 
science to discover; a structure which could be described formally and 
quantitatively. Methodologically then empirical research, and here one might 
well say scientific research, amounted to discovering those regular and 
invariant properties of the phenomena of the world and the relationships 
between them; the properties being described, as far as possible, in terms of 
what is rigorously observable”. 
 
Based on these premises, it became important for the development of the scientific 
method and research process itself to study and clarify issues like, what is theory, what are 
the constructs of a research phenomenon, the relationships among them and the 
methodology used for observing them.  
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 4.2.2 Theory and Theory Development 
The first of the abovementioned issues, i.e. the question of what constitutes a 
theory, is widely discussed from philosophers, but also researchers over a long period of 
time. Before presenting certain elements of a theory, as stated by different organisational 
researchers, it is considered important to emphasise the idea that science cannot offer the 
absolute truth or certain knowledge, which is essential for the understanding of theories. 
As such, “science is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is it a 
system which steadily advances towards a state of finality. Our science is not knowledge 
(epistēmē): it can never claim to have attained truth, or even substitute for it, such as 
probability” (Popper, 1959: 278). Moreover, relating this statement with the purpose and 
nature of a theory, we would say that science is not a collection of true theories, but instead 
a collection of conjectures that still have to be disproved.  
“Science is a system of guesses or anticipations which in principle cannot be 
justified, but with which we work as long as they stand up to tests and of 
which we are never justified in saying that we know that they are ‘true’ or 
‘more or less certain’ or even probable” (Popper, 1959: 318).  
 
The vital idea of the statement above is that, although we can never be certain about 
the truth, it is essential for science that the theories used (i.e. guesses or anticipations) are 
testable. In order for theories to be testable, qualities of falsifiability and corroborability 
need to be met. The former, already discussed in previous paragraphs, is the quality of a 
theory that by being tested it can be rejected or found to be false. This is important, as 
verification, which is the opposite quality, can never be met. The second important quality 
discussed by Popper (1959) and related to falsifiability is that of corroborability. He argued 
(1959: 206, 268) that the more a theory is testable, the higher its corroborability. But for a 
theory to be more testable, its falsifiability should increase. However, the concept of 
falsifiability is converse to that of logical probability. In other words, the more a theory is 
falsifiable, the less probable it is. This makes us infer that testability of a theory increases, 
whilst logical probability is low (and there are arguments saying that logical probability is 
related to objective probability—probability of events).  
Moreover, theories with higher degree of universality and higher degree of 
precision can be better corroborated (Popper, 1959: 268). It is suggested that the more 
corroborating instances we have the higher the corroborability. This means that the more a 
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phenomenon is being observed and tested, the better it can be corroborated. Nevertheless, 
it is argued that the first instances are of greater importance, as further instances add only 
by very little to the degree of corroboration. Except if these further instances are very 
different to the earlier ones, which is achieved by testing the theory in new fields of 
application. This would broaden the universality of the theory and in turn, its 
corroborability. 
Similarly, theory precision is important, as theories with low precision have a high 
logical probability of being correct due to their inaccuracy. An example posed by Popper 
(1959), is that of prophecies of palmists and soothsayers; their predictions are so cautious 
and imprecise that have a high logical probability of being correct.  
To sum up “what is important about a theory is its explanatory power, and whether it 
stands up to criticism and to tests” (Popper, 1998: 12). In other words, the explanatory 
power can be explained by the level of universality and precision, and standing up to 
criticism and tests, by being testable through falsifiability and corroborability qualities. As 
he further claims, the question of the origin of the theory, “of how it is arrived at—whether 
by an ‘inductive procedure’, as some say, or by an act of intuition—may be extremely 
interesting… but it has little to do with its scientific status or character” (Popper, 1998: 
12). 
Moving the discussion to the study’s area of interest, it should be noted that 
organisational researchers have given a lot emphasis trying to define what constitutes a 
theory (Bacharach, 1989; Osigweh, 1989; Van de Ven, 1989; Whetten, 1989; Sutton and 
Staw, 1995; DiMaggio, 1995). For example, Whetten (1989) has suggested that the 
building blocks of theory must contain four essential elements: 
1. What: Which factors (variables, constructs, concepts) should be considered as part 
of the explanation of the phenomena of interest? 
2. How: How are these identified factors related? (This step typically introduces 
causality) 
3. Why: What are the underlying psychological, economic, or social dynamics that 
justify the selection of factors and the proposed causal relationships? 
4. Who, Where, When: These conditions place limitations on the propositions 
generated from a theoretical model/ set the boundaries of generalizability. 
 
According to Whetten (1989), the first two elements describe the phenomena of 
interest and the third and—to my opinion—most important explains. The last element 
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constitutes the range of the theory. However, Bacharach (1989: 501) argues that for a 
theory to be useful, it needs to explain and predict and he states that explanation 
establishes the substantive meaning of constructs, variables (i.e. describe) and their 
linkages (i.e. explain), while prediction tests that meaning, by comparing it to empirical 
evidence. Hence, both Whetten (1989) and Bacharach (1989) seem to agree that a theory 
should describe and explain and Bacharach adds the concept of prediction through 
empirical evidence. Bacharach has named this quality of usefulness of a theory—through 
description, explanation and prediction—utility. 
  To summarise, there are several characteristics that a theory should meet. First of 
all, a theory should be testable, which also requires being falsifiable. This contributes to 
the corroborability of a theory, which further increases with higher universality and 
precision of the theory. Last but not least, the theory should have increased utility (i.e. 
usefulness), which is determined by the four elements (what, how etc.) prescribed by 
Whetten (1989).  
 4.2.3 Research Paradigms for Theory Building 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) presented a matrix with four different research 
paradigms, in an attempt to organise different approaches to theory building.  Gioia and 
Pitre (1990: 586) however, argue that most studies of organisations fall under the 
functional paradigm as “organisational science has been guided predominantly by the 
assumption that the nature of organisations is a basically objective one that is ‘out there’ 
awaiting impartial exploration and discovery”. Table 4.2 shows a summary of the main 
characteristics of the four paradigms. 
 
Table 4.2: Paradigm Differences Affecting Theory Building  
Interpretivist 
Paradigm 
Radical Humanist 
Paradigm 
Radical 
Structuralist 
Paradigm 
Functionalist 
Paradigm 
Goals  
To DESCRIBE and 
EXPLAIN in order 
to DIAGNOSE and 
UNDERSTAND 
Goals  
To DESCRIBE and 
CRITIQUE in 
order to CHANGE 
(achieve freedom 
through revision of 
consciousness) 
Goals  
To IDENTIFY 
sources of 
domination and 
PERSUADE in 
order to GUIDE 
revolutionary 
practices (achieve 
freedom through 
revision of 
structures) 
Goals  
To SEARCH for 
regularities and 
TEST in order to 
PREDICT and 
CONTROL 
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Theoretical 
Concerns 
SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
OF REALITY 
REIFICATION 
PROCESS 
INTERPRETATION 
Theoretical 
Concerns 
SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
OF REALITY 
DISTORTION 
INTERESTS 
SERVED 
Theoretical 
Concerns 
DOMINATION 
ALIENATION 
MACRO FORCES 
EMANCIPATION 
Theoretical 
Concerns 
RELATIONSHIPS 
CAUSATION 
GENERALIZATION 
Theory-Building 
Approaches 
DISCOVERY 
through CODE 
ANALYSIS 
Theory-Building 
Approaches 
DISCLOSURE 
through 
CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS 
Theory-Building 
Approaches 
LIBERATION 
through 
STRUCTURAL 
ANALYSIS 
Theory-Building 
Approaches 
REFINEMENT 
through CAUSAL 
ANALYSIS 
Source: Gioia and Pitre (1990: 591) 
It can be argued, these four paradigms have derived from the two main 
philosophical approaches discussed earlier in this chapter (i.e. positivism and 
interpretivism), in an effort to show in more details certain differences in theory building.  
The positivism and interpretivism views are mainly contradicted based on the objective-
subjective dimension. The added dimension in this approach, which results in having four 
paradigms, is that of regulation (or stability)-change. This thesis, falls under the 
functionalist paradigm (positivistic approach), as it tries to test a number of relationships 
between constructs and variables and to hopefully provide refinement through causal 
analysis. The thesis uses the most common approach in organisational science, as also 
argued by Gioia and Pitre (1990: 586), that is deductive approach to theory building, by 
developing hypotheses and testing them against hypothesis-driven data via statistical 
analysis.  
But in order to test theories and examine certain phenomena, processes, behaviours 
etc., there is a need of these factors, called concepts or constructs that will describe this 
phenomena or processes etc. Examples of such constructs are human capital, or team 
effectiveness and the following section will discuss the contribution of constructs and 
variables in the development of science. 
 4.2.4 Constructs and Variables 
Previous sections tried to analyse what constitutes a theory and discuss various 
characteristics, qualities and elements of a theory. This section will discuss the components 
of a theory.  Bacharach (1989: 498) has defined theory as “a system of constructs and 
variables in which the constructs are related to each other by propositions and the variables 
are related to each other with hypotheses”. The system as a whole is then bounded by 
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theorist’s assumptions about values, time and space. These assumptions seem to converge 
with Whetten’s (1989) “who, where and when” conditions aforementioned, also in 
agreement with Doty and Glick (1994: 233). Figure 4.1 illustrates the components that 
constitute a theory as presented by Bacharach (1989).  
 
Figure 4.1: Components of a Theory 
 
Source: Bachararach (1989: 499) 
Values are the implicit assumptions based often the theorist’s creative imagination 
and ideological orientation or life experience but because of this, theories cannot be 
compared on the basis of their underlying values. Nonetheless, spatial and temporal 
assumptions are often relatively obvious. While limitations based on space and time apply 
to most theories, some theories have stricter restrictions than others. For example, a theory 
could have strict boundaries in space and no boundaries in time. “These theories are only 
applicable to specific types of organizations, but can be applied over different historical 
periods” (Bacharach, 1849: 500). Moreover, the opposite could happen, that is having time 
boundaries but no restrictions in space. Similarly, this would mean that the theory would 
apply to many types of organisations, but only in a specific period of time. From the above, 
it would be logical to say that the fewer boundaries are set to a theory, the more it can be 
generalised. And according to Bacharach (1989: 500) with fewer boundaries (or less 
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details) a theory would also become more abstract.  This argument can also be related to 
the characteristics of universality and precision, which in turn contribute to the important 
quality of corroborability (discussed in section 4.2.2). But to my opinion, the terms of 
universality and precision are more carefully selected to describe certain qualities of a 
theory. It could be said that generalizability has the meaning of universality and in that 
sense less boundaries lead to higher generalizability and higher universality. But setting 
few boundaries does not necessarily result to an abstract theory, as Bacharach claims. 
Popper (1959) suggests that a theory should be universal (i.e. few boundaries of space and 
time), but it is also important to be precise. Thus, to make the parallel, a generalizable 
theory does not have to be abstract; it can be universal (few boundaries) and precise (clear 
boundaries).  
Furthermore, the main components of the theory lie within the boundaries of 
values, time and space. As stated by Bacharach (1989: 500), “on a more abstract level, 
propositions state the relations among constructs, and on the more concrete level, 
hypotheses (derived from the propositions) specify the relations among variables”.  
According to Kaplan (1964: 55) constructs are “terms which, though not observational 
either directly or indirectly, may be applied or even defined on the basis of the 
observables". In different words, constructs are general and broad terms represented by 
their ‘observables’, which are the variables. Hence, a variable is an observable entity, 
which is capable of taking more than one values; this would be the opposite of a constant. 
As inference, “a construct may be viewed as a broad mental configuration of a given 
phenomenon, while a variable may be viewed as an operational configuration derived from 
a construct” (Bacharach, 1989: 500). The propositions are the statements linking two or 
more constructs and hypotheses are the statements linking two or more variables that have 
derived from constructs.  
As Lazarsfelf (1955) stated, variables are an objective and quantitative way of 
describing constructs. The operationalization is a process of finding these objective and 
quantitative observables, or measurements, which will capture the specific phenomena 
through constructs and variables. This process needs to address the problems of reliability 
and validity, so that the measurements are reliable and valid. All issues of reliability and 
validity are presented in Table 4.3, as depicted by Venkatraman and Grant (1986: 79).  
At this point it is important to note that differences can be found in the terms and 
classifications of the components used to test construct validity. One example is that of 
reliability; although it has been treated as a distinct issue by many authors (Avenier and 
 83 
Cajaiba, 2012; Carlson and Herdman, 2012; Hair et al., 2006), there are some authors 
considering it as part of the validity component (Venkatraman and Grant, 1986; Bagozzi et 
al., 1991; Tracey and Tews, 2005). Another example is related to the use of the terms 
internal consistency and reliability. Hair et al. (2006) and Tracey and Tews (2005) refer to 
internal consistency as being the measure of reliability, while Venkatraman and Grant 
(1986) refer to reliability as one element of internal consistency (i.e. the other being 
unidimensionality). It is assumed that there are no significant conceptual and practical 
differences among the different researchers, however for the purpose of this thesis, the 
classification from Venkatraman and Grant (1986) is adopted. 
Content validity, also known as face validity, concerns with the extent to which the 
items reflect a specific domain of the construct. Content is usually attempted through the 
use of academics or/and executives—typically experts in the relevant field—who check 
and revise the measurement items. Content validity for this study was dealt during the 
design process and the pretesting stage of the instrument helped in verification. 
Specifically, in designing the instrument, the variables used were adopted from prior 
academic studies, as already tested constructs should have increased validity. In addition, 
to verify validity the questionnaire instrument was sent to scholars, considered as experts 
in the area of corporate governance, and their feedback with suggestions and comments 
was taken into account. 
The following component according to Venkatraman and Grant (1986), is that of 
internal consistency, which includes two parts, the unidimensionality and reliability. The 
former is related to the extent that the items to be used reflect one specific construct. 
Unidemensionality check for this study is being addressed through exploratory factor 
analysis (Hair et al., 2006: 137), in that each factor should consist of items loading on a 
single factor. 
Reliability of a study means that the reader is given the means to follow the entire 
cognitive path from the research database through to the results, so that s/he can reproduce 
this path if wished (Avenier and Cajaiba, 2012: 2). It refers to the consistency of responses 
to the questions of the instrument. In other words, it means that for a specific measure to be 
reliable, the researcher would attain the same results in different points in time. Having 
said this, a method to check reliability would be to create parallel measurements. One way 
to achieve this would be to repeat the measurement at a different time period using the 
same instrument on the same respondents and check the correlation of the two (Blunch, 
2008: 31).  This method—called test-retest—has the problem that the respondents might 
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remember the initial responses, which could lead to a bias. To avoid this, one could 
develop different instruments of the same difficulty and pass them to the same respondents 
-alternative form method. Again, there are obvious practical limitations to this method (i.e. 
different time intervals needed and difficulty in having totally parallel instruments); 
therefore one more method is suggested that is called split-halves method. With this 
method, the researcher may randomly split the latent variable into two equally sized parts 
and find the correlation of the two parts (same idea with alternative form method, but 
without need of time intervals).  
The problem is that with this last method, the set of data can be split into two, in 
many different ways and the result would depend on this split. However, Cronbach (1951) 
found a way to overcome this problem by measuring the correlation of all possible splits 
and taking their average as one reliability measure. This is the coefficient (Cronbach’s) 
alpha, which the most common diagnostic measure to assess reliability and also used for 
this study. For the purpose of this study, the minimum accepted score for the coefficient 
alpha was decided to be 0.6 (Hair et al., 2006: 137), although most factors were found to 
have scores higher than 0.7, which is in agreement to the limit accepted by other scholars 
(Cruz et al., 2010: 77; Klijn et al., 2013: 1254). However, in one case only, a score lower 
than 0.6 was found and after careful consideration and support from the literature, it was 
decided to accept it.  
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Table 4.3: A Summary of Key Components of Construct Validity  
 
Source: Venkatraman and Grant (1986: 79) 
 
Convergent validity refers to the degree to which multiple attempts to measure the 
same concept with different methods, are in agreement (Carlson and Herdman, 2012; 
Venkatraman and Grant, 1986; Peter and Churchill, 1986). This means that having 
different instruments (e.g. two different questionnaires) to measure the same concept 
should get high correlated results as an evidence of convergent validity. The method used 
in the thesis to test convergent validity is that of correlation of each item with the 
summated scale/factor, following the approach from Cruz et al. (2010: 78).  
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Discriminant validity is the extent to which a concept or variable differs from other 
concepts or variables and is again tested with correlation of one concept to another 
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Venkatraman and Grant, 1986, Peter and Churchill, 1986). 
Finally, nomological validity is the degree to which predictions from a theoretical 
network are confirmed (Venkatraman and Grant, 1986, Hair et al., 2006). 
4.3 Research Design  
The section that follows covers issues related to research design such as the various 
approaches, the sources of data and the scale options available in designing a research 
project. 
4.3.1 Approaches to Research Design  
The research design according to Kerlinger (1986) is the plan and structure of 
investigation considered, as to obtain answers to research questions. The plan is the overall 
scheme or program of the research, including an outline of what the researcher will do, 
from developing hypotheses to analysing the data. The structure is the framework or 
configuration of the relations among the variables of the study. There are two main criteria 
to describe the different research design approaches. The one is related to the purpose of 
the study (i.e. its aims and objectives) and the other differentiates according to the time 
frame employed in the research. 
4.3.1.1 Research Design Approach based on Aims and Objectives  
Research design might vary based on the purpose of the study. There are four 
proposed approaches in social research, depending on the aims and objectives of a study; 
these are explorative, descriptive, explanatory and predictive (Blumberg et al., 2008).  
The explorative approach is used when the researcher does not have a clear idea or 
‘knowledge’ of the issues to be examined in the study. The research design in this case is 
often approached by collecting observations prior to building a theory. The researchers 
might use this approach to identify variables and generate hypotheses that will contribute 
in building a theory. This is more of an inductive approach, used when trying to gain an 
understanding of the phenomena surrounding the research problem. 
On the other hand, the descriptive and explanatory approaches are used when the 
researcher has a good understanding and a well-structured idea of the phenomena to be 
observed.  The difference between these two approaches lies in the objectives of the study.  
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When the research is concerned with finding out what, how, who, where and when, the 
study is descriptive. When it is concerned with understanding why (i.e. trying to find the 
reasons and the factors for proposed causal relationships), the study is explanatory or 
causal.  In simpler words, when a study concerns with explaining instead of just describing 
phenomena, there is a focus on explaining cause-effect relationships between variables. 
The theme of causality is widely discussed in the literature but since it is not the purpose of 
this section to analyse it in detail, it is important to state that two variables are considered 
to have a cause-effect relationship when the cause precedes the effect (i.e. cause begins 
before its effect), the two variables are statistically correlated and finally there is no third 
variable to show the observed correlation as spurious (Babbie, 2004). However, the second 
condition, i.e. the cause to precede the effect, fails to be met in many cases of cross-
sectional surveys, where there is no time ordering to the variables (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 
55). Most of the times, the researcher needs to “draw on common sense or theoretical ideas 
to infer the likely temporal precedence of variables” (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 169). 
Conclusively, the last approach based on the given purpose of a study, is called 
predictive. Under this approach, the researcher tries to make predictions/forecasts, which is 
trying to predict the outcome for a specific variable based on changes of the phenomena 
that are observed. 
All research approaches discussed above aim to achieve different purposes in a 
research study. However, it is not uncommon that a research study combines more than 
one approach and in many cases all approaches are present. In the current thesis, after 
taking into account the objectives as well as the theoretical model of the study, it was 
decided to adopt the descriptive and explanatory approaches, by describing the phenomena 
examined and trying to establish/explain relationships of constructs by testing specific 
propositions.  
4.3.1.2 Research Design Approach based on Time Frame Employed 
A common separation of studies is based on the time frame under which the study 
and its data collection taking place. The two different approaches are the cross-sectional 
and the longitudinal, where in the first the researcher explores the sample in one point in 
time, whereas in the second approach the observations repeat periodically. Although the 
assessment of change over time is fundamental to many phenomena investigated in 
organizational research (Chan, 1998: 421), for the purpose of this study and with the given 
time constraints, the cross-sectional approach was chosen and used.  
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 4.3.2 Primary Vs. Secondary Sources of Data  
The sources of data are divided into primary and secondary. Primary refer to data 
that is collected directly from the researcher to serve the purpose of the research study in 
process. On the other hand, secondary data is “data collected by primary researchers under 
a specific conceptual scheme can be reanalyzed under a vastly different scheme and may 
lead to new insights” (Kaase, 1991: 3253). Collecting secondary data has the significant 
advantage of saving time and money, however a main problem is that the data might not 
have high compatibility with the study in question. In other words, although the data might 
be easily generated, it might be the case that it does not meet the study’s objectives and 
might be inaccurate. In addition there is no real control over the quality of data. Saunders 
et al. (2009) suggests various types of secondary data such as government publications, 
organisations’ records, journals, newspapers, censuses (e.g. of population or employment), 
longitudinal surveys (e.g. government: family spending, or organisation: employee 
attitudes) and ad hoc surveys (e.g. governmental, organisational or academic). On the other 
hand, methods of primary data collection encompass experiments, case studies, surveys 
(e.g. questionnaires, interviews) and focus groups. 
After careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
different collection methods and by taking into account the characteristics of this study, its 
objectives and its hypotheses, a cross sectional approach with primary data through the use 
of online survey technique has been adopted (i.e. Survey Monkey). 
 4.3.3 Objective Vs. Subjective Measures of Data 
An important matter and decision in data collection is whether the measures of 
certain constructs and consequently variables will be objective or subjective. Objective 
measures are based on existing data that are considered to capture certain constructs. 
Subjective measures are based on perceptions of respondents over a specific phenomenon 
or construct. Therefore, subjective data are usually collected through questionnaires or 
interviews, but objective data are usually collected from statements, annual reports or any 
existing documents. Needless to say, that not all constructs can be measured objectively. 
Common examples of constructs, which are measured with both approaches in 
organisational studies, are organisational performance (e.g. Dess and Robinson, 1984; 
Verbeeten and Boons, 2009) and organisational environment (e.g. Downey and Slocum, 
1975; Dess and Beard, 1984; Boyd et al. 1993). Researchers have tried to examine any 
relationship between the two approaches, but with uncertain results. There is no strong 
 89 
evidence that any of the two approaches is more appropriate, however Verbeeten and 
Boons (2009) and Dess and Beard (1984) suggest that using a combination of objective 
and subjective measures, could be a strength for a study.  
In the current study, due to the nature of the constructs, the measurements used are 
subjective, as data is collected through questionnaires, capturing respondents’ perceptions. 
 4.3.4 Scales of Measure 
Designing the measurements and their scales is of high importance, as the 
reliability and validity of a study, discussed earlier in this chapter (see 4.2.4), largely 
depends on this process. The scales determine the extent of measurement precision and the 
literature identifies four levels of measurements firstly proposed by Stevens (1946), i.e. 
nominal (or categorical), ordinal, interval and ratio, with nominal being at the lowest level 
and ratio being at the highest.  
A nominal scale assigns numbers in order to label or identify subjects or objects. 
These numbers have no quantitative meaning except from indicating the presence or 
absence of the attribute or characteristic being investigated (Hair et al., 2006). Common 
variables measured with a nominal scale are many demographic characteristics like gender 
(i.e. male, female), religion (i.e. Christian, Muslim, Hindu, etc.) and ethnic group (White, 
Black, Asian etc.). 
An ordinal scale, widely used for subjective measurements in social science, 
provide no measure of the actual amount in absolute terms, but only the order of values. 
For instance, the ordinal scales 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 1, 3, 9, 27, 81 are equivalent (Gob et al., 
2007: 603). A researcher knows the order but not the amount of differences between the 
values (Hair et al., 2006). The most widely used ordinal scale, was developed by Rensis 
Likert (1932), who suggested a technique where the respondent could choose from a 
variation of ranking choices/points (e.g. from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Initially, 
the scale was five-point, but since then, seven-point is also widely used.  
At this point it is important to state that there is much debate on whether Likert 
scale should be treated as ordinal or not. As Gob et al. (2007: 602) argue, “there is no 
common standard accepted by the scientific community for the correct interpretation and 
analysis of such data... in methodological considerations it is generally acknowledged that 
attitude measuring scales should be considered as ordinal. Nevertheless, many studies use 
cardinal statistics as sample means, variances and t-tests to analyze attitude data”.  Another 
question being discussed in the literature is whether five or seven-point scale (or less, or 
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more) should be used and there are findings supporting all sides. Churchill and Peter 
(1984: 366) argued that the more rating points used the better the reliability and validity. 
Also, Cicchetti et al. (1985: 35), who examined number of scale points being from 2 to 
100, concluded that reliability increases from 2 to 7 points but there is no significant 
increase by using above 7 scale points. On the other hand, Lehmann and Hulbert (1972) 
and Boote (1981) were more reluctant in increasing the number of rating points. 
Furthermore, Lissitz and Green (1975), Dawes (2008) and Wakita et al. (2012), did not 
offer clear conclusions of a preferable format. Dillman et al. (2009: 137) follow a slightly 
different approach to the question. They state that enough categories should be given to 
respondents, to be able to place themselves in the scale, but not so many that the categories 
begin to lose their meaning or become ambiguous. And they agree with most 
abovementioned authors, that five or seven points can fulfill these conditions. However, 
they differentiate by adding the criterion of whether scales are bipolar or unipolar. For 
bipolar, which measure both direction (e.g. agree or disagree) and degree (e.g. strongly, 
slightly), the ideal number of categories seem to be five or seven, giving to each side of the 
middle point, two or three levels of differentiation. For unipolar scales, measuring only 
gradation (e.g. extremely, very, some, not at all), it is argued that the ideal categories 
would be four or five. 
Finally, despite the varied views on the ideal number of rating points, it seems that 
most scholars tend to agree that odd number of response categories is preferred, as they 
allow the middle value to be interpreted as the neutral point. Nevertheless, Wong et al. 
(2011), found in their study that there are no systematic differences of odd number 
response format with the even number response format. 
After taking into account all arguments above, as well as the studies that helped in 
designing the study’s measurements, it was decided to use seven points across all Likert 
scale questions of the study’s survey. 
The next levels of measurement, after ordinal scale, are respectively the interval 
and the ratio scales. These two levels provide the highest level of precision, allowing 
almost any mathematical operation to be performed (Hair et al., 2006). The only difference 
between interval and ratio scales is that interval scales use an arbitrary zero point (0 
Celsius degrees), whereas ratio scales include an absolute zero point (0 British pounds). 
In this study, mainly ordinal scale questions will be used to capture the main 
constructs of the study, but the other levels of measurement will also be used in various 
questions.  
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4.4 Survey Design 
The following sections discuss a number of issues related to the process of 
designing and sending the survey. In specific, the issues that are covered include pre-
notification emails, personalisation, the content of invitation emails, the length and 
structure of the questionnaire and types of questions used. 
 4.4.1 Email Invitation(s) to the Survey 
The survey for this study was conducted online and the invitation was sent through 
email. Therefore, the following paragraphs discuss pre-notification, personalisation, and 
the content of email invitations. 
4.4.1.1 Pre-notification 
Pre-notification is assumed to be effective in improving response rates (Anseel et 
al., 2010; Yammarino et al., 1991; Bosnjak et al., 2008) and as such, a pre-notification 
email was sent to all individuals of the sample to inform them a week in advance that they 
would receive a survey to complete.  The email informed the recipients that an email with 
a web link of the survey would be sent to them in a week’s time and that their voluntary 
participation would be highly appreciated.  
However, it is noteworthy that in a meta-analysis from Cook et al. (2000), there is 
no strong support on the effect of the pre-notification on response rates, as there were 
differences between findings of different non-electronic surveys. 
4.4.1.2 Personalisation 
It is generally argued that no matter what is the survey method, mail or web, 
personalising the contacts is important, as it may establish a connection between the 
surveyor and the respondent and also makes the respondent feel more important for the 
survey, as s/he is drawn out of the sample (Dillman et al., 2009: 272; Heerwegh, 2005). 
Older research showed evidence of a positive effect of personalisation to the response rate 
of mail surveys (e.g. Andreasen 1970; Eisinger et al. 1974), whereas recent findings show 
that the same applies for the webs surveys (Cook et al., 2000; Heerwegh et al., 2005; 
Joinson et al., 2007). However, there are also few studies that found no effect of 
personalisation on response rates (Fan and Yan, 2010; Porter and Whitcomb, 2003). 
Considering all above, all emails sent to the sample (from pre-notification email to 
the last wave) included a personalised salutation (i.e. ‘Dear Mr. Brown’). In a few cases, 
when existing and known, the title of the contact was used, such as Dr. or Lord (UK 
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Parliament, 2013). The personal salutation was achieved with the help of the ‘Mail Merge 
Manager’ of MS Word software.  
4.4.1.3 Content of the Email(s) 
The email invitation sent to the recipients has one main aim that is to convince 
them to participate in the survey. A few motivation tools that could possibly increase the 
recipients’ response rate are discussed in the literature, such as financial rewards or 
emphasis on the benefit of science and consequently the researcher and respondent from 
the survey.  
There are different reasons for not offering a financial reward to the recipients of 
the survey. Firstly, due to financial constraints, it wasn’t feasible to offer money to the 
sample, also taking into account the relatively large size of it. In addition, the nature of the 
sample’s profiles made the use of financial incentives unattractive. As Dillman et al. 
(2009: 36) state, although sending a token of financial incentive to individuals might 
improve response, in the case of business respondents the effect might be the opposite. 
They might find an ethical problem or they might think that in order to accept the money 
they would have to complete extra paperwork.  
On the other hand, an encouragement for participation, based on the premise that 
their contribution would be critical to the progress of the study, was used in the invitation. 
This was combined with a statement, explaining to the respondents that they are part of a 
selected group/sample, which highlights the scarcity and this in turn can increase response 
rates (Porter and Whitcomb, 2003).  
The purpose of the study was briefly but clearly stated in the emails and emphasis 
was put on the fact that this study is conducted for academic purposes. The emails included 
digital signatures of the researchers, they were sent through the University’s email address 
and the subject line was carefully written trying to reduce the undelivered emails due to 
spam filters (Manfreda et al., 2008; Couper, 2000; Porter and Whitcomb, 2003). 
Furthermore, the recipients were ensured for preserved anonymity, which can result in 
higher response rate (Anseel et al., 2010) and they were also informed that completion was 
voluntary.  
Finally, the recipients of the invitation were also told that if they wanted they 
would receive the summary report with the main findings of the study, which is found to 
also affect positively the response rate (Powers and Alderman, 1982). 
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 4.4.2 Measuring Instrument 
The design and development of the questionnaire was a process that took about five 
months to be completed. More than twenty versions were produced before finalising, with 
necessary additions, changes and improvements constantly changing the content and shape 
of the draft. The following sections, provide a description of some ‘technical’ aspects of 
the questionnaire, such as its length, its overall structure and the types of questions used. 
4.4.2.1 Length and Structure of the Questionnaire 
The length of the questionnaire is also a matter of discussion in the literature. An 
effect of the length on the response rate has been found both in mail and web surveys 
(Yammarino et al., 1991; Cook et al., 2000, Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978) although 
the strength of effect vary in these studies. However, Galesic and Bosnjak (2009) claim 
that we know much less about the same effect in web surveys. In addition, they add 
another important factor to the discussion of questionnaire length, which is the actual time 
length and the announced length by the sender to the recipient. They state that when the 
announced length time (in a survey lasting approximately 20 minutes) is longer than the 
actual time, there is higher non-response rate. But when the announced length is shorter, 
the break-off rate is higher. 
  The current study’s length in time was about 20 minutes and taking into 
consideration the above arguments, the same was announced to the recipients at all email 
invitations sent to them. In terms of pages, the questionnaire consisted of nine pages, 
which is in agreement with the recommendation made by Dillman (1978) that is not to 
exceed twelve pages in mail questionnaires. 
The questionnaire consisted of five sections (A to E), each section examining a 
different construct or group of variables. The questionnaire contains 27 questions in total, 
captured with 87 items.   
4.4.2.2 Types of Questions 
Both closed-ended and open-ended questions are found to have advantages and 
disadvantages. On one hand, it is argued that closed-ended questions limit spontaneity of 
the respondents and also bias can result from suggesting responses to individuals 
(Schuman and Presser, 1979: 692; Dillman et al., 2009: 72; Vinten, 1995: 27). On the 
other hand, according to Vinten (1995) and Dillman et al. (2009), closed-ended questions 
are easier to handle, cost less and sometimes eliminate coding time. In addition, Schuman 
and Presser (1979) failed to provide strong support for superiority of open-ended 
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questions, although they believe that total elimination of open-ended question would be a 
mistake. 
Most of the questions in the questionnaire are closed-ended, meaning that they 
“provide respondents with a list of answer choices from which they must choose to answer 
the question” (Dillman et al., 2009: 72). The closed-ended questions were used in order to 
facilitate quantitative analysis. Specifically, seven-point Likert scale questions were used 
consistently in the first two sections of the questionnaire.  
Furthermore, the option “Not-Applicable” was also added to both sections with Likert 
scale questions, to avoid having respondents selecting any false response when the 
question does not apply or is not well understood to them. As Dillman et al. (2009: 210) 
claim, options such as ‘not applicable’, ‘don’t know’, ‘prefer not to answer’, allow 
respondents “to move on with the survey, without having to provide an inaccurate answer 
or quit the survey out of frustration”. 
The rest of the sections included closed-ended questions, in the format of yes/no, 
multiple choice or numerical (ratio scale). The questionnaire however ends with an 
optional question to fill in the respondent’s company name and an open-ended question 
where the respondents could provide any comments or share any other information related 
to the study. This last question was added, to benefit from getting some spontaneous and 
detailed overall feedback. The following sections present the measurements that were 
decided to be used for in the study.  
4.4.2.3 Measurements Used in this Study on Board Roles 
 
Previous chapter discussed the measurements of the board roles, as they have been 
found in the literature. For the purpose of this study, a mix of items from various studies 
was used to measure the roles of board members. This action was decided, as it was 
thought that no study has managed to include all measures needed to capture the roles of 
the board. One reason is that there are studies that only focus on one of the roles; for 
example, McDonald and Westphal (2010) and McDonald et al. (2008) have studied 
monitoring role only, while Judge and Zeithaml (1992) have named and studied the role of 
the board as strategy involvement.  
Another reason is that although scholars have attempted to have a holistic view of 
the roles (i.e. monitoring and service), they have used different approaches and as a result 
the items used among studies may differ in context. For example, Westphal (1999) and 
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Carpenter and Westphal (2001) use three items to capture the monitoring function, by 
mainly focusing on monitoring strategic decisions and the performance of these decisions. 
However, Van Den Heuvel et al. (2010) explain the role by focusing more on determining 
compensation and involving with succession planning of the management.   
Therefore, after careful consideration and thorough analysis of all items found in 
the various articles from the literature, a list of 36 items was created in order to capture the 
board roles, that were measured in a 7-point Likert scale (i.e. little extent to great extent). 
The decision was driven by the objective to include all possible aspects of roles, but at the 
same time avoiding use of duplicate questions. Some of the researchers have used slightly 
different expressions to capture almost identical roles. The items that were selected can be 
seen in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Measures used in Current Thesis to Capture Board Roles  
Item/ Measure Authors 
act as ambassador for the firm Stiles 2001; Wan and Ong, 2005 
build organisational reputation 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 
2008; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
ratify strategic proposals  
Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Wan and Ong, 
2005; McDonald and Westphal, 2010 
call for revisions of strategic proposals  
Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; McDonald and 
Westphal, 2010 
constructively criticise/ask probing questions  
Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; McDonald et al., 
2008; McDonald and Westphal, 2010  
defer to [the CEO’s] judgment on final 
strategic decisions 
Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001; McDonald et al., 2008 
involve in determining salary/ compensation 
of top management 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al. 
2008; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
involve in determining salary/ compensation 
of CEO 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al. 
2008; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
engage in succession planning for CEO 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Wan and Ong, 
2005; Hillman et al., 2008 
engage in succession planning for top 
managers besides CEO 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Wan and Ong, 
2005 
evaluate the CEO's performance 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Stephens et al., 2004; Wan 
and Ong, 2005; Hillman et al., 2008; 
McDonald et al., 2008; Van Den Heuvel et 
al., 2010; 
evaluate the top management's performance 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Stephens et al., 2004; Wan 
and Ong, 2005; Hillman et al., 2008; 
McDonald et al., 2008; Van Den Heuvel et 
al., 2010; 
facilitate access to resources such as capital Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Stephens et al., 
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2004; Hillman et al., 2008; Van Den Heuvel 
et al., 2010 
involve in hiring new executives Stiles, 2001; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010  
involve in hiring CEOs Stiles, 2001; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
involve in firing executives Stiles, 2001; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
involve in firing CEOs Stiles, 2001; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
aid in the formulation of strategy or other 
important firm decisions 
Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001; Wan and Ong, 2005  
link the firm to important stakeholders or 
other important entities 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Stephens et al., 
2004; Hillman et al., 2008 
build external relations 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Stephens et al., 
2004; Wan and Ong, 2005; Hillman et al., 
2008; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
maintain relations with stakeholders 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Stephens et al., 
2004; Wan and Ong, 2005; Hillman et al., 
2008; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
monitor CEO in decision-making 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al, 
2008; McDonald et al., 2008; McDonald and 
Westphal, 2010 
monitor Strategy Implementation 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al, 
2008; McDonald and Westphal, 2010 
monitor top management in decision-making 
Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal, 1999; 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman et 
al, 2008; Wan and Ong, 2005; McDonald 
and Westphal, 2010 
act as a "sounding board" on strategic issues 
Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001 
provide advice and counsel to top managers 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Wan and Ong, 2005; Hillman 
et al., 2008; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
provide expertise to the board 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al. 
2008 
provide legitimacy to the firm 
Stiles, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman et al., 2008 
bolster the image of the firm 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 
2008; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2010 
seek information from the CEO or another 
inside director regarding the progress of 
strategic decisions 
Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Wan and Ong, 
2005; McDonald et al., 2008; McDonald and 
Westphal, 2010 
seek information from the CEO or another 
inside director in order to evaluate the 
performance of top management 
McDonald et al., 2008; McDonald and 
Westphal, 2010 
contribute in diffusion of organisational 
innovation 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al. 
2008 
involve in the development of the corporate 
vision 
Stiles, 2001 
involve in mission articulation Wan and Ong, 2005 
review social responsibilities of the firm Stiles, 2001 
take into account interests of shareholders Stiles, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
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Hillman et al., 2008 
 
4.4.2.4 Measurements Used in this Study on External Environment 
 
External Environment was measured with 11 items, as resulted from the review of 
the literature on certain existing items. Specifically, the measurement of the external 
environment dimensions is presented in Table 4.5 below: 
 
Table 4.5: Measures used in Current Thesis to Capture External Environment 
Variables  
The business unit must change its marketing practices to keep 
up with the market and competitors… (1) extremely rarely (7) 
extremely frequently 
Dynamism 
Miller and Droge (1986: 557) 
 
The rate at which products/ services are becoming obsolete in 
the industry is… (1) extremely slow (7) extremely fast 
 
Actions of competitors are… (1) extremely predictable (7) 
extremely unpredictable 
 
Demand and consumer tastes are… (1) fairly easy to forecast 
(7) almost unpredictable 
 
The production/service technology…(1) Is not subject to very 
much change and is well established (7) Changes often and in 
major way 
The extent that the firm experiences variations in its principal 
industry in… (1) About the same for all products (7) Varied a 
great deal from one product/service to another 
Complexity 
Miller (1988: 308) 
Customers’ buying habits 
The nature of the competition 
Required methods of production service 
The extent that the firm in its principal industry faces intense 
competition in terms of… (1) Much less competition than other 
firms (7) Much greater competition than other firms 
Munificence 
Miller and Friesen 
(1983:233) 
Price competition 
Product competition 
Technological competition 
Distribution competition 
Shortages of labour 
Shortages of raw material 
Unfavourable demographic Trends 
Severe Regulatory Restrictions 
 
4.4.2.5 Measurements Used in this Study on Board Characteristics 
 
Board characteristics were measured with several variables described below. 
Board size was measured as the number of board members serving in the board and is 
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measured at the ratio level (Bliss, 2011: 369; Ahmed et al., 2006: 422; Zona et al., 2013: 
306). In addition, four further questions asked respondents about the number of directors 
being executive, non-executive, affiliated non-executive and independent non-executive 
trying to capture the board dependence. Consequently, the ratio of independent directors 
was measured by dividing the number of independent directors with the number of total 
directors (Bliss, 2011: 369; Ahmed et al., 2006: 422; Andres et al. 2005: 201; Zona et al., 
2013: 306).  
CEO duality is a dichotomous nominal variable (i.e. 1=yes, 2=no) measured by 
asking respondents if the board’s CEO also serves as a Chairperson (Boyd, 1995: 306; 
Bliss, 2011: 369; Kim et al., 2009: 1175).  Moreover, a set of questions asked respondents 
about the establishment of certain board committees (i.e. nomination, remuneration, audit, 
succession, risk management, governance and other committee). Finally, frequency of 
meetings was measured at an ordinal scale with 5 options (i.e. 1=every fortnight, 2=every 
month, 3=every 3 months, 4=twice per year, 5=yearly) adopting Vafeas (1999) and 
Koufopoulos et al. (2009). This variable was reversed so that it really corresponds to the 
variable’s name (i.e. the higher the value, the higher the frequency of meetings). 
4.4.2.6 Measurements Used in this Study on Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The directors’ (respondents) characteristics were captured using various questions. 
Status in Board was measured at an ordinal level with 3 given options (i.e. 1=executive, 
2=non-executive/affiliated, 3=non-executive/independent). In addition, the directors were 
asked with dichotomous (i.e. yes/no) questions to respond whether they are CEO, 
Chairperson or hold committee membership (nomination, remuneration, audit, 
succession, risk management, governance, other). Tenure was measured with two 
questions at a ratio level, asking respondents how many years they work in the company 
and how many years they serve in the company’s board, following Epstein (2013) and 
Williams et al. (2005) who however measured average tenure of top management team. 
Finally, the number of board directorships was measured at a ratio level scale, asking 
respondents to state the number of directorships (including focal company’s) they hold 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003: 196; Zona et al., 2013: 306). 
4.4.2.7 Measurements Used in this Study on Company’s Characteristics 
 
Some of the company’s’ characteristics were also measured to have a view of 
several characteristics. Company size was measured with the absolute number of 
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employees (Koufopoulos et al., 2010). Also, asking respondents to choose the sector in 
which their organisation operates captured industry sector (Industry Classification 
Benchmark, 2010). Moreover organisational age was measured by capturing the actual 
year of company’s establishment (Zona et al., 2013: 306). Finally, listing of participants’ 
organisations included questions that asked participants whether their company is listed in 
a stock exchange (Zona et al., 2013: 306) and if the answer was positive, the specific 
market was also captured. 
 
4.5 Sampling Issues 
This section discusses all issues related to sampling methods used for the study and 
explains sample selection, sample size, key informants, reminders and response rates as 
well as pre-testing procedure and the issue of non-response bias. 
 4.5.1 Population and Sample Selection 
 
Trying to define the population of the study in a specific country, it would be ideal 
to manage and get responses from all board members of all businesses in the UK, but for 
obvious reasons this is nearly impossible. Thus, the initial plan for the thesis was to study 
the boards of top UK listed companies, which were considered to be an appropriate sample 
for a study on corporate governance issues. The reason for this is that it was expected that 
their directors would have the desired knowledge to respond on the various issues of the 
study. Therefore, it was decided that the sample to be used would be all the board members 
of FTSE 350 companies. This plan was soon abandoned, as although the 350 firms could 
be easily identified, the email addresses of their board members were not available.  
4.5.1.1 Sample Size Obtained with Email Contacts 
 
By exhausting all available options, access to email addresses of board members 
was acquired through OneSource Company. The study was conducted by sending the 
survey to different batches, as the low response rate (because of the nature of the sample) 
lead me to acquire a second batch of contacts. 
Initially, the company provided a database of 2,313 contacts from 326 companies 
that had turnover of over GBP 1.5 billions. Trying to justify the sampling method used, it 
 100 
can be argued that the study follows the non-random quota sampling. This results from the 
fact that a quota was used in selecting companies from the UK—over GBP 1.5 billion 
turnover—and in turn only available email contacts were used, which makes the sampling 
non-random. 
After careful examination, I found that only 1,464 were complete and appropriate, 
as many contacts were not from board members and some contacts did not have the email 
address available. As a result, 1,464 emails formed the 1st batch of the study. However, as 
it was expected when the first email was sent to these contacts, 586 emails returned and 
were marked as undelivered. This resulted to a sample size of 878 contacts from this batch 
that received the survey invitation. This means that only 60% of the initial contacts 
acquired could reach a respondent. 
As this number of contacts was not considered as sufficient and the expected 
response rate was already low due to the nature of the key informants (board members), 
another batch of contacts was obtained from OneSource Company, this time by 
significantly lowering the turnover criterion to get enough contacts and achieve a 
satisfactory response rate from the increased sample size. As such, with the quota/criterion 
of turnover being reduced to GBP 5 millions, 2,393 additional contacts were obtained. 
These were all complete and appropriate, however when the initial email was sent to these 
contacts, 826 returned as undelivered. This results in 1,567 delivered emails, which seems 
to form a slightly more updated batch (65.4% compared to the 60% of the 1
st
 batch), a note 
that was already acknowledged by the people in the database company. 
To conclude, the sample size based on the two batches was 2,445. With 75 
responses—collected during February-March 2013—the response rate of this sample was 
3.0%, which is low but corroborates other researchers who claim that there is a great 
difficulty in collecting data from board directors (e.g. Machold and Farqular, 2013; Daily 
et al., 2003; Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). As stated by Zahra and 
Pearce (1989: 324) “this is, in fact, one of the most challenging areas for future research in 
the contribution of boards”, which seems to stand true until presently. The summary of 
contacts and delivered emails is presented in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6: Summary of Email Contacts  
Batches Number of 
Contacts 
Undelivered 
Emails 
Delivered Emails 
1
st
 batch 1,464  586 878  
2
nd
 batch 2,393 826 1,567 
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Total 3,857 1412 2,445 
 
4.5.1.2 Increasing Sample Size Using Social Media (LinkedIn) 
 
Since the responses collected from the email invitation to directors were found to 
be limited—for statistical analysis—it was attempted to collect more data from board 
directors that were members of relevant LinkedIn groups. This would increase the total 
number of respondents, even though it can be regarded as a limitation to the possible 
heterogeneity of the sample. Table 4.7 presents the various groups where the survey 
invitation was posted; a short description of the groups and the number of their members 
are also provided. From this additional effort, 40 extra responses were collected, which 
resulted in a total number of 115 responses. 
 
Table 4.7: A Summary of LinkedIn Groups Accessed for Further Data 
Collection 
Group Name Short Description Members 
Board of Directors 
Society 
This group provides education, insights and 
contacts for entrepreneurs, attorneys, 
investment bankers, angels or venture 
capitalist, investors, recruiters, CEOs, CFOs, 
managers, professionals, consultants and 
individuals who currently sit on a corporate 
board of directors and those who are qualified 
to do so and aspire for election to such a board. 
4,258 
Boards & Advisors 
Membership in this group includes (i) external 
advisers, (ii) internal advisers and (iii) current 
or prospective board and committee members. 
5,755 
Company Directors and 
Governance 
Professionals 
This group is a community of interest focused 
on boards and governance. Membership is open 
to all board members, aspiring board members 
and governance practitioners. 
2,251 
Company Directors 
Networking 
This group is open to IOD Members and by 
invitation from Group members. 
1,923 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance Portal - a virtual 
community where all is found on Corporate 
Governance. An independent investment 
ratings agency and research firm focusing on 
corporate governance, board of director 
effectiveness and board risk. 
2,185 
Corporate Governance 
Contact Point 
The purpose of this group is to bring together 
experts on Corporate Governance in different 
regions of the world, in order to share the latest 
news on the matter. 
598 
Governance Committee Members of our community of corporate 253 
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Members of Corporate 
Boards 
directors who serve on governance committees 
of corporate boards inspire each other with 
information, insights and other resources to 
help elevate their respective boards' 
performance in adding value to the 
corporations they serve. 
Irish Non Executive 
Director (INED) Group 
This is a group for current and aspiring Irish 
based Non Executive Directors (NED's) who 
are seeking new opportunities, share 
experiences, network and promote the role and 
benefits of a Non Executive. 
486 
NED/ NXD – Non 
Executive Directors – 
Global 
This is a group for current NED's/NXD's & 
individuals wishing to aspire to being a Non 
Executive Director. This will create a unique 
platform for open discussions and networking 
opportunities. 
1,940 
Next Director 
Our main objective is to build a platform where 
company directors from around the world and 
with a diverse range of experience and 
aspirations can engage with each other, seek 
and contribute advice and share ideas and 
information. 
4,909 
Non Executive Director 
Network – England 
The network has been set up to provide a forum 
for discussion between non-execs, mentors for 
non-execs, and people interested in taking up a 
non-executive position. 
260 
Non Executive 
Directors Association 
The Non-Executive Directors Association was 
established in 2007 to "represent Non-
Executive Directors and ensure they are 
properly trained and developed. 
1,729 
NXD – membership 
organization for Non-
Executive Directors 
NXD is a group of experienced, successful and 
practical business leaders who want to add 
value to SME businesses. 
297 
The Financial Times 
Non-Executive 
Directors’ Club 
This group is a forum for all aspiring and 
experienced non-executive directors to discuss 
boardroom issues and share thoughts, ideas and 
experiences - and to receive articles and items 
of interest 
929 
The Institutional 
Corporate Governance 
Network 
This group is for people who are involved in 
corporate governance including activists, 
institutional owners, corporate secretaries, 
board members, etc. 
3,116 
 TOTAL 30,889 
 
 4.5.3 Key Informants 
As mentioned in section above, it was decided for this thesis, to collect data from 
any directors sitting in the board. The reason was simply that all directors of a board are 
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considered to be knowledgeable of the constructs of interest. In addition, it was believed 
that collecting responses from any directors—i.e. CEOs, Chairpersons, executives and 
independent members—would be important in capturing the perceptions of the roles for all 
members of the board. After collecting the data, it was found that majority of respondents 
were executive members of the board, including CEOs and the rest of the responses came 
from independent members. 
 
 4.5.4 Reminders and Response Rates 
 The data collection for the current thesis has proven to be very challenging and it is 
argued that the reason is the profile of the respondents. However, among other techniques 
used to motivate respondents in completing the survey—discussed in this chapter (e.g. pre-
notification)—follow up messages are also thought to improve the response rate of any 
kind of survey. As such, after sending the pre-notification email, the initial survey 
invitation was sent that was followed by two reminders and one final call in a period of 
five weeks. This resulted in 75 responses that were later complemented with the 40 
responses from LinkedIn, which made a total of 115 responses. 
 The criterion used to decide which questionnaire will be considered as complete 
was whether the respondent moved through all pages using the navigation buttons, clicked 
the ‘Next’ button on every page, and answered all compulsory questions to finally click 
‘Done’ (http://help.surveymonkey.com/articles/en_US/kb/What-is-a-partial-Total-Started-
or-finished-Total-Finished-response). 
 The numbers of collected responses from the different stages of the survey were 
recorded as follows: 
Table 4.8: Responses Resulted from Different Waves  
Email Wave Responses 
Survey Invitation 44 
1
st
 Reminder 13 
2
nd
 Reminder 12 
Final Call 6 
Linked In 40 
Total 115 
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 4.5.5 Pre-testing Procedure  
The survey instrument was pretested among academics that were regarded as 
experts in the field of corporate governance. As such, an email was sent to selected 
academics from the UK and the United States asking them to provide their feedback and 
comments on the quality and presentation of the questionnaire that was attached in 
document format. All selected academics had either numerous relevant publications on 
corporate governance, or were members of corporate governance interest groups (e.g. 
BAM SIG). Their comments were extremely helpful and constructive and were taken into 
account in the final online version of the questionnaire (e.g. Prof. Amy Hillman and Prof. 
Stephen Perkins). This approach—also used by Hambrick (1981: 261)—was used to 
satisfy the criterion of content validity. 
 
 4.5.6 Non-Respondents 
While conducting the survey through email, there were a few board directors that 
replied to the survey invitation, stating that they do not want to participate. In total, 37 
emails were received during the collection process refusing to participating and asking to 
be excluded from the mailing list. The main reason for the majority was the organisation’s 
policy of not participating in surveys, while other reasons included director’s retirement or 
changed position and lack of time.  
 
 4.5.7 Summary 
Section 4.5 described the sampling approach used in the thesis, which followed two 
different steps. Due to the difficulty experienced in collecting data from respondents 
through email, LinkedIn was used as an additional method and the total responses from the 
two methods was 115. The following section briefly describes the statistical methods used 
to analyse the data collected. 
4.6 Methodology Adopted for Data Analysis 
Important decision for any study is the methods to be used for analysis of the data 
that is collected. While this decision is not independent to the previous parts of 
methodology, it is argued that the analysis approach needs to follow the purpose and 
approach of the designed methodology. Having said this, as discussed earlier, the main 
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purpose of the study, is to examine relationships between the study’s theoretical constructs. 
These relationships are already discussed in chapter three, where the relevant hypotheses 
have also been developed. 
The following paragraphs outline and briefly explain the steps and methods 
selected to present and analyse the findings of the data that was entered into the SPSS 
software. 
 4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The initial step of analysis in a study is to use univariate statistical techniques, 
including the measures of central tendency—such as mean, median, mode—and the 
measures of dispersion—such as standard deviation, variance (Curwin and Slater, 2006). 
This level of analysis is provided in Chapter 5, with the use of frequency scores, 
percentages, measures of central tendency (or location) and measures of dispersion. The 
descriptive findings are presented through tables and graphs, followed by a description. 
This first step is useful, in order to get an initial understanding of the data that is 
collected through the survey. 
 4.6.2 Factor Analysis 
Since the variables used to capture the constructs of the study were numerous, it 
was considered necessary to reduce data with the use of factor analysis. This is a widely 
used method in order “ to examine the underlying patterns or relationships for a large 
number of variables and to determine whether the information can be condensed or 
summarised in a smaller set of factors or components” (Hair et al., 2006: 101). In other 
words the method can be used either to explore the pattern of variables and identify factors 
that can capture dimensions of a construct, or to confirm whether expected factors derived 
from literature have high loadings. The steps and decisions taken in implementing the 
factor analysis are presented in detail in Chapter 6. 
 4.6.3 Correlation Analysis 
Moreover, the next step of analysis was to use a bivariate technique to get a better 
understanding of the hypothesised relationships. This is a commonly used method when 
researchers want to examine the potential relationship between variables. As such, the 
correlation coefficient (r) that can take values from -1 to 1 is used. Values closer to 0 
indicate that the relationship of two variables is weak, while values closer to -1 or 1 show 
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that there is strong relationship. For negative values the relationship has negative direction 
and for positive values it has positive direction (Hair et al., 2006; Field, 2009). 
This level of analysis is useful, in order to get a first outlook of the potential 
relationships and before conducting further analysis (i.e. regression) to test the hypotheses.  
 4.6.4 Hypothesis Testing Explanation 
While the correlation analysis is used to understand whether expected relationships 
between constructs exist, the method is not sufficient to test the hypotheses developed on 
these relationships. The whole purpose of testing hypotheses is to try and confirm or reject 
them based on the collected data, in order to be able to generalise to the whole population. 
Although as discussed earlier in this chapter this may not be possible (see falsification 
doctrine in 4.2), it is an objective of this thesis to investigate the relationships 
hypothesised. 
When testing hypothesis, a common approach is to develop two different and 
opposing statements, the null (H0) and the alternative hypothesis (H1) (Curwin and Slater 
(2006: 278). The alternative hypothesis states the expected relationship and the null 
hypothesis states that this relationship does not exist. Since, based on previous discussion a 
relationship can never be proved, the researcher can only confirm or reject the null 
hypothesis. As such, even though a researcher tries to confirm the alternative hypothesis 
(i.e. that relationship exists), he can only accept it indirectly by rejecting the null 
hypothesis (i.e. no relationship exists). 
 4.6.5 Multiple Regression Analysis 
The final—and most significant—step of the findings is to decide the multivariate 
technique to be used for testing the hypotheses. An important factor in making this 
decision is the level of measurements used to depict the variables, as with every level of 
measurement different statistical techniques should be employed.  
The relationships to be examined in this thesis, is between various independent 
variables with one dependent variable at a time. All the dependent (outcome) variables are 
measured at the ordinal level, as Likert scale questions were used to capture them. 
However, it was decided to treat these questions as interval that allow additional tests, as 
this is a common approach in social science (Gob et al., 2007). Moreover, the 
predictor/independent variables were found to be nominal (e.g. duality), ordinal (e.g. 
environmental dimensions measured in Likert scale) and interval/ratio (e.g. board size and 
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ratio of independent). As such, multiple regression analysis was chosen as the most 
appropriate method for analysis (Field, 2009; Hair et al, 2006). 
The general form that the multiple regression equation has in representing its 
dependent and independent variables is: 
Y=b0+b1X1+b2X2+b3X3+…+bnXn+e 
Where: y= dependent variable 
b0= intercept or constant 
bn= gradient or slope of straight line 
Xn= independent variable 
e= error   
In brief, the constant (b0) shows the value that y would have with the independent 
variables being zero. Moreover, the gradient (bn) shows the change to y for a unit change 
in Xn.  
From the analysis output, there are three main measure that are used for 
interpretation and conclusions. 
First, t-statistic tests the null hypothesis that b is 0. As such, if it is significant (e.g. 
p<0.05) we gain the confidence that the b-value is significantly different than zero, which 
means the predictor makes a strong contribution to the outcome variable (Field, 2009). 
Hence, the t-value represents the number of standard errors that the coefficient is from 
zero. For instance, Hair et al. (2006: 219) explain that a coefficient of 2.5 with standard 
error of 0.5 would have t value of 5 (which means coefficient is 5 standard errors from 
zero). The standard error is the expected variation of the coefficients (i.e. standard 
deviation) due to sampling error (Hair et al., 2006: 217) 
Second, F-ratio that is a measure of how much the model improves the prediction 
of the outcome compared to the level of its inaccuracy. If a model is good, the F-ration 
should be large, i.e. greater than 1 (Field, 2009: 203). 
Third, the adjusted R
2
 is used, which results from R
2
. The R
2
, also called 
coefficient of determination, is a result of the method known as the method of least squares 
(Field, 2009: 202; Hair et al., 2006: 184). This process starts by calculating the difference 
between observed values of the outcome variable and its mean value—that is initially 
considered a good estimate model. All these differences need to be squared, to avoid 
having their sum being equal to zero. This sum is called total sum of squares (SSTotal).  
The mean is a useful measure and easy to be calculated, however the regression 
line (line of best fit) is used as a further step, trying to find a better estimate model. 
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Similarly, the differences between each observed data and the value predicted by the 
regression line are calculated (i.e. vertically distance between observed data point and 
point on regression line). The sum of these differences is again calculated, after being 
squared. This result is the sum of squared error (SSError). The smaller this number, the 
better the prediction of the regression line model, which also shows improvement in 
relation to the mean as a model. 
Finally, the difference between the SSTotal and the SSError (SST-SSE), give the 
SSRegression (SSR) i.e. the sum of squares due to regression or sum of squares explained. The 
larger this number, the higher the difference of the regression model from using the mean 
to predict the dependent variable. Therefore, a large number indicates major improvement 
in predicting the dependent variable due to the regression model.  
The R
2 
is the division of SSR over SST and by multiplying the result with 100, the 
result can be interpreted as a percentage. This percentage represents the amount of 
variance of the dependent variable explained by the model and its predictors. Since by 
adding more predictors to the model the R
2
 will keep increasing, adjusted R
2
 takes into 
account the non-significant predictors as well as the sample size (Hair et al., 2006: 216), 
being a more objective measure and as such this measure will be used in the findings. In 
Chapter 7 the steps followed in running the regression analysis are discussed in detail. 
 
 
4.7 Summary 
This Chapter provided analytical explanation of the philosophical approach and the context 
of the study, as well as the research approach and design used, the sampling techniques and 
the methods selected to analyse the data collected. Next chapters will present the empirical 
part of this thesis, covering all methods described earlier, starting with the descriptive 
statistics that are presented in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Descriptive Statistics
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5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, following the discussion on research approaches and methodology 
design of this thesis, an initial view of the data is provided through the presentation of 
descriptive statistics.  
More particularly, frequencies of responses, measures of location (i.e. mean and 
mode) and standard deviation of variables will be presented, before proceeding to the 
following chapters, which will examine the relationships between the constructs, in order 
to test the hypotheses. The descriptive statistics will present data from all constructs 
including board roles, external environment as well as director, board and company 
characteristics. 
5.2 Board Roles 
The board roles construct consists of 36 items, which are presented in Table 5.1. 
The table shows the frequencies of responses to the 7-point Likert scale questions. 
Directors were asked to respond to what extent they contribute to the board on various 
activities. These activities, as also discussed in previous chapters, describe roles of 
directors related to monitoring, providing service and resources and assisting in strategy. 
From the first look, it seems that directors believe that they actively take part in all 
activities in which they were asked. This can be argued, as the mean for most questions is 
found to be above 4, that is the median point in the Likert scale questions. More 
particularly, in thirty out of the thirty-six questions the mean is above the middle point. 
Interestingly, all six activities in which the directors do not seem to participate are related 
to monitoring and controlling the CEO. In specific, the directors scored low when asked 
about their extent of contribution to: hiring (mean= 3.51) and firing (3.25) the CEO, 
determining his/her salary/compensation (3.30), evaluating his/her performance (3.66) and 
finally monitoring CEO’s decision making (3.88) and deferring to his/her judgement on 
final strategic decisions (3.61). Hiring, firing the CEO and determining his/her salary can 
be considered as control activities since they require some active involvement in specific 
processes. On the other hand, evaluating performance, monitoring decision making and 
deferring to judgement on strategic decisions of CEO, can be considered as monitoring 
activities, which would be regarded as more passive; that is overseeing the actions and 
performance of the CEO to ensure that the right direction is followed, without necessarily 
 111 
taking further actions. This can be explained to some extent from the fact that 17 out of 97 
respondents (as 18 of the 115 respondents, did not disclose their status) were CEOs and it 
is expected that their responses would be either ‘N/A’ or ‘to a little extent’, which lowers 
the overall mean for these questions.  
Moreover, the highest ranked variables on the participation of directors are: 
ratifying strategic proposals (6.22), constructively criticizing/ asking probing questions 
(6.13), providing expertise to the board (6.13), aiding in the formulation of strategy or 
other important firm decisions (6.13) and taking into account interests of shareholders 
(6.0). These are the five variables that ranked the highest -six or above- although they 
cannot be categorised under one role. By looking at the five variables it can be noticed that 
features of both monitoring and service are present.  
Other roles that scored high -and have a mean that is very close to point six- are, 
acting as a "sounding board" on strategic issues (5.99), acting as ambassador of the firm 
(5.96), calling for revisions of strategic proposals (5.91) and building organisational 
reputation (5.82). By combining the five highest scoring questions with these questions, it 
is evident that directors perceive their main role as being resource and networking 
providers to the organisation by also assisting in the strategic direction of their firms. 
Another interesting outcome from the descriptive statistics is the standard deviation 
for many of the questions that appears to be high. Specifically, eight of the variables have a 
standard deviation higher than 2; for a 7-point scale used this is considerably high. This 
shows that there was much divergence among directors perception of their roles, as there 
were questions that were found to have balanced responses in the two extremes (i.e. little 
extent and high extent). This could be explained by the different status of directors, as 
executives and non-executives are expected to have different approach in their board roles. 
Of course, this deviation could also be smoothed out, if the number of responses was 
increased. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Board Roles  
Variables (1)* (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) N/A n Mean*** SD 
act as ambassador for the firm 6 (5.2)** 2 (1.7) 3 (2.6) 5 (4.3) 10 (8.7) 27 (23.5) 62 (53.9) - 115 5.96 1.62 
build organisational reputation 5 (4.3) 2 (1.7) 3 (2.6) 11 (9.6) 12 (10.4) 26 (22.6) 55 (47.8) 1 (0.9) 115 5.82 1.61 
ratify strategic proposals 4 (3.5) - 1 (0.9) 4 (3.5) 14 (12.2) 21 (18.3) 70 (60.9) 1 (0.9) 115 6.22 1.34 
call for revisions of strategic 
proposals 
5 (4.3) - 1 (0.9) 9 (7.8) 19 (16.5) 25 (21.7) 55 (47.8) 1 (0.9) 115 5.91 1.47 
constructively criticise/ask probing 
questions 
5 (4.3) - 1 (0.9) 6 (5.2) 9 (7.8) 30 (26.1) 64 (55.7) - 115 6.13 1.42 
defer to [the CEO’s] judgment on 
final strategic decisions 
10 (8.7) 18 (15.7) 11 (9.6) 22 (19.1) 20 (17.4) 13 (11.3) 10 (8.7) 11 (9.6) 115 3.99 1.80 
involve in determining salary/ 
compensation of top management 
12 (10.4) 11 (9.6) 5 (4.3) 16 (13.9) 20 (17.4) 17 (14.8) 31 (27.0) 3 (2.6) 115 4.75 2.04 
involve in determining salary/ 
compensation of CEO 
38 (33.0) 6 (5.2) 2 (1.7) 5 (4.3) 5 (4.3) 9 (7.8) 32 (27.8) 18 (15.7) 115 3.90 2.69 
engage in succession planning for 
CEO 
27 (23.5) 3 (2.6) 4 (3.5) 8 (7.0) 11 (9.6) 16 (13.9) 36 (31.3) 10 (8.7) 115 4.57 2.45 
engage in succession planning for top 
managers besides CEO 
14 (12.2) 3 (2.6) 6 (5.2) 18 (15.7) 22 (19.1) 19 (16.5) 31 (27.0) 2 (1.7) 115 4.88 1.97 
evaluate the CEO's performance 22 (19.1) 10 (8.7) 3 (2.6) 8 (7.0) 10 (8.7) 13 (11.3) 30 (26.1) 19 (16.5) 115 4.39 2.43 
evaluate the top management's 
performance 
10 (8.7) 3 (2.6) 2 (1.7) 16 (13.9) 22 (19.1) 23 (20.0) 32 (27.8) 7 (6.1) 115 5.16 1.83 
facilitate access to resources such as 
capital 
14 (12.2) 9 (7.8) 7 (6.1) 21 (18.3) 23 (20.0) 18 (15.7) 21 (18.3) 2 (1.7) 115 4.49 1.95 
involve in hiring new executives 14 (12.2) 9 (7.8) 5 (4.3) 21 (18.3) 18 (15.7) 28 (24.3) 19 (16.5) 1 (0.9) 115 4.58 1.95 
involve in hiring CEOs 30 (26.1) 7 (6.1) 1 (0.9) 7 (6.1) 7 (6.1) 7 (6.1) 36 (31.3) 20 (17.4) 115 4.25 2.63 
involve in firing executives 18 (15.7) 7 (6.1) 8 (7.0) 12 (10.4) 24 (20.9) 18 (15.7) 21 (18.3) 7 (6.1) 115 4.44 2.08 
involve in firing CEOs 33 (28.7) 7 (6.1) 1 (0.9) 6 (5.2) 4 (3.5) 7 (6.1) 34 (29.6) 23 (20.0) 115 4.07 2.70 
aid in the formulation of strategy or 
other important firm decisions 
4 (3.5) 1 (0.9) 2 (1.7) 7 (6.1) 7 (6.1) 26 (22.6) 65 (56.5) 3 (2.6) 115 6.13 1.45 
link the firm to important 
stakeholders or other important 
entities 
7 (6.1) - 2 (1.7) 12 (10.4) 19 (16.5) 36 (31.3) 37 (32.2) 2 (1.7) 115 5.58 1.57 
build external relations 6 (5.2) 1 (0.9) 3 (2.6) 8 (7.0) 21 (18.3) 26 (22.6) 48 (41.7) 2 (1.7) 115 5.72 1.60 
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maintain relations with stakeholders 6 (5.2) - 6 (5.2) 8 (7.0) 14 (12.2) 35 (30.4) 44 (38.3) 2 (1.7) 115 5.70 1.59 
monitor CEO in decision-making 12 (10.4) 11 (9.6) 7 (6.1) 16 13.9) 16 (13.9) 19 (16.5) 19 (16.5) 15 (13.0) 115 4.46 2.01 
monitor Strategy Implementation 5 (4.3) 1 (0.9) 2 (1.7) 9 (7.8) 18 (15.7) 38 (33.0) 41 (35.7) 1 (0.9) 115 5.74 1.48 
monitor top management in decision-
making 
7 (6.1) 6 (5.2) 5 (4.3) 11 (9.6) 24 (20.9) 35 (30.4) 22 (19.1) 5 (4.3) 115 5.11 1.71 
act as a "sounding board" on strategic 
issues 
4 (3.5) 2 (1.7) - 5 (4.3) 18 (15.7) 27 (23.5) 55 (47.8) 4 (3.5) 115 5.99 1.43 
provide advice and counsel to top 
managers 
6 (5.2) 4 (3.5) 1 (0.9) 9 (7.8) 19 (16.5) 31 (27.0) 43 (37.4) 2 (1.7) 115 5.62 1.65 
provide expertise to the board 4 (3.5) 1 (0.9) 2 (1.7) 6 (5.2) 6 (5.2) 31 (27.0) 63 (54.8) 2 (1.7) 115 6.13 1.42 
provide legitimacy to the firm 6 (5.2) 2 (1.7) 7 (6.1) 13 (11.3) 17 (14.8) 33 (28.7) 30 (26.1) 7 (6.1) 115 5.33 1.66 
bolster the image of the firm 5 (4.3) - 5 (4.3) 16 (13.9) 13 (11.3) 32 (27.8) 40 (34.8) 4 (3.5) 115 5.60 1.56 
seek information from the CEO or 
another inside director regarding the 
progress of strategic decisions 
7 (6.1) 1 (0.9) 4 (3.5) 11 (9.6) 13 (11.3) 29 (25.2) 38 (33.0) 12 (10.4) 115 5.53 1.71 
seek information from the CEO or 
another inside director in order to 
evaluate the performance of top 
management 
8 (7.0) 6 (5.2) 3 (2.6) 12 (10.4) 25 (21.7) 29 (25.2) 21 (18.3) 11 (9.6) 115 5.03 1.76 
contribute in diffusion of 
organisational innovation 
9 (7.8) 7 (6.1) 7 (6.1) 18 (15.7) 27 (23.5) 22 (19.1) 19 (16.5) 6 (5.2) 115 4.73 1.78 
involve in the development of the 
corporate vision 
6 (5.2) 2 (1.7) 1 (0.9) 9 (7.8) 19 (16.5) 26 (22.6) 51 (44.3) 1 (0.9) 115 5.76 1.60 
involve in mission articulation 7 (6.1) 4 (3.5) 2 (1.7) 10 (8.7) 17 (14.8) 28 (24.3) 42 (36.5) 5 (4.3) 115 5.53 1.74 
review social responsibilities of the 
firm 
7 (6.1) 2 (1.7) 4 (3.5) 12 (10.4) 21 (18.3) 36 (31.3) 32 (27.8) 1 (0.9) 115 5.40 1.64 
take into account interests of 
shareholders 
7 (6.1) 1 (0.9) - 8 (7.0) 6 (5.2) 24 (20.9) 61 (53.0) 8 (7.0) 115 6.00 1.65 
*Scale: (1)=to little extent; (7)= to great extent **numbers in brackets indicate percentages ***mean and standard deviation are calculated by excluding the 
N/A responses
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5.3 External Environment 
The external environment was measured with 16 variables, which are presented in 
Table 5.2. Similarly to the variables on the roles of directors, the questions were measured 
on a 7-point Likert scale, however different variables used different labels in the scales, 
due to the different nature of question; the labels used in the questions are provided at the 
bottom of the table. The questions asked about the external environment aimed at 
capturing the three dimensions that were discussed in earlier chapters, which are 
dynamism, complexity and munificence. By looking at the variables of the environment, it 
is noticed that mean scores do not deviate much from the middle point (i.e. 4); this can be 
interpreted as a fairly dynamic, complex and munificent environment based on directors’’ 
perceptions. However by looking at the frequencies it is seems that there is a high variance 
in responses, which can also be confirmed from the relatively high standard deviations.  
In specific, regarding the dynamism dimension, directors were asked to rate the 
frequency of change in marketing practices (mean= 4.90), the rate of product/service 
obsolescence in the industry (3.76), the predictability rate of i) competitors’ actions (3.91) 
and of ii) demand and tastes of customers (3.64) and the rate of change in the production/ 
service technology (4.18). 
Moreover, the directors were asked to appreciate the complexity of the 
environment by the extent that their firms experience variations -in their principal industry- 
in customers’ buying habits (3.73), in the nature of the competition (3.76) and in required 
methods of production service (3.58).  
Finally, munificence was measured by asking the respondents about the extent of 
competition in eight areas and the findings show that on average there is moderate level of 
competition. In some areas, the competition is found to be high (i.e. price competition and 
regulatory restrictions), while there is an area with low competition based on directors’ 
perceptions (i.e. shortages of raw material). More specifically, the eight areas were: price 
competition (4.43), product competition (3.95), technological competition (3.96), 
distribution competition (3.89), shortages of labour (3.07), shortages of raw material 
(3.07), unfavourable demographic trends (3.52) and severe regulatory restrictions (4.31). 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of External Environment  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) N/A n Mean** SD 
 Extremely rarely    Extremely frequently     
The business unit must change its 
marketing practices to keep up with the 
market and competitors… 
8 (7.6)* 2 (1.9) 6 (5.7) 16 (15.2) 29 (27.6) 32 (30.5) 12 (11.4) - 105 4.90 1.60 
 Extremely slow    Extremely fast     
The rate at which products/ services are 
becoming obsolete in the industry is…  
13 (12.4) 12 (11.4) 20 (19.0) 18 (17.1) 24 (22.9) 11 (10.5) 4 (3.8) 3 (2.9) 105 3.76 1.67 
 Extremely predictable    Extremely unpredictable     
Actions of competitors are…  5 (4.8) 8 (7.6) 26 (24.8) 31 (29.5) 23 (21.9) 8 (7.6) 3 (2.9) 1 (1.0) 105 3.91 1.33 
 Fairly easy to forecast    Almost unpredictable     
Demand and consumer tastes are…  8 (7.6) 15 (14.3) 25 (23.8) 22 (21.0) 28 (26.7) 5 (4.8) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 105 3.64 1.40 
 
Is not subject to very 
much change and is 
well established 
   Changes often and in 
major way 
    
The production/service technology… 5 (4.8) 18 (17.1) 13 (12.4) 15 (14.3) 28 (26.7) 17 (16.2) 7 (6.7) 2 (1.9) 105 4.18 1.67 
The extent that the firm experiences 
variations in its principal industry in… 
About the same for all 
products 
   Varied a great deal from 
one product/service to 
another 
    
Customers’ buying habits 15 (14.3) 20 (19.0) 16 (15.2) 11 (10.5) 17 (16.2) 16 (15.2) 8 (7.6) 2 (1.9) 105 3.73 1.92 
The nature of the competition 11 (10.6) 23 (22.1) 10 (9.6) 21 (20.2) 18 (17.3) 11 (10.6) 8 (7.7) 2 (1.9) 104 3.76 1.80 
Required methods of production service 15 (14.4) 21 (20.2) 16 (15.4) 14 (13.5) 18 (17.3) 12 (11.5) 6 (5.8) 2 (1.9) 104 3.58 1.83 
The extent that the firm in its principal 
industry faces intense competition in 
terms of… 
Much less competition 
than other firms 
   Much greater competition 
than other firms 
    
Price competition 8 (7.6) 7 (6.7) 8 (7.6) 27 (25.7) 26 (24.8) 12 (11.4) 13 (12.4) 4 (3.8) 105 4.43 1.68 
Product competition 12 (11.5) 9 (8.7) 12 (11.5) 28 (26.9) 20 (19.2) 13 (12.5) 5 (4.8) 5 (4.8) 104 3.95 1.67 
Technological competition 10 (9.5) 16 (15.2) 8 (7.6) 28 (26.7) 15 (14.3) 15 (14.3) 7 (6.7) 6 (5.7) 105 3.96 1.75 
Distribution competition 10 (9.5) 12 (11.4) 11 (10.5) 28 (26.7) 15 (14.3) 14 (13.3) 4 (3.8) 11 (10.5) 105 3.89 1.66 
Shortages of labour 15 (14.3) 17 (16.2) 15 (14.3) 36 (34.3) 8 (7.6) 8 (7.6) 1 (1.0) 5 (4.8) 105 3.33 1.50 
Shortages of raw material 18 (17.1) 14 (13.3) 12 (11.4) 24 (22.9) 9 (8.6) 2 (1.9) 2 (1.9) 24 (22.9) 105 3.07 1.56 
Unfavourable demographic Trends 13 (12.4) 16 (15.2) 12 (11.4) 26 (24.8) 14 (13.3) 5 (4.8) 5 (4.8) 14 (13.3) 105 3.52 1.67 
Severe Regulatory Restrictions 9 (8.6) 6 (5.7) 13 (12.4) 32 (30.5) 16 (15.2) 8 (7.6) 17 (16.2) 4 (3.8) 105 4.31 1.76 
*numbers in brackets indicate percentages **mean and standard deviation are calculated by excluding the N/A responses
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5.4 Independent Variables 
In this section, variables that are considered as independent for the current thesis 
are presented. These variables are most clearly discussed under three main constructs/ 
categories. These constructs capture the board, the director and the company 
characteristics. The number of responses in some of these variables is less reduced, since 
they were not marked as compulsory questions.  
5.4.1 Board Characteristics 
 The board characteristics were captured with variables that capture board size, 
status of directors, leadership structure, established committees and frequency of meetings. 
 The average board size of the companies (n=93) is found to be 8.87. The majority 
of the boards (54 boards or 57.4%) have a board size between 6 and 10 members. 
Moreover, 19 of the boards (20.2%) have between 11 and 15 members, while there are 6 
boards (6.3%) that have more than 15 directors. The largest board was found to have 24 
members. On the other hand, 15 respondents (16.0%) indicated that they have no more 
than 5 directors in their boards. Figure 5.1 below shows the board size and Figure 5.2 
shows the board size, grouped from small to large: (1)= up to 5 members; (2)= 6-10 
members; (3)= 11-15 members; (4)= 16 or more members.  
 
Figure 5.1: Board Size (n=94) 
 
 117 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Grouped Board Size (n=94) 
 
 
The executive directors in the boards of the companies (n=88) are on average 4.05. 
There were 16 respondents (18.2%) who indicated that they only have one executive 
director in their boards; it can be argued that this director is the CEO or general manager of 
the company. Also there are 16 boards (18.2%) with two executives and 22 boards (25.0%) 
with three executives.  
Consequently, 54 out of the 88 boards (61.4%) have a maximum of three 
executives in their boards. Only 8 respondents (9.0%) indicated that they have ten or more 
executives in their boards with the maximum found to be eighteen executive members. 
Figure 5.3 presents the frequency of executive members in the 88 boards. 
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Figure 5.3: Executive Members in the Board (n=88) 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the average non-executive directors sitting in each board are 
4.49 (n=87). There were 12 respondents (13.8%) who claimed that there aren’t any non-
executive members and 8 respondents (9.2%) that reported one non-executive. This is 
generally regarded as poor practice as usually at least two non-executive members are 
recommended for each board (e.g. see FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). 
Moreover, almost half of the boards (42 or 48.3%) have between two and five, while 10 
cases (11.5%) were found to have exactly two non-executives. Furthermore, 9 respondents 
(10.3%) replied that they have ten or more non-executives with the maximum being 
nineteen. Figure 5.4 shows the number of non-executives in the 88 boards. 
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Figure 5.4: Non-executive Members in the Board (n=87) 
 
 
The participants of the study were further asked to report how many of the non-
executive members are considered as affiliate (i.e. dependent) and how many as truly 
independent.  
In 84 responses received, 14 respondents (16.7%) claimed that no independent 
directors sit in their boards, while 13 (15.5%) responded that they have one independent 
director. This is an indicator for low independence, as it means that in about one third of 
the companies (32.1%) almost all board members are executives or in the case that some 
members are not, they have some form of affiliation to the company (i.e. being former 
employees, or relatives of company’s executives etc.).  
Additionally, 37 of the companies (44.0%) have two to five independent directors 
sitting in their boards and 15 companies (17.9%) have between six and ten. Finally, 5 
respondents (6.0%) reported more than ten independents sitting in their board. 
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Figure 5.5: Independent Non-executive Members in the Board (n=84)  
 
However, while the absolute number of independent members per board gives an 
idea of independence, it becomes fully meaningful when presented as a proportion to the 
total board size. Therefore, it is important to say that the proportion of independent 
members in the 84 boards is 41.4% meaning that about four in ten directors have an 
independent status. 
Another finding related to the board characteristics concerns the leadership 
structure of the boards, widely described as the issue of CEO duality in the literature. 18 
respondents (18.6%) answered that the CEOs of their companies also hold the Chairperson 
position, while 79 (81.4%) have a separate structure with the two roles being held by two 
directors (n= 97).  
Furthermore, the respondents were asked to indicate the board committees that are 
established in their companies. Table 5.3 shows the committees that are established in the 
companies. It seems from the findings that the majority of the companies have established 
the audit (80.0%) and the remuneration (78.7%) committee, while nomination (54.8%) and 
risk management (54.9%) committees are also popular. The succession (22.1%) and 
governance (36.8%) committees are not widely in use. Finally, although the respondents 
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had the option to specify any other committees that they have established, there was no 
other committee that appeared in more than one companies. 
Table 5.3: Board Committees Established  
Committees Established n 
Nomination Committee  51 (54.8)* 93 
Remuneration Committee 74 (78.7) 94 
Audit Committee 76 (80.0) 95 
Succession Committee 19 (22.1) 86 
Risk Management Committee 50 (54.9) 91 
Governance Committee 32 (36.8) 87 
*numbers in brackets indicate percentages 
 
Finally, the frequency of board meetings was measured with the majority of 
participants (56 or 57.1%) responding that they meet monthly and next most frequent 
answer being quarterly (35 or 35.7%). In addition, there are 5 boards (5.1%) that meet 
every fortnight and only 2 (2.0%) that meet twice per year (n=98). The histogram in Figure 
5.6 presents analytically the frequency of board meetings: (1)= every fortnight; (2)= every 
month; (3)= every three months; (4)= twice per year. 
 
Figure 5.6: Frequency of Board Meetings (n=98)  
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5.4.2 Director Characteristics 
 
The director characteristics were measured by asking the respondents about their 
personal status in the board, any memberships they hold in board committees, their tenure 
in the organisation, their tenure in the industry and any memberships they hold in other 
boards. 
About two thirds of the respondents (60 or 61.9%) are characterised as executive 
board members while 37 respondents (38.1%) identify themselves as non-executive. 
However, out of these 37 non-executive directors, 4 (4.12%) are considered as affiliated 
and 33 (34.02) as independent. Therefore, it is strongly evident that from the respondents 
that are characterised as non-executive, the vast majority (89.2%) are also independent. 
Figure 5.7 shows the frequencies and percentages of board status among the respondents. 
 
Figure 5.7: Respondents’ board status (n=97)  
 
 
In addition, 17 (14.8%) of all the 115 respondents are also the CEOs, while 3 of 
them have a dual role by being also the Chairpersons. Out of all the participants, 24 
(20.9%) were found in total to be Chairpersons of their organisations. 
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Moreover, the participants were asked to respond in whether they hold any 
membership in various committees established by their boards (Table 5.4). Taking into 
consideration that there are committees not established by some of the organisations, the 
level of membership of the respondents to the committees is relatively high. The 
percentages show that hardly one fifth of the respondents participate to each of the 
committees, however this does not reflect the full picture. For example, it was found that 
51 organisations have established the nomination committee (i.e. from previous question 
on establishment of committees), which makes the participation of 20 respondents rising 
from 17.4% (in 115 companies) to 39.2% (in 51 organisations). 
 
Table 5.4: Membership of Respondents to Board Committees  
Committees Membership 
(n=115) 
Nomination Committee  20 (17.4)* 
Remuneration Committee 24 (20.9) 
Audit Committee 30 (26.1) 
Succession Committee 9 (7.8) 
Risk Management Committee 23 (20.0) 
Governance Committee 12 (10.4) 
*numbers in brackets indicate percentages 
  
Furthermore, the respondents were asked to report their tenure in years, both as an 
employee and as a board member in the focal organisation. It was found that the average 
tenure of respondents being in the organisation is 10.7 years (n=92) and the average tenure 
of sitting in the board of the company is 7.0 years (n=95). Figures 5.8 and 5.9 present the 
tenure in the company and the board respectively (1=up to five years; 2= six to ten years; 
3=eleven to fifteen years; 4= sixteen or more years). As it can be seen, nearly half of the 
respondents work in the organisation for less than 5 years; specifically 37 (40.2%) work in 
their company for less than 5 years. Interestingly, the maximum tenure found among 
respondents was 40 years. 
 Regarding the tenure in the board, half of the respondents (47 or 49.5%) sit in their 
boards for less than 5 years. One interesting finding is that 17 respondents (18.9%) said 
that they sit in their boars for more than 10 years. This could be an indication of lack of 
independence in the board, as it is generally suggested that the board members should be 
replaced after a few years of service. 
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Figure 5.8: Respondents’ Tenure in Organisation (n=92)  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Respondents’ Tenure in Board of Organisation (n=95)  
 
 Finally, the number of board directorships held by the respondents was measured 
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and about two thirds (66.0%) of them also hold at least one more board position in other 
organisations. More specifically, there are 32 respondents (34.0%) that only hold a board 
position in the focal organisation, while there are 23 respondents (24.5%) that also sit in 
another board. 13 respondents (13.8%) hold in total 3 directorships and there are 9 (9.6%) 
that hold 4. There is finally a respondent claiming that s/he is a board member in 18 
boards. In Figure 5.10 the frequencies of board directorships are analytically portrayed.  
 
Figure 5.10: Total number of board directorships held by respondents (n=94)  
 
 
5.4.3 Company Characteristics 
 
 Company characteristics were measured by asking the participants general 
information about their companies. Questions included the size of the company (in 
employees), the industry sector in which the focal organisation operates, the company age, 
the country in which the company is based and information about company listing in stock 
exchange. 
 The company size was found to be 3,549 employees per company on average (n= 
88). However, this is just an indication and it can be misleading, taking into account that 
the standard deviation is 10,409.72, which is very high. This is mainly due to a few 
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companies that have a significantly large size -and especially one company that was found 
to have 87,000 employees- which has resulted in an inflated average. Out of the 88 
companies, for which the number of employees was reported, 12 (13.6%) can be 
characterised as small companies (less than 50 employees) and about a third (i.e. 29 
companies or 33%) in total are considered as SMEs (less than 250 employees). 
Consequently, 59 companies (67%) are characterised as large, having 250 or more 
employees. It is important to note that the company size classification in the current study 
has been determined according to the standards of the UK Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills (2010) and the European Union Commission (2003). Figure 5.11 
shows the company size under small, medium and large categories. 
 
Figure 5.11: Grouped Company Size (n=88)  
 
 
 
Moreover, the respondents were asked to indicate the industry sector in which their 
focal organisation operates. The 82 responses are dispersed in various industries; most 
companies come from the ‘industrial goods and services’ industry sector (10 companies, or 
12.2%), with ‘food and beverage’ and ‘health care’ following with 9 companies (11.0%). 
In total, respondents came from 18 different sectors leaving only ‘chemicals’ sector 
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without participation. Table 5.4 shows all the organisations and the industry sector in 
which they operate. 
 
Table 5.4: Industry Sector of Focal Organisation  
Industry Sector Frequency 
(n= 82) 
0500 Oil & Gas 5 (6.1) 
 1700 Basic Resources 1 (1.2) 
2300 Construction & Materials 7 (8.5) 
2700 Industrial Goods & Services 10 (12.2) 
3300 Automobiles & Parts 1 (1.2) 
3500 Food & Beverage 9 (11.0) 
3700 Personal & Household Goods 1 (1.2) 
4500 Health Care 9 (11.0) 
5300 Retail 1 (1.2) 
5500 Media 4 (4.9) 
5700 Travel & Leisure 6 (7.3) 
6500 Telecommunications 1 (1.2) 
7500 Utilities 6 (7.3) 
8300 Banks 1 (1.2) 
8500 Insurance 3 (3.7) 
8600 Real Estate 5 (6.1) 
8700 Financial Services 6 (7.3) 
9500 Technology 6 (7.3) 
 
Furthermore, the organisational age was measured and the average year of 
establishment was found to be 1956. Interestingly, almost a third of the respondents’ 
companies (27 or 30.3%) were established in the first half of the twentieth century while 
18 companies (20.2%) were established between 1950 and 1979. The companies 
established this century are 17 (19.1%). Figure 5.12 graphically shows the distribution of 
companies based on their age. 
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Figure 5.12: Grouped Company Age (n=89) 
 
 
 
Additionally, the respondents were asked to determine the country that their 
organisation is based and vast majority of the companies were found to be from the UK, 
something that can be largely explained by the sampling framework and process. In 
specific, 17 out of the 115 companies (14.8%) are not UK companies, however almost half 
of these come from member states of the Commonwealth of Nations (2 from Australia, 4 
from Canada and 3 from New Zealand), while others come from Anglophone culture (3 
from Ireland and 1 from the US). There are 4 respondents whose companies are based in 
Chile, Finland, Greece and Japan. In following chapters, only the UK companies were 
included in the analysis, in order to retain homogeneity of the sample. 
Furthermore, one of the questions aimed at capturing the listing of participants’ 
organisations in various stock exchanges, as it is expected that listed companies may have 
higher accountability which may affect the followed corporate governance practices. In the 
89 valid responses, 33 (37.1%) respondents argued that their organisations are listed and 
56 (62.9%) said that their organisations are non-listed. Out of the 33 listed organisations, 
27 are in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the remaining 6 are listed in different 
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markets, i.e. Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK), NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), NYSE Euronext, Santiago Stock Exchange (SSE), Tokyo Stock Exchange (TPX). 
Finally, 30 out of the 33 respondents whose organisation is in a stock exchange 
market, indicated the year when their organisation became listed. It was found that 6 (20%) 
organisations became listed before 1980; 11 organisations (36.7%) between 1980 and 1999 
and 13 (43.3%) between 2000 and 2012. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the descriptive results of all variables included in the 
theoretical model of the thesis. The following chapter will present the results of the 
principal component analysis performed for the two main constructs of the study (i.e. 
directors’ roles and external environment), as well as the summary of all measurements 
used before running regression analysis test in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6: Principal Component Analysis and Scale Validation 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
 Previous chapter presented the descriptive findings that resulted from the study’s 
conducted survey. This chapter will continue the data examination by using more complex 
statistical techniques, considered a required step before proceeding to the next chapter, 
which will investigate potential relationships between constructs and variables identified 
and hypothesized in earlier chapters. 
 From the development of previous chapters it is evident that while few constructs 
are included in the theoretical model, there are numerous variables proposed to capture 
these constructs. As such, the main steps to be followed in this chapter are specific; first 
step is to examine all data before any analysis, trying to detect and delete cases with 
missing data and outliers responses that could influence the results. Second step is to 
examine the correlation results of variables within the proposed constructs, in order to 
ensure that they are interrelated, which indicates that they aim to measure a similar 
concept. On the other hand, their correlation should not be above a certain limit (see 
chapter 4), as this could indicate that the variables do not differ from each other. Next step 
is to conduct principal component analysis in order to reduce the construct variables into 
various dimensions (i.e. factors) that capture this construct. Furthermore, validity and 
reliability tests of the scales will be conducted to ensure construct validity.  
6.2 Examination of Data prior to Analysis 
 
 Before the analysis of every empirical study, there is a need to examine data 
responses, to try and detect potential problems that could influence the results of the study 
(Hair et al., 2006). These problems are identified in cases where respondents have many 
variables/questions in which they have not responded (i.e. missing data), or cases where 
the respondents’ answers can be considered as outliers. According to Hair et al. (2006: 73) 
“outliers are observations with a unique combination of characteristics identifiable as 
distinctly different from the other observations. In practice this is detected as an unusually 
high or low value on a variable, or a unique combination of values across several variables 
that make the observation stand out from the others”.  
 As a result, from the 115 total responses that are presented in chapter 5, it was 
decided in the cleaning data stage that only a 95 would be included in further analysis. 
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Specifically, out of the 115 observations, 15 were considered as having significant missing 
values since, either the respondents only responded the first part of the survey (i.e. part on 
the directors’ roles), or a considerable number of missing values throughout the 
questionnaire were noticeable. Furthermore, 5 more observations were excluded from 
further analysis, falling in the category of outliers with ‘a unique combination of values 
across several variables that make the observation stand out from the others’. These 
observations included responses that used a pattern (e.g. consistently selecting value 1 in 
responses throughout questionnaire, or giving unusual answer like having a board size of 0 
or 1 members). 
 Nevertheless, before the final decision was made, factor analysis and reliability 
tests were run both with all 115 cases and with the reduced cases; since there were no 
significant conceptual differences found in the results, it was decided to choose the 
reduced cases which would be more appropriate for the regression analysis of the 
following chapter.  
6.3 Confirmatory vs. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
 Factor analysis, as earlier discussed, is mainly used in order to reduce the data into 
latent variables (factors) that can explain certain phenomena (i.e. of whole data) to a 
satisfactory extent. As argued by Joreskog (1974, cited in Anderson and Gerbing, 1988: 
411) “many investigations are to some extent both exploratory and confirmatory since they 
involve some variables of known and other variables of unknown composition”. Anderson 
and Gerbing (1988: 412) argue that the distinction of two methods should not be thought as 
a strict dichotomy but an ordered progression. However, there are various issues that need 
to be considered for the selection of the appropriate available method. These issues largely 
concern conceptual level and it is argued (e.g. Hair et al., 2006: 119; Field 2009: 636) that 
in many instances, similar empirical results are demonstrated by using different methods.  
First step is to decide is whether the factor analysis will be confirmatory or 
exploratory. Although this thesis has specific hypotheses that need to be tested, the 
measures that have been utilised -and consequently the data collected- need to be explored 
first. This happens when “the researcher has little control over the specification of the 
structure (e.g., number of factors, loadings of each variable etc.)” (Hair et al., 2006: 162). 
As such, the current thesis performs exploratory factor analysis, in order to explore the 
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data before concluding on the factors that will be used in the further analysis, rather than 
test and confirm a hypothesized measurement model.  
6.4 Common Factor Analysis Vs. Principal Component Analysis 
 
Since the exploratory factor analysis has been decided for the study, the different 
options available had to be considered as a next step. The two most common techniques 
for exploratory factor analysis are the principal component analysis and the common factor 
analysis. As stated by Blunch (2008: 47), both techniques are most often described under 
the name of factor analysis and little pragmatic differences appear to exist.  
The differences between the two methods can be outlined in the following points 
raised by Hair et al. (2006): 
“Component factor analysis is most appropriate when: 
a) data reduction is a primary concern, focusing on the minimum number of 
factors needed to account for the maximum portion of the total variance 
represented in the original set of variables. 
b) Prior knowledge suggests that specific and error variance represent a relatively 
small proportion of total variance 
Common factor analysis is most appropriate when: 
a) the primary objective is to identify the latent dimensions or constructs  
represented in the original variables, and 
b) the researcher has little knowledge about the amount of specific and error 
variance and therefore wishes to eliminate this variance”. 
Although the two methods differ theoretically and some researchers argue that they 
also differ in practical terms (e.g. Mulaik, 1990), other scholars claim that often both 
methods arrive at similar results (e.g. Velicer and Jackson, 1990; Guadagnoli and Velicer, 
1998), especially when the number of variables exceeds 30 (e.g. Stevens, 2002, cited in 
Field, 2009: 638; Gorsuch, 1990, cited in Hair et al., 2006: 119), which is the case for the 
measurement of the directors’ roles construct.  
For this thesis, taking into account the above conceptual differences, the principal 
component analysis was chosen, as the main purpose was regarded the data reduction 
focusing on the minimum number of factors, with the highest representation of the original 
set of variables. However, as it is suggested that both methods offer similar results in most 
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of the cases, the following sections might refer to component analysis by also using the 
term factor analysis, which is a common practice. 
6.5 Principal Component Analysis 
 
 As stated in the introductory section of this chapter, the first step before proceeding 
with principal component analysis of the two main constructs used (i.e. directors’ roles and 
external environment), is to examine whether there is correlation between the variables of 
each construct. It was therefore important to run bivariate correlation analysis and find that 
the variables/ items are correlated, indicating that they measure the same concept. As a 
result, correlation analyses were produced to find out whether significant relationships 
existed between the variables. After running the correlations of the items within each 
construct, it was decided that some items/questions should be deleted as they poorly 
correlate with the other measures of the construct and the reliability of the measure was 
also affected. After deleting the items, factor analysis was run to find out how the 
remaining items/questions loaded into different factors.  
 6.5.1 Correlation Analyses for the Constructs 
 
The way to examine the correlation between variables, is by producing the R-
matrix (correlation matrix) for all variables that aim to capture the same construct and 
visually scan for ‘lots’ of correlations that are below 0.3, which however is a very 
subjective approach (Field, 2009: 648). Taking into account the subjectivity of this 
approach, which was increased with the many items that were used for the two main 
constructs (i.e. 36 for director roles and 16 for external environment), no action was taken 
to delete any items for the two constructs. Even though the correlation matrix was 
produced and the general view was that each item correlated highly to at least a few of the 
other items, there were cases of items having limited correlations. However, at this stage 
no items were deleted, expecting that any potential problems with items would arise in the 
processes that follow, i.e. factor analysis and reliability analysis. 
6.5.2 Component Analysis of the Directors’ Roles Measurement 
 
At first, all 36 items used in the study to capture directors’ roles were selected to 
run the component analysis. The preliminary analysis indicated that two variables should 
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be eliminated, as their score in the anti-image correlation matrix was lower than 0.5 and 
should not be accepted (Hair et al., 2006:115; Field, 2009: 659). These two items were 
‘defer to [the CEO’s] judgement on final strategic decisions’ and ‘provide legitimacy to the 
firm’. 
Running the analysis again, with these two variables excluded, all scores in the 
anti-image correlation analysis were in the acceptable range of 0.5 or higher. In addition, 
the communalities of the variables were checked in order to confirm that they share 
satisfactory level of variance (i.e. squared standard deviation). This amount of shared 
variance between two variables is simply the squared correlation. For more than two 
variables the squared multiple correlation of the variable with all others is used; i.e. 
multiple regression with one outcome variable and all others as predictors (Field, 2009: 
637). Communality is the estimate of the variable’s shared (or common) variance (Hair et 
al., 2006: 117). The communality of the variables was acceptable, as it was above 0.5 for 
all variables (Hair et al., 2006: 149).  
Next step was to check the factor analysis results, to find any problems with the 
loadings of the different factors. According to Hair et al. (2006: 151), when cross-loadings 
are found, further action is needed. This can be either a) purposively ignoring the cross-
loadings, or b) deleting the item to eliminate the cross-loadings, or c) using another 
rotation technique, or d) decreasing the number of factors. For this thesis, due to its 
exploratory nature, it was decided not to decrease the factors without having clear reason. 
Ignoring the cross-loadings was considered to be a lenient solution, thus after using other 
rotation techniques that did not show significant differences, it was decided to delete 
certain items. These were the items that loaded into two factors with a very similar loading 
(i.e. loading differences less than 0.1). After deleting certain items, the factor analysis was 
run again to see if any other items come with cross-loadings. By doing this, nine items 
were deleted in six consecutive stages, which resulted in maintaining 25 items. The items 
deleted from this process are presented in Table 6.1. Only one cross-loading remained, but 
due to the difference in the score loading on the two factors, combined with the fact that 
the item conceptually fitted clearly in the factor with the highest loading, it was decided to 
keep the item (i.e. “engage in succession planning for top managers besides CEO”). 
The next step was to check the measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) of the data 
collected through the KMO measure (i.e. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure). This was found to 
be 0.727, which is good (Kaiser and Rice, 1974: 112; Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999, 
cited in Field, 2009: 659). In addition, the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was found to be 
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significant (p=0.000), indicating that there are sufficient significant correlations among the 
variables (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.1: Directors’ Roles Deleted Items from Cross -Loadings 
Items Deleted Stage of deletion 
take into account interests of shareholders 1 
aid in the formulation of strategy or other important firm decisions 2 
provide advice and counsel to top managers 2 
provide expertise to the board 3 
facilitate access to resources such as capital 4 
build external relations 4 
involve in firing executives 5 
evaluate the top management's performance 5 
involve in hiring new executives 6 
 
Table 6.2: KMO and Bartlett’s Test for the factorability of Directors’ Roles  
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .727 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1323.177 
df 300 
Sig. .000 
 
 Moreover, for the 25 items that were finally included in the factor analysis, the 
factors excluded from the process were six. The criterion used for retaining six factors, was 
Kaiser’s (1960: 147) recommendation, who suggested keeping factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1 (i.e. latent root criterion). An alternative criterion for retaining factors could 
have been the scree plot –which proposed fewer factors- however the latent criterion was 
considered more specific -in relation to the readability of the scree plot (Figure 6.1). 
According to Hair et al. (2006: 120) the latent root criterion is appropriate, especially when 
the number of variables is between 20 and 50. 
 As a result, the six factors were found to explain 75.294% of the total variance (see 
Table 6.3). The eigenvalues and the percentages of variance for each factor are presented 
in the Table before and after rotation. After trying a variety of rotation methods and getting 
relatively similar results, it was decided to use orthogonal rotation (i.e. VARIMAX), as 
Hair et al. (2006) claim that no specific rules have been developed for selection of method 
and in most cases the choice should be made on the basis of the specific needs of the given 
research problem. More specifically, they argue that orthogonal rotation “is the most 
widely used and it is preferred when the research goal is data reduction to either a smaller 
number of variables or a set of uncorrelated measures tor subsequent use in other 
multivariate techniques” (Hair et al., 2006: 127).  
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Table 6.3: Total Variance Explained for Directors’ Roles  
Total Variance Explained 
Comp 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive % 
1 7.589 30.355 30.355 7.589 30.355 30.355 5.163 20.652 20.652 
2 4.612 18.447 48.802 4.612 18.447 48.802 4.003 16.013 36.664 
3 2.267 9.066 57.868 2.267 9.066 57.868 3.478 13.910 50.574 
4 1.834 7.334 65.202 1.834 7.334 65.202 2.752 11.008 61.583 
5 1.384 5.538 70.740 1.384 5.538 70.740 1.733 6.932 68.515 
6 1.139 4.554 75.294 1.139 4.554 75.294 1.695 6.780 75.294 
7 .969 3.877 79.171       
8 .789 3.156 82.327       
9 .648 2.594 84.921       
10 .537 2.148 87.069       
11 .506 2.024 89.093       
12 .428 1.714 90.806       
13 .388 1.551 92.357       
14 .363 1.452 93.809       
15 .260 1.039 94.849       
16 .256 1.023 95.871       
17 .209 .838 96.709       
18 .194 .778 97.487       
19 .164 .658 98.145       
20 .135 .542 98.686       
21 .107 .428 99.114       
22 .082 .330 99.444       
23 .061 .245 99.688       
24 .054 .217 99.906       
25 .024 .094 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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After the discussion of the preliminary results with all necessary tests, deletion of 
items and the selection of rotation method, the 25 items loaded with relatively high scores 
to six factors showing a satisfactory structure (Table 6.4). At this point it is important to 
state that factor loadings below the value 0.4 were supressed, which is in agreement to 
Blunch (2008: 65) and Field (2009: 661). The following sections will discuss each of these 
factors and the labelling that will be used to describe each one of them. The labelling is not 
derived or assigned by the factor analysis, but is developed by the researcher based on its 
appropriateness for representing the underlying dimensions of a particular factor (Hair et 
al., 2006: 131). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Scree Plot on Component Analysis of Directors’ Roles  
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Table 6.4: Summary of Principal Component Analysis for Directors’ Roles  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
involve in firing CEOs .935      
involve in hiring CEOs .928      
involve in determining salary/ compensation 
of CEO 
.926      
evaluate the CEO's performance .882      
engage in succession planning for CEO .881      
monitor CEO in decision making .731      
involve in mission articulation  .841     
involve in the development of the corporate 
vision 
 .797     
monitor top management in decision making  .733     
contribute in diffusion of organisational 
innovation 
 .728     
monitor Strategy Implementation  .604     
review social responsibilities of the firm  .581     
act as ambassador for the firm   .894    
build organisational reputation   .828    
link the firm to important stakeholders or 
other important entities 
  .747    
bolster the image of the firm   .652    
maintain relations with stakeholders   .648    
constructively criticise/ask probing questions    .812   
call for revisions of strategic proposals    .804   
ratify strategic proposals    .709   
act as a "sounding board" on strategic issues    .608   
seek information from the CEO or another 
inside director regarding the progress of 
strategic decisions 
    .807  
seek information from the CEO or another 
inside director in order to evaluate the 
performance of top management 
    .744  
involve in determining salary/ compensation 
of top management 
     .798 
engage in succession planning for top 
managers besides CEO 
 .537    .657 
Eigenvalues 5.16 4.00 3.48 2.75 1.73 1.70 
% of Variance 20.65 16.01 13.91 11.01 6.93 6.78 
Cumulative % 20.65 36.66 50.57 61.58 68.52 75.29 
Cronbach’s Alpha .947 .854 .859 .820 .706 .702 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
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 6.5.2.1 Factor 1: Controlling CEO (RCEO1) 
 
The first factor consists of six variables that loaded highly on the factor and 
generated an eigenvalue of 5.16. Specifically the six variables are: ‘involve in firing CEO’, 
‘involve in hiring CEO’, ‘involve in determining salary/ compensation of CEO’, ‘evaluate 
the CEO’s performance’, ‘engage in succession planning for CEO’ and ‘monitor CEO in 
decision making’. 
By observing the six variables, it is obvious that they have a clear conceptual 
association, as all variables describe actions related to the CEO. These actions encompass 
some level of controlling; therefore the factor was labelled as controlling CEO (RCEO1). 
The mean score for the RCEO1 factor –measured on a seven-point scale- is 4.42 (SD= 
2.22), which indicated that respondents believe they fairly contribute to this role. 
Interestingly, the high standard deviation reveals that respondents have a scattered 
perception of this role. 
Moreover, reliability –also explained in chapter 4- is an assessment of the degree of 
consistency between multiple measurements of a construct. In this thesis this is measured 
with the Cronbach’s alpha where a result higher than 0.6 is accepted (except from one 
case, where relevant justification and support is offered). The Cronbach’s alpha score for 
the six items is 0.947 (for the remaining 6 items), which is satisfactory. Moreover, last 
column of Table 6.5 shows that reliability would only be slightly increased with deletion of 
the last item (i.e. monitor CEO in decision making). However, since the item seems to be 
relevant to the factor and the increase of a would be only by 0.006, it was decided not to 
delete the variable.  
In addition, the ‘corrected item-total correlation’ is presented in the Table, showing 
that all items have a strong correlation with the total score of the factor. (see Field, 2009: 
678; Blunch, 2008: 40). Specifically, by following the recommendation made by Field 
(2009: 678), if the correlation of any item is found to be less than 0.3 with the sum of the 
rest, the item(s) may be deleted and the correlation test should be run again to see if any 
further item deletions are found appropriate.  
It should be noted that Blunch (2008: 40) argues that often a minimum of 0.4 is 
accepted, however it was considered strict for the current study and the limit of 0.3 was 
used. In Table 6.5, the ‘corrected item-total correlation is presented’, with all remaining 
items having a correlation higher than 0.3. 
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Table 6.5: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Controlling CEO’ Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.947 .947 6 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
involve in firing CEOs 22.32 119.626 .863 .806 .935 
involve in hiring CEOs 22.19 118.748 .909 .851 .929 
involve in determining salary/ 
compensation of CEO 
22.48 118.091 .887 .797 .932 
evaluate the CEO's 
performance 
21.89 126.745 .843 .742 .937 
engage in succession planning 
for CEO 
21.83 125.253 .843 .734 .937 
monitor CEO in decision 
making 
21.96 140.363 .700 .528 .953 
 
 6.5.2.2 Factor 2: Providing Service (RSER2)  
 
The second factor consists of six variables with high loadings and an eigenvalue of 
3.89 that is high. The six items for this factor are: ‘involve in mission articulation’, 
‘involve in the development of the corporate vision’, ‘monitor top management in decision 
making’, ‘contribute in diffusion of organisational innovation’, ‘monitor strategy 
implementation’ and ‘review social responsibilities of the firm’. 
This second factor appears to describe how directors assist in shaping strategic 
direction by providing various services. Thus, the factor was labelled as providing service 
(RSER2) and measured on a seven-point Likert scale it has a mean of 5.50 (SD= 1.12). 
This result indicates that respondents seem to overall strongly contribute to this function of 
the board. It is important to clarify here, that although each of these items might be 
described with different terms like involve, monitor, contribute and review, they all seem 
to describe directors providing some sort of service to the board that can be also 
characterised as relevant to the strategic direction of the company. 
The Cronbach alpha score to test reliability of this factor was 0.854 for the six 
factors and there is no item whose deletion would result in an improved reliability (i.e. 
improved alpha). Additionally, the item to total correlation for all questions is above 0.5 
that is satisfactory (Table 6.6). 
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Table 6.6: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Providing Service’ Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.854 .856 6 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
involve in mission articulation 27.31 29.975 .771 .713 .803 
involve in the development of 
the corporate vision 
27.13 31.392 .792 .731 .802 
monitor top management in 
decision making 
27.80 31.609 .654 .453 .827 
contribute in diffusion of 
organisational innovation 
28.30 31.778 .566 .366 .847 
monitor Strategy 
Implementation 
27.17 36.622 .531 .331 .848 
review social responsibilities 
of the firm 
27.42 33.933 .564 .382 .843 
 
 6.5.2.3 Factor 3: Controlling External Contingencies (RCEC3)  
 
The third factor is explained by four variables that capture activities in relation to 
maintaining relations and improving the firm image. These activities are: ‘act as 
ambassador of the firm’, ‘build organisational reputation’, ‘link the firm to important 
stakeholders or other important entities’ and finally, ‘bolster the image of the firm’.  
As a result, the label used for this factor is controlling external contingencies 
(RCEC3) and the mean score for this seven-point scale measure is 5.91 (SD= 1.06). 
Respondents seem to strongly perceive this role as core to their responsibilities as it has the 
second highest mean among all roles.  
The reliability of this factor is satisfactory as the Cronbach alpha was 0.859 and 
there is no deletion of any item that would increase the score. Moreover, all items 
correlated strongly with the total of the latent variable as all scores are above 0.5 (Table 
6.7). 
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Table 6.7: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Controlling External Contingencies’ 
Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.859 .858 5 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
act as ambassador for the firm 23.44 17.694 .737 .643 .813 
build organisational reputation 23.51 18.186 .725 .675 .816 
link the firm to important 
stakeholders or other 
important entities 
23.77 18.557 .727 .644 .816 
bolster the image of the firm 23.84 19.650 .609 .401 .846 
maintain relations with 
stakeholders 
23.60 19.731 .581 .560 .853 
 
 6.5.2.4 Factor 4: Involvement in Strategy (RIIS4) 
 
The fourth factor comprises four items that seem to describe activities related to 
strategy involvement. In specific, the questions that captured the factor that was named as 
involvement in strategy (RIIS4) are: ‘constructively criticise/ ask probing questions’, ‘call 
for revisions of strategic proposals’, ‘ratify strategic proposals’ and ‘act as a “sounding 
board” on strategic issues’.  
The mean score for this factor is 6.29 (SD= 0.77) which is the highest scoring 
factor, showing the high importance perceived by the respondents. Also, it should be noted 
that this role has similarities with the providing service role, however for this one the items 
have a more direct relation to strategy. 
Moreover, the Cronbach’s alpha for this role was found 0.820, which indicates 
satisfactory reliability of the scale, and there is no item with whose deletion the score 
would be increased. Furthermore, the item-total correlation shows that all items are 
correlated to the total score of the factor (Table 6.8). 
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Table 6.8: Reliability Analysis for the ‘ Involvement in Strategy’ Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.820 .822 4 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
constructively criticise/ask 
probing questions 
18.78 5.748 .646 .440 .772 
call for revisions of strategic 
proposals 
18.98 5.483 .640 .412 .775 
ratify strategic proposals 18.74 5.698 .699 .495 .750 
act as a "sounding board" on 
strategic issues 
19.00 5.596 .594 .362 .798 
 
 6.5.2.5 Factor 5: Seeking Internal Information (RSII5) 
 
The fifth factor consists of only two items that clearly capture the role of directors 
in seeking internal information. Specifically, the two items included in the seeking internal 
information (RSII5) factor are:  ‘seek information from the CEO or another inside director 
regarding the progress of strategic decisions’ and ‘seek information from the CEO or 
another inside director in order to evaluate the performance of top management’.  
The mean score for this factor is 5.44 (SD= 1.39) indicating that the respondents 
rate this role as important among their other responsibilities. The reliability of this factor is 
high, as the Cronbach’s α is 0.706. The correlation to the item-total is acceptable and it 
should be noted that it is the same in both cases, which can be explained by the fact that 
the factor has only two items. For the same reason, there is no score given for the 
Cronbach’s α if one of the items was deleted, as this would result to a one item factor 
(Table 6.9). The combination of the Cronbach’s α and the item-total correlation seem to 
cover the different views of scholars on how reliability should be tested when having a 
two-item scale (Eisinga et al., 2013: 637). 
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Table 6.9: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Seeking Internal Information’ Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.706 .708 2 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
seek information from the 
CEO or another inside 
director regarding the progress 
of strategic decisions 
5.17 2.727 .548 .300 . 
seek information from the 
CEO or another inside 
director in order to evaluate 
the performance of top 
management 
5.71 2.281 .548 .300 . 
 
 6.5.2.6 Factor 6: Controlling Top Management Executives (RTME6) 
 
The last factor extracted with an eigenvalue higher than 1.0 was called controlling 
top management executives (RTME6) and similarly to the fifth factor it consists of only 
two items. These items are: ‘involve in determining salary/ compensation of top 
management’ and ‘engage in succession planning for top managers besides CEO’. The 
factor has a mean score of 4.43 (SD= 1.60), which based on the respondents perception 
shows that they contribute moderately to this role. 
The reliability of this scale is 0.702 and the correlation of the items to total are 
satisfactory, being above 0.5 (Table 6.10). There is no Cronbach score presented for 
deletion of any item, as this would mean only having one item as a factor. 
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Table 6.10: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Controlling Top Management’ Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.702 .703 2 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
involve in determining salary/ 
compensation of top 
management 
5.10 3.379 .542 .294 . 
engage in succession planning 
for top managers besides CEO 
4.89 3.766 .542 .294 . 
 
 6.5.3 Component Analysis of the External Environment Measurement 
 
Following the same steps for the analysis of the external environment, the 16 
items/questions were selected to run component analysis. The preliminary analysis 
indicated that one question should be deleted, due to a score in the anti-image correlation 
matrix lower than the accepted 0.5. This item was “shortages of labour” and its score was 
0.418. Therefore, a visual scan of the component matrix was followed, identifying a cross-
loading with similar results for one item. The item was ‘product competition’ and its 
deletion was decided -as it loaded into two factors with loadings differing less than 0.1.  
Running the analysis again, without the one variable that was deleted, all scores in 
the anti-image correlation analysis were above the acceptable minimum limit of 0.5. 
Moreover, the communalities of the variables were checked in order to confirm that they 
share satisfactory level of variance (i.e. squared standard deviation). The communality of 
the two variables was below the acceptable limit of 0.5 (Hair et al., 2006: 149), so it was 
decided to remove them. These variables were “demand and consumer tastes are” and 
“severe regulatory restrictions”.  
Furthermore, the results of factor analysis were checked, to spot any problems with 
the loadings of each factor. The 13 items loaded in 4 different factors and it was decided to 
delete the items having cross-loadings, following the same decision as in the roles 
construct (i.e. items that have very similar loadings). By doing this, 2 items were deleted in 
one stage, which resulted in maintaining 11 items. The items deleted from this process are 
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“the rate at which products/ services are becoming obsolete in the industry is…” and “the 
production/ service technology…”.  
After concluding to the final number of items that would capture the external 
environment, the KMO measure was used to test the measure of sampling adequacy 
(MSA) of the data. This was found to be 0.760, which is good (Kaiser and Rice, 1974: 112; 
Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999, cited in Field, 2009: 659). Next, the result of Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity was found to be significant (p=0.000), demonstrating significant 
correlations among the remaining variables (Table 6.11). 
 
Table 6.11: KMO and Bartlett’s Test for the factorability of External 
Environment 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .760 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 305.604 
df 55 
Sig. .000 
  
Moreover, after the preliminary tests of the external environment construct, four 
factors were excluded for the 11 items that were finally included in the factor analysis. The 
criterion used for retaining four factors, was again Kaiser’s (1960: 147) recommendation, 
(i.e. latent root criterion). However, it is interesting to note that in the case of this construct 
the solution is similar to one of the possible solutions resulting from the scree plot (Figure 
6.2).  
 As a result, the four factors were found to explain 72.02% of the total variance (see 
Table 6.12). The eigenvalues and the percentages of variance for each factor are presented 
in the Table before and after rotation. Similarly to the roles of directors construct, various 
rotation methods were examined and no significant differences were spotted so it was 
decided to use orthogonal rotation (i.e. VARIMAX). Also, it was considered as important 
to keep consistency in the methods used throughout this thesis, which helped in choosing 
the same rotation method.  
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Table 6.12: Total Variance Explained for External Environment  
Total Variance Explained 
Comp 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive % 
1 3.986 36.235 36.235 3.986 36.235 36.235 2.647 24.066 24.066 
2 1.715 15.587 51.822 1.715 15.587 51.822 2.093 19.025 43.091 
3 1.162 10.560 62.382 1.162 10.560 62.382 1.707 15.515 58.606 
4 1.060 9.639 72.021 1.060 9.639 72.021 1.476 13.415 72.021 
5 .711 6.460 78.480       
6 .652 5.927 84.408       
7 .576 5.234 89.642       
8 .406 3.690 93.332       
9 .316 2.872 96.204       
10 .238 2.159 98.363       
11 .180 1.637 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Figure 6.2: Scree Plot on Component Analysis of External Environment  
 
After the analysis of all necessary tests, deletion of items and the selection of 
rotation method, the 11 items loaded with relatively high scores to the four factors 
presented in Table 6.13 and showing a satisfactory structure. Similarly to the analysis of 
the directors’ roles construct, factor loadings below the value 0.4 were supressed, which is 
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in agreement to Blunch (2008: 65) and Field (2009: 661). The following sections will 
discuss each one of the factors and the labelling that will be used to describe them.  
 
Table 6.13:Summary of Principal Component Analysis  for External 
Environment 
 1 2 3 4 
The nature of the competition... .889    
Required methods of production or service... .836    
Customers’ buying habits... .798    
Shortages of Raw Material  .784   
Unfavourable Demographic Trends  .776   
Distribution Competition  .765   
Technological Competition   .799  
Product Competition .513  .710  
Price Competition   .641  
Actions of competitors are...    .846 
Our business unit must change its marketing 
practices to keep up with the market and 
competitors... 
   .690 
Eigenvalues 2.65 2.09 1.71 1.48 
% of Variance 24.07 19.03 15.52 13.42 
Cumulative % 24.07 43.09 58.61 72.02 
Cronbach’s Alpha .852 .712 .618 .383 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
 6.5.3.1 Factor 1: Environmental Complexity (ECOM1) 
 
The first factor consists of three variables that loaded highly on the factor and 
generated an eigenvalue of 2.65. Specifically the three variables are: ‘the nature of the 
competition...’, ‘required methods of production or service...’ and ‘customers’ buying 
habits...’. 
It is evident that the three questions correspond to the complexity dimension of the 
environment that has been discussed in previous chapters. Therefore the factor was 
labelled as environmental complexity (ECOM1). The mean score for the ECOM1 factor –
measured on a seven-point scale- is 3.72 (SD= 1.67), which indicated that respondents 
perceive the environment as moderately complex.  
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Additionally, the Cronbach’s alpha score for the three items is 0.852, which shows 
satisfactory reliability of the scale. Moreover, last column of Table 6.14 shows that alpha 
would be slightly increased with deletion of the middle item (i.e. Required methods of 
production or service...). Nevertheless, since the item seems to be relevant to the factor and 
the increase of -an already high- alpha would be only by 0.006, it was decided not to delete 
the variable. Finally, the ‘corrected item-total correlation’ is presented in the Table, 
showing that all items have a strong correlation with the total score of the factor.  
 
Table 6.14: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Environmental Complexity’ Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.852 .852 3 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
The nature of the 
competition... 
7.53 10.529 .793 .638 .725 
Required methods of 
production or service... 
7.69 11.895 .651 .437 .858 
Customers’ buying habits... 7.52 10.486 .729 .577 .788 
 
 6.5.3.2 Factor 2: Micro-Environmental Hostility (EMHO2) 
 
The second factor consists of three questions with high loadings and an eigenvalue 
of 2.09 that is high. In details, the three items are ‘shortages of raw material’, 
‘unfavourable demographic trends’ and ‘distribution competition’. The labelling for this 
factor was more challenging, as although the three questions have common features they 
are not easily identified. Nevertheless, it was decided to label this factor as micro-
environmental hostility (EMHO2) as all items seem to concern issues related to the 
microenvironment of the organisation. The mean for the factor is 3.59 (SD= 1.26) showing 
that respondents perceive it as moderately important. 
The Cronbach alpha score was 0.712, showing acceptable reliability of the factor 
and there is no item’s deletion that would result in higher reliability (Table 6.15). Finally, 
the item to total correlation is acceptable as the lowest one is 0.482. 
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Table 6.15: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Micro-Environmental Hostility’ 
Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.712 .712 3 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Shortages of Raw Material 7.55 7.611 .482 .235 .680 
Unfavourable Demographic 
Trends 
7.08 6.980 .535 .298 .617 
Distribution Competition 6.87 6.809 .577 .336 .563 
 
 6.5.3.3 Factor 3: Competitive Hostility (ECHO3) 
 
The third factor is also explained by three variables that capture elements of the 
competitive environment and as such, it was decided to label it as competitive hostility 
(ECHO3) of the environment. The elements comprising this factor are ‘technological 
competition’, ‘product competition’ and ‘price competition’. 
The mean score for this seven-point scale measure is 4.31 (SD= 1.24), which 
indicates that in contrast to the previous factor (i.e. micro-environmental hostility), 
respondents perceive a strong competition -and in turn a hostile environment- in the 
grounds of technology, product and price. 
The reliability test is acceptable, although relatively low, as Cronbach’s alpha score 
is 0.618. In addition, although deletion of “price competition” item would increase the 
score to 0.699, it was decided to keep the item, as it is conceptually relevant to the other 
items and the factor. Also, the item to total correlation of the same item is slightly lower 
(0.289) than the recommended 0.3, but for the same reason it was decided to maintain it in 
the scale (Table 6.16). 
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Table 6.16: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Competitive Hostility’ Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.618 .617 3 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Technological Competition 8.65 6.253 .479 .296 .439 
Product Competition 8.59 6.440 .529 .316 .370 
Price Competition 8.18 8.108 .289 .087 .699 
 
 6.5.3.4 Factor 4: Environmental Dynamism (EDYN4) 
 
The last factor of the external environment scale comprises two items. These items 
are ‘actions of competitors are…’ and ‘our business unit must change its marketing 
practices to keep up with the market and competitors...’. Since these two items seem to 
capture predictability and rate of change, it was decided to label the factor environmental 
dynamism (EDYN4). 
The mean score of the factor is 4.64 (SD= 1.03) being the highest scoring factor of 
external environment. This means that respondents see the environment of their 
organisations as quite dynamic.  
The reliability of this scale based on Cronbach alpha is 0.383 that is low, however 
this does not necessary indicate an unreliable scale and can be explained in various ways. 
Firstly, various scholars have been discussing issues arising in measuring reliability 
of a two-item scale. While many researchers keep using the Cronbach’s alpha as a measure 
of reliability in two-item scales (e.g. Lowe et al., 2005; Young et al. 2009), others claim 
that coefficient alpha is meaningless in two-item scales and they suggest Pearson 
correlation to be used instead (e.g. Sainfort and Booske, 2013; O’Brien et al., 2008). 
Moreover, there are authors arguing that Pearson correlation between items is similar to 
the split-half reliability measure; thus, they suggest Spearman-Brown formula to estimate 
the reliability, while the result is never lower than alpha and usually found to be higher 
(Eisinga et al. 2013). Following these studies, Spearman-Brown score was also checked 
and found almost identical result with the alpha coefficient (i.e. Spearman-Brown=.384, 
while α=.383).  
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Secondly, while the above leaves concerns about the reliability of the specific 
scale, Van de Ven and Ferry (1980: 78-80) claim that another important criterion for 
developing a standard for coefficient alpha -in addition to the number of items in a scale- is 
the breadth of the factor, that can be understood as the number of distinct terms/elements 
necessary to define the meaning of the factor. They further argue that combinations of 
these two criteria, can lead to accepting alpha coefficients from 0.35 to 0.90. Powell (1996: 
328) used this approach reinforcing the argument, as they computed factors scoring lower 
than 0.6.  
In the case of environmental dynamism factor, two elements are needed to define 
the factor based on the literature, that is ‘predictability’ and ‘rate of change’.  
Taking into account the two elements needed to define the factor and the fact that 
the minimum number of items are used for this the scale (two), it was decided to accept the 
score for this factor.  
Furthermore, the low reliability of the dynamism scale could be explained by the 
fact that although the literature repeatedly uses dynamism as a critical dimension, Downey 
et al. (1975: 625) argue that it is not as important contributor as complexity. Last but not 
least, the low score can be explained by the ambiguity of the factors perceived to capture 
the dimension as conceptualised by Davis et al. (2009: 423). 
 Concluding from the above, it was decided to accept the low reliability score and 
use the dimension, as it is regarded important in further analysis (Table 6.17). 
 
Table 6.17: Reliability Analysis for the ‘Environmental Dynamism’  Factor 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.383 .384 2 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Actions of competitors are... 5.13 1.729 .237 .056 . 
Our business unit must change 
its marketing practices to keep 
up with the market and 
competitors... 
4.06 1.528 .237 .056 . 
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6.5.4 Summary of Conducted Validity Tests 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, validity of an instrument should be tested through 
different methods. The approach used to test validity and reliability was the one suggested 
by Venkatraman and Grant (1986). Specifically, the components tested were content 
validity, internal consistency, reliability, convergent and discriminant validity and 
nomological validity. 
In specific, content validity was achieved during the design process of the 
instrument by adopting the variables from other academic studies as it was expected that 
the already tested measures would have higher validity. As next step, scholars considered 
as experts in the field of corporate governance (e.g. Prof. Amy Hillman and Prof. Stephen 
Perkins) were approached through email with an attached questionnaire and their 
suggestions were taken into account. 
Internal consistency according to Venkatraman and Grant (1986) includes both 
unidimensionality and reliability. The unidimensionality was checked with the exploratory 
factor analysis making sure that each item reflects one specific construct. On the other 
hand, reliability was checked for each factor by utilising the widely used coefficient of 
alpha (Cronbach’s α). Internal consistency measures are presented in earlier sections. 
Moreover, convergent validity was checked by looking at the correlations among 
variables within the same factor and also the correlation of each variable with the total of 
the items in the factor (Venkatraman and Grant, 1986). The results were satisfactory 
indicating that there is high convergent validity for both constructs. 
Running correlations between the different latent variables created, tested 
discriminant validity. Inter-correlation values less than 0.60 suggest discriminant validity 
(Gaur et al., 2011: 1768). All correlations were less than the recommended value of 0.60 
(Tables 6.18 and 6.19) except from the one between ‘controlling CEO’ and ‘controlling top 
management executives’. This result seems reasonable, as although the two latent variables 
represent controlling of different people, the nature of the role is similar.  
Finally, nomological validity that assesses the “degree that the summated scale 
makes accurate predictions of other concepts” (Hair et al., 2006: 138) has been indirectly 
examined in the following chapter. This was achieved by checking the extent to which 
predictions from the formal theoretical model, including the latent variable in 
investigation, are confirmed.  
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Table 6.18: Correlation Test Between Latent Variables of Directors’ Roles  
 Controlling 
CEO 
Providing 
Service 
Controlling 
External 
Contingencie
s 
Involvement 
in Strategy 
Seeking 
Internal 
Information 
Controlling 
Top 
Management 
Executives 
Controlling CEO 1      
Providing Service .152 1     
Controlling 
External 
Contingencies 
.064 .461** 1    
Involvement in 
Strategy 
.240 .446** .428** 1   
Seeking Internal 
Information 
.290* .366** .193 .461** 1  
Controlling Top 
Management 
Executives 
.810** .303* .090 .304* .256* 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Listwise: N=67 
 
Table 6.19: Correlation Test Between Latent Variables of Environment 
 Environmental 
Complexity 
Macro-
Environmental 
Hostility 
Competitive 
Hostility 
Environmental 
Dynamism 
Environmental Complexity 1    
Micro-Environmental 
Hostility 
.273* 1   
Competitive Hostility .443** .374** 1  
Environmental Dynamism .389** .190 .322** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Listwise: N=75 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has provided the results and analysis of the various factors that resulted 
from the principal component analysis method. This was applied in order to identify the 
underlying structure of the questions used to capture the two main constructs (i.e. 36 for 
roles of directors and 16 for external environment). The method extracted six factors for 
the roles of directors and three factors for the external environment.  
In addition the validity and reliability of the scales used was tested in the chapter and 
the summated scales that will be used in the further statistical analysis of the following 
chapter were created. 
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Chapter 7: Correlation and Multiple Regression Analysis 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
 Chapter 5 presented the descriptive findings that resulted from the study’s 
conducted survey. Previous chapter presented the principal component analysis conducted 
for the two main constructs of the study, in order to reduce the number of variables 
capturing the dimensions/elements of each construct (i.e. roles of directors and external 
environment). Data reduction is considered an important process, as the factors that 
derived from this process are useful for the more complex statistical techniques that will 
follow in this chapter.  
These techniques are utilised so as to examine the potential relationships among the 
constructs that are discussed in the theoretical model of the study. Therefore, by 
investigating these potential relationships the propositions and hypotheses formed in 
chapter 3 will be either supported or rejected.  
The next section will review the four variables used to capture the board 
characteristics, the two used to describe the director’s (i.e. respondent’s) status in board 
and the three used to capture the organisational characteristics. Along with the ten factors 
extracted in the previous chapter—six factors for directors’ roles and four factors for 
environment—correlation analysis will be conducted to test relationships between the 
nineteen in total scales formed. Furthermore, multiple regression analysis will be run, 
testing the effect of the independent variables to the dependent. 
7.2 Description of Remaining (Non-Factor) Variables 
 
 The analysis also includes variables that are not subject to principal component 
analysis. The reason is that each of these variables was only measured with one 
item/question so no reduction technique was needed. In addition, while these variables are 
viewed as ‘one-item scales’ recoding was needed for some of them. 
 7.2.1 Board Characteristics  
  
Board characteristics were measured with four variables described below. Board 
size was measured as the number of board members serving in the board and is a variable 
measured at the ratio level. CEO duality is a dichotomous nominal variable measured by 
asking respondents if the board’s CEO also serves as a Chairperson (i.e. 1=yes, 2=no). 
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Frequency of Meetings was measured at an ordinal level with 5 options (i.e. 1=every 
fortnight, 2=every month, 3=every 3 months, 4=twice per year, 5=yearly). This variable 
was reversed so that it really corresponds to the variable’s name (i.e. the higher the value, 
the higher the frequency of meetings). Ratio of independent directors is a (ratio) variable 
resulting from the division of absolute number of independent directors over the board 
size. 
 7.2.2 Director’s Status 
 
The status of the directors (respondents) was measured with two variables 
described below. Status in Board was measured at an ordinal level with 3 given options 
(i.e. 1=executive, 2=non-executive/affiliated, 3=non-executive/independent). Tenure in 
board was measured at a ratio level, asking respondents how many years they serve in the 
company’s board. 
 7.2.3 Organisational Characteristics 
 
The organisational characteristics were measured with three variables.  
Organisational size was measured at a ratio level, by asking respondents about the 
number of employees working in the organisation. Recording the year of organisation’s 
establishment captured organisational age, however this variable also needed to be 
reversed. Before reversing the variable, the larger values (more recent years) indicated a 
younger age. The reverse score transformation is achieved by subtracting each value from 
the highest recorded value (i.e. the year 2010), which results in having large scores being 
small and small becoming large (Field, 2009: 155). Finally, listed/non-listed was a 
dichotomous nominal variable measuring whether the company is listed or not to a stock 
exchange market (1=yes, 2= no). 
7.3 Summary of all Scales (Factor and Non-Factor) Included in 
Further Analysis 
  
After providing the results of the principal component analysis in Chapter 6 and the 
description of remaining non-factor variables in previous section, a total of sixteen 
variables has resulted, summarised in the Table 7.1 below. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of all Scales 
Constructs Dimensions No. of 
Variables 
Directors’ Roles Controlling CEO 6 
Providing Service 6 
Controlling External Contingencies 5 
Involvement in Strategy 4 
Seeking Internal Information 2 
Controlling TMT 2 
External Environment Complexity 3 
Macro-Environmental Hostility 3 
Competitive Hostility 3 
Dynamism 2 
Board Characteristics Board Size 1 
CEO Duality 1 
Frequency of Meetings 1 
Ratio of Independent 1 
Director’s Status Status in board 1 
Tenure in Board 1 
Organisational Characteristics Company Size 1 
Company Age 1 
Listed/Non-Listed 1 
 
7.4 Correlation Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
 
 The following two sections present the results from the correlation analysis and test 
hypotheses based on the correlation results before proceeding to the regression analysis. 
7.4.1 Correlation Analysis 
 
The sixteen new scales were examined through correlation analysis, in order to 
understand the extent of relationships between the dependent and independent variables. 
More specifically, both Pearson and Spearman’s correlation analyses were run to test the 
potential relationships of directors’ roles (dependent) with the external environment, the 
board characteristics and directors’ status (independent). In addition, organisational 
characteristics were also included in the analysis (control variables), to check whether they 
have any relationships with the directors’ roles. 
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The following table (Table 7.2) illustrates the results of Pearson’s correlations. 
Also, in order to avoid having a separate table presenting the Spearman’s correlations, 
notes have been made to the footnote of the table, where the relationships—or significance 
levels—were found to be different. There were minor differences found between the two 
methods thus, it was decided to report the Pearson results in the following paragraphs. 
The first dependent variable—controlling CEO—was found to correlate with 7 
independent variables. In specific, it was significantly and positively associated with the 
ratio of independent directors (p<0.01), the director’s status in board (p<0.01) and CEO 
duality (p<0.05). Moreover, a significant negative relationship was found with 
environmental dynamism (p<0.1), board size (p<0.1), company age (p<0.05) and 
listed/non-listed (p<0.05).  
The second dependent variable—providing service—was only found to correlate 
with one variable. Specifically, it was found to significantly (p<0.1) correlate with 
environmental complexity and the relationship was negative, and relatively weak. 
The third dependent variable—controlling external contingencies—was found to 
associate with four independent variables. A significant positive association was found 
with environmental dynamism (p<0.1) and director’s tenure in board (p<0.1). On the other 
hand, a significant negative relationship was found with the ratio of independent directors 
in the board (p<0.01) and the director’s status in board (p<0.01). 
The fourth dependent variable—involvement in strategy—was found to be 
associated with two variables. In specific, a significant positive relationship was found 
with environmental complexity (p<0.01) and with frequency of board meetings (p<0.01). 
The fifth dependent variable—seeking internal information—did not correlate with 
any of the variables, indicating no relationship of the factor with any potential predictors. 
The sixth dependent variable—controlling TMT—was found to significantly 
correlate with four variables. Controlling TMT was positively associated with the ratio of 
independent directors in the board (p<0.01) and with the director’s status in the board. On 
the other hand, a negative association was identified with environmental dynamism and 
board size. 
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Table 7.2 Correlation Analysis Findings  
Dependent Controlling CEO 
 
Providing Service 
 
Controlling 
External 
Contingencies 
Involvement in 
Strategy 
Seeking Internal 
Information 
Controlling TMT 
Independent 
External Environment  
Complexity -0.028 -0.191*4 0.084 .293*** -0.035 -0.091 
N 75 84 91 90 83 81 
Macro-Envir. Hostility 0.046 -0.085 -0.111 0.094 0.038 0.043 
 60 71 75 73 66 63 
Competitive Hostility -0.040 0.096 -0.015 0.1636 -0.010 -0.048 
N 73 83 89 88 81 79 
Dynamism -0.194*1 -0.176 0.174* 0.146
7 0.094 -0.208*9 
N 75 84 91 90 83 81 
Board Characteristics 
Board Size -0.210* -0.133 -0.068 -0.120 -0.036 -.241** 
N 71 78 85 84 78 77 
CEO Duality .270** -0.005 0.012 0.136 0.134 0.147 
N 70 77 84 83 77 76 
Frequency of Meetings  -0.026 0.178 0.139 .222**8 0.089 0.156 
N 71 78 85 84 78 77 
Ratio of Independent .464*** -0.092 -.296*** -0.016 -0.104 .299*** 
N 68 73 80 79 75 74 
Director’s Status 
Status in Board .527*** -0.163 -.504*** -0.039 -0.050 .371*** 
N 71 78 85 84 78 77 
Tenure in Board 0.122 0.113 0.195*5 0.100 0.173 0.173 
N 70 78 85 84 77 76 
Organisational Characteristics 
Company Size 0.048 -0.050 0.025 -0.082 -0.024 0.078 
N 66 71 78 77 73 72 
Company Age -.279** 2 -0.044 0.019 -0.116 -0.057 -0.183 
N 68 73 80 79 75 74 
Listed/Non-listed -.264**3 0.024 -0.045 -0.132 -0.142 -0.118 
N 67 72 79 78 74 73 
Pearson’s coefficient: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
Spearman’s Rho (when different from Pearson’s results) 1: No Significant; 2: No Significant; 3: Significant at 0.01 level; 4: No Significant; 5: Significant at 0.01 level; 6: 
Significant at 0.10 level; 7: Significant at 0.10 level; 8: No Significant; 9: No Significant
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7.4.2 Hypothesis Testing based on Correlation Analysis 
 Based on the correlation findings discussed in previous section and presented in 
Table 7.2, an initial hypotheses testing can be provided. As such, Table 7.3 summarises the 
propositions and relative hypotheses made in Chapter 3, by showing whether they are 
fully, partially or not supported. Furthermore, the section following will provide the results 
from the multiple regression analysis. The hypotheses provided below are the alternative 
(H1) and they appear to be supported when the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected. 
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Table 7.3 Hypotheses Testing Based on Correlation Analysis  
Propositions Hypotheses Result 
PA1: Board Control is related to environmental complexity. Not supported 
 HA1a: Controlling CEO is positively related to environmental complexity. Not supported 
 HA1b: Controlling TMT is positively related to environmental complexity. Not supported 
 HA1c: Seeking internal information is positively related to environmental complexity. Not supported 
PA2: Board Control is related to environmental dynamism. Partially supported 
 HA2a: Controlling CEO is positively related to environmental dynamism. Not supported* 
 HA2b: Controlling TMT is positively related to environmental dynamism. Not supported* 
 HA2c: Seeking internal information is positively related to environmental dynamism. Not Supported 
PA3: Board Control is related to environmental munificence. Not supported 
 HA3a: Controlling CEO is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. Not supported 
 HA3b: Controlling TMT is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. Not supported 
 HA3c: Seeking internal information is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. Not supported 
 HA3d: Controlling CEO is positively related to competitive hostility. Not supported 
 HA3e: Controlling TMT is positively related to competitive hostility. Not supported 
 HA3f: Seeking internal information is positively related to competitive hostility. Not supported 
PA4: Board Control is related to various board characteristics. Partially supported 
 HA4a: Controlling CEO is negatively related to board size. Supported 
 HA4b: Controlling TMT is negatively related to board size. Supported 
 HA4c: Seeking internal information is positively related to board size. Not supported 
 HA4d: Controlling CEO is lower when there is CEO duality. Supported 
 HA4e: Controlling TMT is lower when there is CEO duality. Not supported 
 HA4f: Seeking internal information is lower when there is CEO duality. Not supported 
 HA4g: Controlling CEO is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. Supported 
 HA4h: Controlling TMT is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. Supported 
 HA4i: Seeking internal information is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. Not supported 
 HA4j: Controlling CEO is positively related to frequency of meetings. Not supported 
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 HA4k: Controlling TMT is positively related to frequency of meetings. Not supported 
 HA4l: Seeking internal information is positively related to frequency of meetings. Not supported 
PA5: Board Control is related to respondent’s status in board. Partially supported 
 HA5a: Controlling CEO is higher when respondent’s status is independent. Supported 
 HA5b: Controlling TMT is higher when respondent’s status is independent. Supported 
 HA5c: Seeking internal information is higher when respondent’s status is independent. Not supported 
 HA5d: Controlling CEO is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. Not supported 
 HA5e: Controlling TMT is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. Not supported 
 HA5f: Seeking internal information is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. Not supported 
PB1: Resource Provision is related to environmental complexity. Partially supported 
 HB1a: Providing Service is positively related to environmental complexity. Not supported* 
 HB1b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to environmental complexity. Not supported 
PB2: Resource Provision is related to environmental dynamism. Not supported 
 HB2a: Providing Service is positively related to environmental dynamism. Not supported 
 HB2b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to environmental dynamism. Not supported 
PB3: Resource Provision is related to environmental munificence. Not supported 
 HB3a: Providing Service is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. Not supported 
 HB3b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to macro-environmental 
hostility. 
Not supported 
 HB3c: Providing Service is positively related to competitive hostility. Not supported 
 HB3d: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to competitive hostility. Not supported 
PB4: Resource Provision is related to various board characteristics. Partially supported 
 HB4a: Providing Service is positively related to board size. Not supported 
 HB4b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to board size. Not supported 
 HB4c: Providing Service is lower when there is CEO duality. Not supported 
 HB4d: Controlling external contingencies lower when there is CEO duality. Not supported 
 HB4e: Providing Service is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. Not supported 
 HB4f: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to the ratio of independent Supported 
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directors. 
 HB4g: Providing Service is positively related to frequency of meetings. Not supported 
 HB4h: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to frequency of meetings. Not supported 
PB5: Resource Provision is related to respondent’s status in board. Partially supported 
 HB5a: Providing Service is higher when respondent’s status is independent. Not supported 
 HB5b: Controlling external contingencies is higher when respondent’s status is independent. Not supported* 
 HB5c: Providing Service is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. Not supported 
 HB5d: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in 
board. 
Supported 
PC1: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental complexity. Supported 
 HC1a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to environmental complexity. Supported 
PC2: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental dynamism. Not supported 
 HC2a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to environmental dynamism. Not supported 
PC3: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental munificence. Not supported 
 HC3a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. Not supported 
 HC3b: Strategic Involvement is positively related to competitive hostility. Not supported 
PC4: Strategic Involvement is related to various board characteristics. Partially supported 
 HC4a: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-U relationship with board size. Not supported 
 HC4b: Strategic Involvement is lower when there is CEO duality. Not supported 
 HC4c: Strategic Involvement is negatively related to the ratio of independent directors. Not supported 
 HC4d: Strategic Involvement is positively related to frequency of meetings. Supported 
PC5: Strategic Involvement is related to respondent’s status in board. Not supported 
 HC5a: Strategic Involvement is higher when respondent’s status is independent. Not supported 
 HC5b: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-U relationship with the respondent’s tenure in 
board. 
Not supported 
*Opposite relationship found 
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7.5 Multiple Regression Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
 
In this section the hypothesised relationships developed in chapter 3 will be 
examined through the use of multiple regression analysis. These relationships concern the 
directors’ roles (dependent) with the external environment, the board characteristics and 
the directors’ status (independent). The previous section presented findings from the 
correlation analysis, showing some initial indications of potential relationships between 
variables. 
Since correlation analysis indicated that the three organisational characteristics 
variables do not correlate to the dependent variables—only two weak relationships were 
found—it was decided to leave these variables outside the further analysis. An additional 
reason for taking this decision is the low importance of the organisational characteristics in 
the theoretical model of the study. Organisational characteristics were suggested as control 
variables in this study and are not part of the main model—and its constructs—to be 
examined. 
Specifically, Table 7.4 presents the findings of all regression analyses conducted. 
Separate regression analyses were performed for each of the six dependent variables (i.e. 
directors’ roles). The table shows the standardised regression coefficients (Beta) of each 
independent variable for the six models, including the t-statistic and its significance level. 
Additionally, the coefficient of determination (R
2
) and the adjusted coefficient of 
determination (Adjusted R
2
), as well as the F-Ratio—explained to unexplained variance—
for each model are provided.  
Furthermore, multicollinearity tests will be provided in section 7.5.2 that follows, 
ensuring that independent variables—or predictors—do not highly correlate to each other, 
which is a needed condition when running regression analysis. 
7.5.1 Regression Analysis and Hypothesis Testing: Predicting Directors’ Roles 
 
As stated above, six regression analyses were applied, one for each dependent 
variable tested in the current study. In particular the dependent variables capturing 
director’s roles are controlling CEO, providing service, controlling external contingencies, 
involvement in strategy, seeking internal information and controlling TMT. The 
independent variables included in the model as predictors to the roles, were ten. 
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Specifically, four variables measured the external environment, four variables measured 
board characteristics and two variables measured director’s status. 
When looking at the overall results of the six models (Table 7.4), it can be observed 
that the coefficient of multiple determination (R
2
) ranges from 0.170 to 0.565. These 
figures show the extent to which variability in the dependent variables is explained by the 
independent variables. In other words, it is the extent to which the independent variables 
predict the dependent variable. Therefore, it can be said that the weakest model predicts 
17% of the dependent variable’s variation, while the strongest model predicts 56.5% of the 
dependent variable’s variation. 
While the R
2
 is a very useful statistic in determining the strength of the model in 
predicting the dependent variable, the adjusted R
2
 adds further value by also taking into 
account both the sample size and the number of independent variables (Hair et al., 2006: 
170). This means that while R
2
 increases even when a non-significant predictor is added to 
the model (i.e. problem termed as overfitting), adjusted R
2
 is more objective considering 
the number of observations per independent variable (Hair et al., 2006: 216). This becomes 
particularly useful when data with different sample sizes or different number of predictors 
are compared. Based on this approach (and the weak correlations), it was decided to 
exclude the three ‘organisational characteristics’ variables from the model, since by 
including them to the model, even though the R
2
 increased, the adjusted R
2
 decreased.  
Moreover, by looking again the results in Table 7.4, the adjusted R
2
 for all six 
models ranges from -0.14 to 0.456. The one negative value found indicates weakness of 
the model to predict the dependent variable (i.e. seeking internal information); this could 
be explained by either the large number of predictors (10) or by non-relevance of some 
predictors to this dependent variable. The other five models have a positive adjusted R
2
 
showing some power of prediction. 
At this point it is important to say that a main reason why the majority of the 
models did not show strong predictive power could be—among other things discussed in 
limitations of section 8.5 in the next chapter—the relatively low number of responses. The 
reason for this is the profile of the participants, who are regarded as very difficult to 
approach. The limited number of quantitative board studies seems to support this 
argument. As Pettigrew and Reber (2013: 343) said “many board members are reluctant to 
speak about their participation on corporate boards, and corporate executives may not see 
the work of researchers pursuing primary research of this kind as important, and thus 
requests get ignored or pushed to the side”.  
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Furthermore, the F-statistic was finally presented for the six models. The results 
show that F is significant for four out of the six models, ranging form .922 to 5.186. In 
short, this means that the four models predict the relevant dependent variables significantly 
well, while the other two do not. 
Following sections will discuss every model in detail, by providing supporting or 
rejecting the propositions and hypotheses formed in chapter 3. 
 
7.5.1.1 Model 1:  
 
Model 1 shows the impact that predictors have on controlling CEO role. In Chapter 
3, it was assumed that various dimensions from the external environment as well as various 
characteristics of the board and the respondents’ status would affect the extent to which the 
board controls the CEO. Specifically, the ten hypotheses that were developed are: 
 
  HA1a: Controlling CEO is positively related to environmental complexity. 
 HA2a: Controlling CEO is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
 HA3a: Controlling CEO is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
 HA3d: Controlling CEO is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 HA4a: Controlling CEO is negatively related to board size. 
 HA4d: Controlling CEO is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HA4g: Controlling CEO is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
 HA4j: Controlling CEO is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 HA5a: Controlling CEO is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
 HA5d: Controlling CEO is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
 
 Table 7.4 shows the overall fit of the model that has an R of 0.565 indicating that 
56.5% of the variation of the ‘controlling CEO’ role is explained by the independent 
variables. Moreover, the adjusted R
2 
of 0.456 or 45.6% shows that the predictive power of 
the model is still high, although slightly reduced when considering the sample size and the 
number of predictors in the morel. In addition, the F-statistic was found to be significant 
(F=5.186, p<0.001), indicating an overall strong power of the regression equation.  
 Moreover, by checking the independent variables of the model separately in Table 
7.4, it is noticed that board size (Beta=-0.406, t=-3.262, p<0.05), ratio of independent 
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directors (Beta=0.368, t=2.109, p<0.05) and the tenure of the respondents in the board 
(Beta=0.203, t=1.727, p<0.1), are significantly predictors to the role of directors in 
controlling the CEO.  
 As such, the following hypotheses were supported from this model: 
 
 HA4a: Controlling CEO is negatively related to board size. 
 HA4g: Controlling CEO is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
 HA5d: Controlling CEO is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
7.5.1.2 Model 2:  
 
Model 2 shows the equation used in order to to predict the providing service role of 
the board members. It was hypothesised that the providing service role is predicted from 
ten variables as follow: 
 
 HB1a: Providing Service is positively related to environmental complexity. 
 HB2a: Providing Service is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
 HB3a: Providing Service is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
 HB3c: Providing Service is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 HB4a: Providing Service is positively related to board size. 
 HB4c: Providing Service is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HB4e: Providing Service is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
 HB4g: Providing Service is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 HB5a: Providing Service is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
 HB5c: Providing Service is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
 
From Table 7.4, it is noticed that the model has a weak predictive power as the 
adjusted R
2
 is only 0.02 (2%) even though R
2
 is 0.19 (19%). The weakness of the model is 
also depicted by the low F-statistic that was not found to be significant (F=1.114). 
However, although the model does not have a strong power in predicting the 
dependent variable, it was found that competitive hostility is a variable that affects the role 
of directors in providing their services to the board (Beta=0.364, t=2.282, p<0.05). As a 
result only one hypothesis found support from model 2 which is: 
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 HB3c: Providing Service is positively related to competitive hostility. 
7.5.1.3 Model 3:  
 
Model 3 attempts to find the extent to which controlling external contingencies 
role of directors, is affected by the external environment, the board characteristics and the 
status of the respondents sitting in the board. In short, it was hypothesised that: 
 
 HB1b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to environmental 
complexity. 
 HB2b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to environmental 
dynamism. 
 HB3b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to macro-
environmental hostility. 
 HB3d: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to competitive 
hostility. 
 HB4b: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to board size. 
 HB4d: Controlling external contingencies lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HB4f: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to the ratio of 
independent directors. 
 HB4h: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to frequency of 
meetings. 
 HB5b: Controlling external contingencies is higher when respondent’s status is 
independent. 
 HB5d: Controlling external contingencies is positively related to the respondent’s 
tenure in board. 
 
As presented in Table 7.4, the R of the model is 0.33, showing that 33% of the 
variation in the role, can be explained from the independent variables. As expected, the 
adjusted R
2
 is slightly reduced, but still indicating a noteworthy predictive power of the 
model (0.199 or 19.9%). The F-statistic was also found to be significant (F=2.513, 
p<0.05). 
Furthermore, by looking at the individual variables included as predictors in the 
model, only one appears to be a significant predictor, while all other variables are found as 
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insignificant. The significant predictor is the status of the respondent sitting in the board—
i.e. executive or non-executive independent member—(Beta=-0.513, t=-3.217, p<0.05). 
From this model, only one relationship is found, however the hypothesis is rejected as the 
relationship has opposite direction: 
 
 HB5b: Controlling external contingencies is higher when respondent’s status is 
independent. 
7.5.1.4 Model 4:  
 
Model 4 shows the analysis used to test if the external environment, the board 
characteristics and the status of the respondents in the board affect the directors’ 
involvement in strategy. Specifically, the ten hypotheses that were developed are: 
 
HC1a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to environmental complexity 
HC2a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to environmental dynamism 
HC3a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
HC3b: Strategic Involvement is positively related to competitive hostility. 
HC4a: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-U relationship with board size. 
HC4b: Strategic Involvement is lower when there is CEO duality. 
HC4c: Strategic Involvement is negatively related to the ratio of independent 
directors. 
HC4d: Strategic Involvement is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
HC5a: Strategic Involvement is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
HC5b: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-U relationship with the respondent’s 
tenure in board. 
 
As observed in Table 7.4, the R of the model is 0.272, showing that 27.2% of the 
variation in the degree of involvement in strategy is explained by the independent 
variables. Moreover, the adjusted R
2
 for the regression equation is 0.123 and the F-statistic 
is significant with the value of 1.827 (p<0.1). 
By inspecting the independent variables of the model, it is found that three of them 
significantly contribute as predictors to the model. These are environmental complexity 
(Beta=0.311, t=2.013, p<0.05), CEO duality (Beta=0.329, t=2.334, p<0.05) and frequency 
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of meetings (Beta=0.261, t=2.056, p<0.05). Based on these results, three of the hypotheses 
of this model found support; these hypotheses are: 
 
HC1a: Strategic Involvement is positively related to environmental complexity 
HC4b: Strategic Involvement is lower when there is CEO duality. 
HC4d: Strategic Involvement is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
7.5.1.5 Model 5:  
 
Model 5 shows the regression equation used to examine the variables that were 
hypothesised as predictors of the seeking internal information role. In specific the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 were: 
 
 HA1c: Seeking internal information is positively related to environmental 
complexity. 
 HA2c: Seeking internal information is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
 HA3c: Seeking internal information is positively related to macro-environmental 
hostility. 
 HA3f: Seeking internal information is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 HA4c: Seeking internal information is positively related to board size. 
 HA4f: Seeking internal information is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HA4i: Seeking internal information is positively related to the ratio of independent 
directors. 
 HA4l: Seeking internal information is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 HA5c: Seeking internal information is higher when respondent’s status is 
independent. 
 HA5f: Seeking internal information is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in 
board. 
 
From Table 7.4 it is observed that the model has a low fit, with an R
2
 being 0.170, 
which is translated as 17% of the variation in the ‘seeking internal information’ being 
explained by the independent variables. Furthermore, the combination of the relatively low 
R
2
 for this model with the relatively low response rate resulted into a negative adjusted R
2
 
(-0.014), which indicates the weak power of the specific model. 
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However, two of the independent variables appear to have a significant relationship 
to the role that can be a useful outcome of the model. Specifically, both CEO duality 
(Beta=0.284, t=1.772, p<0.1) and respondent’s tenure in the board (Beta=0.343, t=2.274, 
p<0.05) are found to predict the role of directors to seek for internal information. As a 
result, two hypotheses were confirmed in this model, which are the following: 
 
 HA4f: Seeking internal information is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HA5f: Seeking internal information is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in 
board. 
7.5.1.6 Model 6:  
 
Model 6 shows the shows the impact that predictors have on controlling TMT role. 
In Chapter 3, it was assumed that dimensions of the external environment, the board 
characteristics and the respondents’ status in the board, affect the role of directors in 
controlling the TMT. Similarly to the previous models, the ten hypotheses that were 
developed are: 
 HA1b: Controlling TMT is positively related to environmental complexity. 
 HA2b: Controlling TMT is positively related to environmental dynamism. 
 HA3b: Controlling TMT is positively related to macro-environmental hostility. 
 HA3e: Controlling TMT is positively related to competitive hostility. 
 HA4b: Controlling TMT is negatively related to board size. 
 HA4e: Controlling TMT is lower when there is CEO duality. 
 HA4h: Controlling TMT is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
 HA4k: Controlling TMT is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
 HA5b: Controlling TMT is higher when respondent’s status is independent. 
 HA5e: Controlling TMT is positively related to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
 
Table 7.4 shows that the predictive power of this mode is adequate, as the R
2
 for 
the model is 0.472. This means that 47.2% of the variation of the ‘controlling CEO’ role is 
explained by the independent variables. Moreover, the adjusted R
2
 for the regression 
equations is 0.349 (34.9%) and the F-statistic is found to be significant (F=3.847, 
p<0.001), indicating an overall sufficient power of the regression equation.  
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Furthermore, by checking the independent variables of the model individually, it is 
noticed that three of the variables are statistically significant. Specifically, board size 
(Beta=-0.398, t=-2.990, p<0.005), frequency of meetings (Beta=0.211, t=1.780, p<0.1) 
and ratio of independent directors (Beta=0.321, t=1.801, p<0.1) are significantly related to 
the ‘controlling CEO’ role. Hence, based on these results the following hypotheses were 
confirmed: 
 
 HA4b: Controlling TMT is negatively related to board size. 
 HA4h: Controlling TMT is positively related to the ratio of independent directors. 
 HA4k: Controlling TMT is positively related to frequency of meetings. 
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Table 7.4 Multiple Regression Results Predicting Directors’ Roles  
                  Dependent 
 
Controlling CEO 
 
 
Providing Service 
 
 
Controlling External 
Contingencies 
 
Involvement in 
Strategy 
 
Seeking Internal 
Information 
 
Controlling TMT 
 
 Independent 
(Predictors) 
Hypotheses HA1a HA2a HA3a HA3d 
HA4a HA4d HA4g HA4j 
HA5a HA5d 
HB1a HB2a HB3a HB3c 
HB4a HB4c HB4e HB4g 
HB5a HB5c 
HB1b HB2b HB3b HB3d 
HB4b HB4d HB4f HB4h 
HB5b HB5d 
HC1a HC2a HC3a HC3b 
HC4a HC4b HC4c HC4d 
HC5a HC5b 
HA1c HA2c HA3c HA3f 
HA4c HA4f HA4i HA4l 
HA5c HA5f 
HA1b HA2b HA3b HA3e 
HA4b HA4e HA4h HA4k 
HA5b HA5e 
 Stand. 
Reg. 
Coef. 
(Beta)             
t-statistic Stand. 
Reg. 
Coef. 
(Beta)             
t-statistic Stand. 
Reg. 
Coef. 
(Beta)             
t-statistic Stand. 
Reg. 
Coef. 
(Beta)             
t-statistic Stand. 
Reg. 
Coef. 
(Beta)             
t-statistic Stand. 
Reg. 
Coef. 
(Beta)             
t-statistic 
(Constant)  .370  2.472**  3.221****  2.845***  0.142  0.759 
External Environment 
Complexity 
 
 
.176 1.297 -.198 -1.173 .118 .822 .311 2.013** -.184 -1.059 .083 .566 
Macro-Envir. Hostility 
 
.066 .554 -.202 -1.298 -.203 -1.502 -.034 -.233 .030 .186 .075 .586 
Competitive Hostility 
 
 
 
.028 .221 .364 2.282** .037 .256 .091 .592 .033 .191 .027 .192 
Dynamism .023 .187 -.128 -.818 .160 1.193 .020 .141 .195 1.231 -.059 -.450 
Board Characteristics 
  Board Size -.406 -3.262** .124 .844 .066 .510 -.120 -.875 .134 .848 -.398 -2.990**** 
  CEO Duality .106 .862 .088 .589 .120 .910 .329 2.334** .284 1.772* .069 .531 
  Frequency of Meetings .005 .040 .170 1.256 .159 1.337 .261 2.056** .105 .721 .211 1.780* 
  Ratio of Independent .368 2.109** .162 .828 .173 .995 .020 .108 -.238 -1.080 .321 1.801* 
Director’s Status 
  Status in Board .260 1.557 -.247 -1.338 -.513 -3.217** -.024 -.141 .267 1.339 .167 .993 
  Tenure in Board .203 1.727* .126 .883 .155 1.258 .156 1.183 .343 2.274** .208 1.678 
R
2 
.565 .192 .330 .272 .170 .472 
Adjusted R
2 
.456 .020 .199 .123 -.014 .349 
F 5.186***** 1.114 2.513** 1.827* .922 3.847***** 
   *. Significant at the 0.1 level             **.  Significant at the 0.05 level             ***.  Significant at 0.01 level        ****. Significant at 0.005 level               *****.  Significant at 0.001level
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7.5.2 Testing Multicollinearity 
 
Table 7.5 shows the multicollinearity results between the independent variables. 
These results are important, in order to ensure that each independent variable is not 
explained by the other independent variables. Collinearity is the extent of correlation of 
one variable to another, while assessing multicollinearity checks the relationship of one 
variable with a set of independent variables. To test multicollinearity, several regression 
models are run. According to Hair et al. (2006: 227) in each model, one independent 
variable is treated as a dependent variable and all other independent variables as predictors 
of that variable. As a result R
2 
is calculated, showing the amount of variance for each 
independent variable, explained by the other independent variables.  
Moreover, the tolerance—that is a direct measure for multicollinearity—is 
calculated as 1- R
2
. Therefore, the bigger the tolerance result the smaller degree of 
multicollinearity. In addition, VIF (i.e. variance inflation factor) is displayed in the results, 
which is calculated as the inverse of tolerance value, i.e. 1/tolerance (Hair et al., 2006: 
227). As such, the smaller values of VIF are preferred to indicate low multicollinearity. 
Specifically, the guidelines from different sources indicate that the tolerance value 
should not be below 0.1 and ideally not below 0.2; at the same time, the VIF should not 
exceed 10 and it is preferable not to be substantially greater than 1 (Curto and Pinto, 2011: 
1500; Mason and Perrault, 1991: 270; Field, 2009: 242; Hair et al, 2006: 230).  
The findings of the study on tolerance and VIF scores are satisfactory. All tolerance 
values are above the preferable limit of 0.2 ranging from 0.357 to 0.944. Similarly, the VIF 
scores are at an acceptable level as they range from 1.060 to 2.799. 
Based on these findings, it was concluded that multicollinearity did not affect the 
results of the theoretical model’s statistical analysis.  
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Table 7.5 Multicollinearity Results  
                  Dependent Controlling CEO 
 
Providing Service 
 
Controlling 
External 
Contingencies 
Involvement in 
Strategy 
Seeking Internal 
Information 
Controlling TMT 
 
Independent 
(Predictors) 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
External Environment 
Complexity 
 
 
0.588 1.701 0.604 1.656 0.636 1.573 0.624 1.603 0.610 1.639 0.566 1.766 
Macro-Envir. Hostility 
 
0.757 1.320 0.710 1.408 0.718 1.394 0.705 1.419 0.722 1.385 0.748 1.337 
Competitive Hostility 
 
 
 
0.667 1.499 0.676 1.479 0.632 1.583 0.627 1.594 0.614 1.629 0.618 1.619 
Dynamism 0.716 1.396 0.707 1.414 0.731 1.369 0.705 1.419 0.733 1.364 0.724 1.381 
Board Characteristics 
  Board Size 
0.704 1.420 0.793 1.261 0.785 1.274 0.786 1.273 0.742 1.348 0.694 1.440 
  CEO Duality 0.716 1.398 0.761 1.314 0.758 1.320 0.750 1.334 0.717 1.394 0.718 1.393 
  Frequency of Meetings 0.865 1.156 0.944 1.060 0.932 1.073 0.924 1.082 0.875 1.142 0.876 1.142 
  Ratio of Independent 0.357 2.799 0.448 2.233 0.433 2.308 0.431 2.322 0.380 2.630 0.386 2.593 
Director’s Status 
  Status in Board 0.390 2.566 0.503 1.987 0.517 1.935 0.528 1.893 0.462 2.162 0.432 2.313 
  Tenure in Board 0.791 1.264 0.849 1.178 0.864 1.158 0.859 1.164 0.809 1.236 0.798 1.253 
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7.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, after summarising all scales used in the study, the results of 
correlation analyses were provided, examining the relationship between environmental 
dimensions, board characteristics, status of respondents (directors) and board roles. The 
purpose was to conduct a preliminary investigation of the potential relationships based on 
the developed hypotheses from Chapter 3 as shown in Table 7.3. 
Moreover, to further examine the hypothesised relationships, the ordinary least 
squares method was applied to estimate the unknown parameters of the six linear 
regression models of the study. Each of the six models had a role of directors as a 
dependent variable, which derived from the principal component analysis of Chapter 6. 
The independent variables in all six models remained the same, assuming that they might 
predict any of the roles that the directors undertake when sitting in boards. These variables 
captured the three main independent constructs of the study. Firstly, external environment 
was measured with four dimensions (i.e. complexity, macro-environmental hostility, 
competitive hostility and dynamism). Secondly, board characteristics were measured with 
four variables (i.e. board size, CEO duality, frequency of meetings and ratio of 
independent). Thirdly, director’s status—capturing the status of respondents—was 
measured with two variables (i.e. status and tenure in board). Table 7.4 shows the results of 
all six regression models, while Table 7.5 shows the multicollinearity between the 
independent variables. The summary of hypotheses tested, both with correlation and 
regression analyses, is presented in Table 7.6. 
 The final chapter that follows provides the conclusions of the current study based 
on the findings, along with the contributions and limitations of the study, making also 
some recommendations for future researchers. 
 
 179 
Table 7.6 Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
Propositions Hypotheses Correlation 
Result 
Regression 
Result 
PA1: Board Control is related to environmental complexity. Not supported Not supported 
 HA1a: Controlling CEO is positively related to 
environmental complexity. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA1b: Controlling TMT is positively related to 
environmental complexity. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA1c: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to environmental 
complexity. 
Not supported Not supported 
PA2: Board Control is related to environmental dynamism. Partially 
supported 
Not supported 
 HA2a: Controlling CEO is positively related to 
environmental dynamism. 
Not 
supported* 
Not supported 
 HA2b: Controlling TMT is positively related to 
environmental dynamism. 
Not 
supported* 
Not supported 
 HA2c: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to environmental 
dynamism. 
Not Supported Not supported 
PA3: Board Control is related to environmental munificence. Not supported Not supported 
 HA3a: Controlling CEO is positively related to 
macro-environmental hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA3b: Controlling TMT is positively related to 
macro-environmental hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA3c: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to macro-environmental 
hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA3d: Controlling CEO is positively related to 
competitive hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA3e: Controlling TMT is positively related to 
competitive hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA3f: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to competitive hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
PA4: Board Control is related to various board characteristics. Partially 
supported 
Partially 
supported 
 HA4a: Controlling CEO is negatively related 
to board size. 
Supported Supported 
 HA4b: Controlling TMT is negatively related 
to board size. 
Supported Supported 
 HA4c: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to board size. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA4d: Controlling CEO is lower when there is 
CEO duality. 
Supported Not supported 
 HA4e: Controlling TMT is lower when there is 
CEO duality. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA4f: Seeking internal information is lower Not supported Supported 
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when there is CEO duality. 
 HA4g: Controlling CEO is positively related to 
the ratio of independent directors. 
Supported Supported 
 HA4h: Controlling TMT is positively related to 
the ratio of independent directors. 
Supported Not supported 
 HA4i: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to the ratio of independent 
directors. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA4j: Controlling CEO is positively related to 
frequency of meetings. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA4k: Controlling TMT is positively related to 
frequency of meetings. 
Not supported Supported 
 HA4l: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to frequency of meetings. 
Not supported Not supported 
PA5: Board Control is related to respondent’s status in board. Partially 
supported 
Partially 
supported 
 HA5a: Controlling CEO is higher when 
respondent’s status is independent. 
Supported Not supported 
 HA5b: Controlling TMT is higher when 
respondent’s status is independent. 
Supported Supported 
 HA5c: Seeking internal information is higher 
when respondent’s status is independent. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA5d: Controlling CEO is positively related to 
the respondent’s tenure in board. 
Not supported Supported 
 HA5e: Controlling TMT is positively related to 
the respondent’s tenure in board. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HA5f: Seeking internal information is 
positively related to the respondent’s tenure 
in board. 
Not supported Supported 
PB1: Resource Provision is related to environmental 
complexity. 
Partially 
supported 
Not supported 
 HB1a: Providing Service is positively related 
to environmental complexity. 
Not 
supported* 
Not supported 
 HB1b: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to environmental 
complexity. 
Not supported Not supported 
PB2: Resource Provision is related to environmental 
dynamism. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB2a: Providing Service is positively related 
to environmental dynamism. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB2b: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to environmental 
dynamism. 
Not supported Not supported 
PB3: Resource Provision is related to environmental 
munificence. 
Not supported Partially 
supported 
 HB3a: Providing Service is positively related 
to macro-environmental hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
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 HB3b: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to macro-environmental 
hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB3c: Providing Service is positively related 
to competitive hostility. 
Not supported Supported 
 HB3d: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to competitive hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
PB4: Resource Provision is related to various board 
characteristics. 
Partially 
supported 
Not supported 
 HB4a: Providing Service is positively related 
to board size. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB4b: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to board size. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB4c: Providing Service is lower when there is 
CEO duality. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB4d: Controlling external contingencies 
lower when there is CEO duality. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB4e: Providing Service is positively related 
to the ratio of independent directors. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB4f: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to the ratio of independent 
directors. 
Supported Not supported 
 HB4g: Providing Service is positively related 
to frequency of meetings. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB4h: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to frequency of meetings. 
Not supported Not supported 
PB5: Resource Provision is related to respondent’s status in 
board. 
Partially 
supported 
Partially 
supported 
 HB5a: Providing Service is higher when 
respondent’s status is independent. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB5b: Controlling external contingencies is 
higher when respondent’s status is 
independent. 
Not 
supported* 
Not 
supported* 
 HB5c: Providing Service is positively related 
to the respondent’s tenure in board. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HB5d: Controlling external contingencies is 
positively related to the respondent’s tenure 
in board. 
Supported Not supported 
PC1: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental 
complexity. 
Supported Supported 
 HC1a: Strategic Involvement is positively 
related to environmental complexity. 
Supported Supported 
PC2: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental 
dynamism. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HC2a: Strategic Involvement is positively 
related to environmental dynamism. 
Not supported Not supported 
PC3: Strategic Involvement is related to environmental Not supported Not supported 
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munificence. 
 HC3a: Strategic Involvement is positively 
related to macro-environmental hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HC3b: Strategic Involvement is positively 
related to competitive hostility. 
Not supported Not supported 
PC4: Strategic Involvement is related to various board 
characteristics. 
Partially 
supported 
Partially 
supported 
 HC4a: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-
U relationship with board size. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HC4b: Strategic Involvement is lower when 
there is CEO duality. 
Not supported Supported 
 HC4c: Strategic Involvement is negatively 
related to the ratio of independent directors. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HC4d: Strategic Involvement is positively 
related to frequency of meetings. 
Supported Supported 
PC5: Strategic Involvement is related to respondent’s status in 
board. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HC5a: Strategic Involvement is higher when 
respondent’s status is independent. 
Not supported Not supported 
 HC5b: Strategic Involvement has an inverted-
U relationship with the respondent’s tenure in 
board. 
Not supported Not supported 
*Opposite relationship found 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Previous chapter presented and described all the findings from the correlation and 
regression analyses, which examined the potential relationships between constructs and 
variables as hypothesised in Chapter 3, following the theoretical model of this thesis.  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss these findings in accordance to the existing 
literature, followed by a section that highlights the contribution of the study to the existing 
knowledge in the field and another section that poses some potential managerial 
implications. In addition, the various limitations of the study will be discussed and the 
chapter will conclude with some ideas, which might serve as recommendations for future 
research and possible academic improvements. 
8.2 Discussion of Findings 
 
This section discusses the findings presented in the previous chapter, which 
examined the relationship between the independent and dependent variables of the study. 
Six regression models were tested in this thesis, examining how several variables might 
relate to the roles that directors undertake in the board—as resulted from the principal 
component analysis. These (independent) variables can be largely classified under three 
main constructs that were used in the theoretical model (Figure 8.1). Based on this model, 
three main relationships were examined: the extent that the external environment, the 
board characteristics and the director’s status relate to the board roles. 
8.2.1 Regression Model 1 (controlling CEO) 
 
The first regression model examined the extent to which the controlling CEO role 
is affected by the external environment, the various board characteristics and the 
respondent’s status in board. The results of this model showed that the external 
environment does not have any effect on the role of directors to control the CEO. This 
means that variance in the complexity, dynamism or hostility of the environment does not 
seem to relate to the directors’ role to control the CEO, despite the arguments made by 
other researchers (Johnson et al., 2011: 1788; Liu and Lai, 2012: 354; Pirson and Turnbull, 
2011: 463).  
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On the other hand, it seems that the controlling the CEO role is affected by some 
board characteristics. Specifically, it was found that board size has a negative relationship 
with the role, meaning that the greater the number of directors sitting in the board, the less  
 
Figure 8.1: Theoretical Model of the Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the CEO is being controlled. This result is in agreement with Jensen (1993: 865), who 
argues that when a board is very large, it cannot function effectively, making the CEO 
more able to control its members. 
In addition, it was found from this model, that the ratio of independent directors is 
positively related to the controlling CEO role. In other words, when the ratio of 
independent directors over the board size becomes higher, the board controls the CEO 
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more intensively. The literature largely supports this view, which is mainly discussed 
under the lenses of the agency perspective (Zona et al., 2013; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Daily et al., 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). This is also in agreement to different 
corporate governance codes and reports (e.g. The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012; 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises, 2005) that 
strongly recommend a high presence of independent members in the boards, for 
monitoring reasons. 
Finally, it was found that the tenure of the respondents in their boards has a positive 
effect on the controlling CEO function. This means that the longer a director sits in the 
board, the higher the controlling of CEO will be. In similar lines, Khanna et al. (2014: 559) 
claim that the increased experience of directors in boards, leads to better ability in 
monitoring.  
8.2.2 Regression Model 2 (providing service) 
 
The second regression model examined the extent to which the providing service 
role is affected by the external environment and the board characteristics, along with the 
status of the respondent in the board. This model was found to be weak as there was no 
contribution found by most variables. The results showed that the only significant predictor 
out of the environment’s dimensions for this role was the competitive hostility. This 
indicates that increased competition in the organisation’s environment, results in higher 
service provision of directors to the organisation. This is in agreement to Boyd (1990: 421) 
who argues that increased pressures from the external environment—including 
competition—lead to higher requirement for service provision by the board members.  
However, there was no other dimension of the environment that appeared to affect 
the service role based on the findings. In addition, the board characteristics being board 
size, CEO duality, frequency of meetings and ratio of independent members were not 
found to have any significant effect on the service role of directors which contradicts to the 
work of various scholars (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 168; Daily and Dalton, 1994: 
1606; Boyd et al., 2011: 1896, Zahra and Pearce, 1990: 166; Vafeas, 1999: 114 etc.). 
Finally, the respondents’ characteristics (i.e. dependence/independence and tenure in 
board) were not found to be significant predictors of the service role, despite arguments in 
literature that suggest relationship (Daily and Dalton, 1994: 1606; Judge and Miller, 1991: 
450).  
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8.2.3 Regression Model 3 (controlling external contingencies) 
 
The third regression model assessed the extent to which the independent variables 
affect the controlling external contingencies role of board members. This model was found 
to be significant, however only one variable significantly contributed to the role. This 
variable is the status of respondents in their boards, which was found to be a significant 
predictor of the controlling external contingencies responsibility. Specifically, it was found 
that when the status of respondents in the board is independent, they tend to control 
external contingencies less intensively. As suggested by the literature, this could be 
through access to either resources or information. This result is surprising, as based on the 
literature it is more expected from the independent directors—rather than the executive 
members—to provide access to external resources and information (Daily and Dalton, 
1994: 1606; Zahra and Pearce, 1990: 166). As such, the relevant hypothesis developed in 
the thesis was rejected while the relationship hypothesised had an opposite relationship 
than the one found to exist.  
No other predictor was found to be significant for this model, meaning that neither 
the external environment, nor the various board characteristics influence the directors’ task 
to control external dependencies. 
8.2.4 Regression Model 4 (involvement in strategy) 
 
The fourth model proposed, examined the relationship between the independent 
variables and the involvement in strategy role of directors. The regression model was found 
to have some predictive power and few variables to affect the directors’ strategy role. More 
specifically, the external environment was once again found to have limited predictive 
power over the role, with only one of its dimensions being found to be significant. The 
dimension of the environment that appears to affect the involvement in strategy is that of 
complexity. More particularly, it was found that in more complex environments, directors 
involve more in the strategy of the organisation. This is in similar lines to Judge and 
Zeithaml (1992: 786) who argue that in more complex environments directors become 
more strategically adaptive. 
Moreover, it was found that CEO duality is a significant predictor of the strategy 
role of board members. In specific, it was found that when there is CEO duality the 
strategic involvement is lower. Supporting the literature and the developed hypothesis of 
the study, the results indicate that having a separate leadership structure is important for 
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the strategic involvement of the board (Ruigrok et al., 2006: 1208; Golden and Zajac, 
2001; 1089). 
Finally, the strategy role of directors was found to be affected by the frequency of 
board meetings. The findings showed that increased frequency of board meetings results in 
higher involvement of board members in the strategic decisions of the organisation, which 
is logical and in agreement with other work in the extant literature (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 
1990: 171). 
8.2.5 Regression Model 5 (seeking internal information) 
 
Furthermore, the fifth regression model was found to be weak with lack of overall 
predictive power, nevertheless there were indications of contribution from two independent 
variables. The model attempted to examine the factors that may affect the role of directors 
in seeking internal information. Once again, the external environment was found to have 
no effect on the role, indicating no relationship of environmental dimensions with the task 
of board members to seek internal information—as part of their overall control role. 
However, leadership structure in the organisation was found to be a significant 
determinant of the role. When there is CEO duality, directors seek for less internal 
information. This can be explained by the increased power of the CEO holding both 
positions, which may result in less control power of the rest of directors (Daily and Dalton, 
1994: 1605; Lohrke et al., 2004: 75, Boyd, 1995: 303). On the other hand, when the CEO 
and Chairperson positions are separated, there is increased seeking of internal information. 
This may be happening as the separate Chairperson gives a stronger voice in setting the 
agenda, selecting the directors, controlling the meeting process (Lorsch, 1989: 185). 
Additionally, the tenure of respondents in their board was found to contribute in the 
seeking internal information role. This means that the greater the experience that the 
directors have in their boards, the more they tend to seek internal information. This 
hypothesis was supported from the findings and is in similar lines with Khanna et al. 
(2014: 559) arguing that the experience of directors in their boards is likely to improve 
their ability to perform their monitoring role. 
8.2.6 Regression Model 6 (controlling TMT) 
 
Finally, the sixth regression model examined the contribution of the independent 
variables to the controlling TMT role. Overall, the model was found to have a relatively 
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strong predictive power, although the external environment appeared to have no effect on 
the role. Similarly to the controlling CEO role, this finding is surprising, as it is not in 
agreement with various studies stating the importance of the external environment in the 
control role (e.g. Johnson et al., 2011: 1788; Liu and Lai, 2012: 354; Pirson and Turnbull, 
2011: 463). 
On the other hand, all board characteristics used in the model, except for the CEO 
duality, appear to contribute to the regression model. Firstly, board size was found related 
with the controlling TMT role by having a negative relationship. This means that as the 
board size increases, the board’s activity in controlling the top management becomes 
weaker. This agrees to Jensen (1993) who claims that the larger boards will be weaker 
monitors of the managerial performance. 
Secondly, frequency of meetings was found to be a significant predictor of the 
controlling TMT role. In other words, when the frequency of meetings for directors is 
higher, they become stronger monitors of the top management. Lin et al. (2014: 267) and 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006: 722) argue that low frequency of meetings could prevent 
directors from monitoring the management of the organisation successfully. 
Thirdly, it was found that the ratio of independent directors is an important 
determinant for the controlling TMT role. Specifically, it was found that the higher the 
ratio of independent members in the board—over the whole board size—the more control 
is exercised on the top management. The argument on this relationship is mainly supported 
from the agency perspective; independent directors are expected to contribute more in the 
monitoring of the organisation’s management (Zona et al., 2013; Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). 
Finally, the respondent’s status in the board—dependence/independence and 
tenure—was not found to be significant contributor to the controlling TMT role. 
8.3 Contribution of the Thesis to Knowledge 
 
This section discusses the contribution of the thesis in knowledge, by justifying the 
significance of the study. As such, it can be argued that the current study has contributed in 
the following theoretical and methodological areas. 
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8.3.1 Theoretical Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Initially, the thesis proposed a theoretical framework that was supported and 
approached from various different theories discussed. The dominant ones—based on most 
studies—are the agency and the resource dependence perspectives, however the literature 
review also covered upper echelons, stewardship, institutional, and social network theories 
attempting to describe the corporate governance constructs from a multi-theoretical 
perspective. This—combined with the discussion of what a theory and its qualities are (e.g. 
Popper, 1959; Bacharach, 1989; Whetten, 1989; Van de Ven, 1989; Kilduff, 2006)—can 
be considered as contribution, giving a new direction to future researchers.  
Secondly, the literature review chapter identifies a wide number of articles, trying 
to collect most—if not all—studies on board roles in order to clarify which are the roles 
based on previous work. It was realised that many different roles have been described in 
the literature including monitor, control, service, resource dependence, advice and counsel, 
strategy. The studies found, use the roles interchangeably, which results in a mixed and 
unclear set of roles for the directors. After a thorough review, it was concluded that the 
discrepancies found are not due to substantive reasons. To my opinion various scholars use 
different terms for convenience, overlooking to keep consistency among the studies. 
However, by examining the description that the scholars offered, it was also realised that 
some of the roles overlap each other. This mainly occurred in describing the strategic role 
of the directors, which in cases seems to have aspects of both control and providing 
resources roles (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). This thesis suggests, that from the activities described in various studies, 
three board roles are broadly identified, which are control, providing resources and 
strategy. It is noteworthy, that while this assumption was made, the roles are considered to 
be a continuum rather than a trichotomy. This means that there are not clearly distinct 
activities for each role and while a director undertakes a task, s/he might be performing 
two or three of her/his roles. 
Thirdly, it is argued that the theoretical model itself contributes to the existing 
literature, as there are not any studies—to my knowledge—investigating the impact of the 
external environment on the board roles. The theoretical model proposes a direct 
relationship of external environment to the roles instead of using its dimensions as 
determinants of the board characteristics. Most previous studies (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Daily and Dalton, 1994; Yamak et al., 2014) have examined the impact of the 
 191 
environment’s dimensions on board characteristics, neglecting how the directors might 
directly respond to any environmental pressures. Only few scholars have considered this 
direct relationship, but have still conducted limited research on it. For example, Johnson et 
al. (2011: 1788) refer to the higher needs for monitoring when complexity increases, while 
Walrave et al. (2011: 1732) explain how boards’ involvement in strategy might slow down 
during times of environmental change. 
Fourthly, the respondents’ status was also considered in the framework, which can 
be considered a contribution, as previous research either uses one type of board members 
in their samples (e.g. CEOs) or by asking respondents to state the roles that the whole 
board undertakes. In this thesis, it was assumed that the different status of the respondent 
in the board (i.e. dependence and tenure in board) is another important determinant for the 
roles undertaken and as such it was included in the tested model.  
As a result, the theoretical model of this thesis, proposes three possible 
determinants of board roles that is the external environment, the board’s characteristics and 
the status of the respondents in the board. 
8.3.2 Methodological Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Another area of contribution for this thesis is the proposition of a new instrument 
for measuring board roles, after conducting a principal component analysis. Specifically, in 
the methodology of this thesis, existing measurements/questions from previous studies 
were used and principal component analysis was used to reduce the data set by retaining as 
much information as possible. Consequently, six factors/roles were proposed that are 
supposed to cover the full spectrum of board members’ activities. These are ‘controlling 
CEO’, ‘providing resources’, ‘controlling external contingencies’, ‘involving in strategy’, 
‘seeking internal information’ and ‘controlling TMT.   
Finally, a contribution of this thesis is the data collected from UK organisations, as 
there is very limited quantitative research on UK boards. Most of the—already limited—
existing studies in the UK have collected qualitative data mainly through interviews (e.g. 
Roberts et al., 2005; Long et al. 2005; Machold and Farqular, 2013), which makes the 
current study more important, despite the low response rate. The profile of the respondents 
might explain this difficulty in collecting data from boards, which could also be the reason 
for the very limited attempts in the extant literature to survey board directors through 
questionnaires. 
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While the qualitative findings offer some interesting insights in terms of the board 
roles, the approach and framework they use is different. These studies do not investigate 
the impact of the external environment or the board characteristics on directors’ duties. For 
example, Long et al. (2005: 669) researched the roles of non-executive directors, trying to 
identify the differences between the listed and unlisted companies in UK. They found that 
directors in ‘unlisted’ boards have higher involvement—than ‘listed’ boards—in strategy, 
financial monitoring, shareholder communication, and overall contribution and less 
involvement in management monitoring, executive remuneration, appointing and removing 
directors, and succession planning. These findings agree to all roles that resulted from the 
current thesis, however the current thesis contributes by suggesting that controlling the 
CEO and the management is not the same function. Additionally, the current thesis 
proposes the providing internal information as a separate important function that should be 
measured.   
Another example is that of Machold and Farqular (2013: 161) who conducted a 
qualitative study and suggested in their conclusions that board tasks are neither 
homogeneous, nor linear not unchanging. By looking at the current thesis’ proposed roles, 
it can be argued that the views of Machold and Farqular (2013) find further support. While 
this thesis proposes—as a result of the component analysis—six distinct roles for the 
directors, by having a closer look to the activities it can be argued that they are not 
discrete. This can be a significant contribution and a recommendation for future 
researchers, to not look at the roles of directors as independent functions of the board, but 
as a mixed set of activities that contain controlling, provision of service and involvement in 
strategy. 
Furthermore, a contribution of the thesis is the fact that the external environment 
and the board characteristics have been included in the framework as predictors of the 
board roles. There is no or limited empirical evidence on examination of these 
relationships, which recommends further research. 
 
8.4 Implications of the Thesis 
 
It can be argued that this thesis also has some implications to different groups like 
business specialists, decision makers, management consultants and even policy makers. 
These implications are mainly derived from the findings of the thesis, however it should be 
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noted that certain limitations are related to the findings, which are discussed in the 
following section.  
However, although researchers might be more reluctant in accepting findings of a 
study—even though still using them for evidence—practitioners should be also alert and 
follow a critical approach before adopting any of the findings as universally true. This 
applies mainly due to the fact that each study faces various limitations. Nevertheless, a 
more important reason is the philosophical and fundamental issue—that troubles 
philosophers for over two thousand years—of attainment of real knowledge and certain 
truth. This idea goes back to the homo mensura proposition of Protagoras, which means 
that “man is the measure of all things” and therefore we must take human knowledge as 
our standard of measure (Popper, 1998: 1). To my opinion, this is a helpful proposition to 
make us understand that after testing certain propositions and coming with some findings, 
there might be some serious and fundamental issues of validity that cannot be avoided, so 
we can never be certain about our results. In similar lines, Xenophanes—another pre-
Socratic philosopher—argued the following (cited in Popper, 1998: 25):  
 
“But as for certain truth, no man has known it, 
Nor will he know it; neither of the gods 
Nor yet of all the things of which I speak. 
And even per chance he were to utter 
The perfect truth, he would himself not know it; 
For all is but a woven web of guesses.” 
 
After discussing the above issues, which are considered essential and should make 
practitioners cautious before adopting results, it is important to discuss the main 
implications of the thesis. The theoretical framework of the study examined the impact that 
the external environment, the board characteristics and the status of respondents in their 
boards have on the roles of board directors. In short the following findings were found: a) 
limited support on the assumption that the external environment affects the roles of 
directors, b) board characteristics appear to have a significant impact on roles and 
especially control and strategy and c) there is evidence that the respondents’ status in board 
can be a predictor of the directors’ roles.  
More specifically, the practitioners should be aware of the importance that 
environmental complexity appear to have on directors’ involvement in strategy. This is 
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translated as higher involvement of directors in strategy when the nature of the 
competition, the customers’ buying habits and the required methods of production 
significantly vary from one product/service to another.  
Moreover, competitive hostility was found to affect the role of directors in 
providing service. In particular, directors are found to provide service more intensively 
when there is higher competition in issues like shortages of raw material, distribution and 
unfavourable demographic trends. Dynamism and macro-environmental hostility were not 
found to be significant predictors of any board roles, however further research is 
recommended on these relationships.   
Furthermore, practitioners should take into account the second premise that resulted 
from the findings, that is the impact of board characteristics on the directors’ roles. Board 
size and ratio of independent directors appear to be significant predictors, mainly for the 
control role of the board. Smaller boards and with higher ratio of independents perform 
their control role more intensively.  
In addition, practitioners and decision makers should be knowledgeable of the 
effect that CEO duality and frequency of meetings have on involvement of board members 
in strategy. The separate leadership structure and the high frequency of meetings are found 
to contribute in higher strategic involvement of directors. The separate structure also 
appears to increase the directors’ role in seeking internal information.  
Finally, practitioners should become aware of the potential effect of the 
respondents’ status on the board roles. Specifically, the independent directors seem to 
control external contingencies less intensively, while the directors with higher tenure in 
board control the CEO and seek internal information more regularly. 
In summary, the above implications are listed below: 
 Controlling CEO was found related to: 
o Board Size (-) 
o Ratio of Independent (+) 
o Tenure of respondent in board (+) 
 Providing Service was found related to: 
o Competitive Hostility (+) 
 Controlling External Contingencies was found related to: 
o Status of respondent in board (-) 
 Involvement in Strategy was found related to: 
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o Complexity (+) 
o CEO Duality (+) 
o Frequency of Meetings (+) 
 Seeking Internal Information was found related to: 
o CEO Duality (+) 
o Tenure of respondent in board (+) 
 Controlling CEO was found related to: 
o Board Size (-) 
o Frequency of Meetings (+) 
o Ratio of Independent (+) 
8.5 Limitations of the Thesis 
 
All parts of this thesis have been organised and structured very carefully, however 
there are certain limitations that should be considered while interpreting and using any of 
the conclusions. Most of the limitations that will be explained in the following lines are 
common to any research study and not just limitations of the current thesis. The key reason 
for this is the limited resources that a researcher has, especially in the limited timeframe of 
a study. 
An important limitation of this thesis that should be taken into account is the large 
room for improvement in the conceptual/theoretical framework developed. As in all 
studies, the researcher only includes specific constructs and proposes specific relationships 
for examination. More specifically, when the theoretical model was described in Chapters 
2 and 3, specific factors/constructs were selected in order to test their potential effect on 
the dependent construct, i.e. directors’ roles. There are certainly many more factors that 
could be regarded as determinants of the directors’ roles, but due to the size and timeframe 
of the thesis only the specific ones were selected. This significant limitation should make 
researchers understand, that many different outcomes may result with a large number of 
factors used as determinants. Adding more factors in the existing model could help in 
getting closer to the real knowledge—a fact that is evident for all kinds of research studies. 
As Protagoras has argued, we can only keep improving our knowledge a little, by using the 
existing human knowledge (Popper, 1998: 4).  
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The above limitation concerns the theoretical conceptualisation of the study. The 
following points are further limitations of the study, related to the empirical part of the 
thesis.  
An issue that can be regarded as a limitation of the study is that collected data come 
only from UK firms. This implies that while the findings might apply in the UK context, 
differences that might exist in another country (e.g. legal structures, corporate governance 
codes and guidelines etc.) are not captured in the data. An example of this would be the 
one or two-tier boards that are found in different countries, which are expected to have 
different roles and behaviours. As such, even though companies are often internationalised, 
what applies in one country might not apply in another. Studies from multiple contexts 
would offset the potential risk associated with generalizing, however studies from multiple 
contexts are relatively rare. Overall, we caution scholars against generalizing these 
findings to other contexts. 
Similarly, since collection of data for the thesis appeared to be difficult due to the 
nature/profile of respondents, the data had to be collected from a variety of industries. It 
should be noted, that different industries might share different characteristics, which could 
not be tested in this thesis due to the relatively low response rate. Therefore, the findings 
should not be generalised in all industries before examining possible characteristics within 
certain industries.  
Also, the survey was mainly based on perceptual/subjective questions, which by 
definition is regarded as a limitation to a study. Since the findings are based on 
respondents’ personal judgement, there is a raised issue of concern. 
Moreover, it is argued by Minichilli et al. (2009: 70), that getting answers from 
respondents that have different status in board produces bias. On the other hand, if all 
respondents had the same status (e.g. CEOs or Chairpersons), the problem of single 
respondent bias would be faced. The thesis tried to overcome this issue by including 
variables in the framework, which capture respondents’ characteristics/status in board. 
However, these variables (i.e. status and tenure in board) do not capture the full profile of a 
respondent and also the relatively low response rate made it difficult to check for this 
effect—even though there are indications in the findings showing some significance.  
Furthermore, the study is cross sectional, which is subject to few limitations. The 
findings result from a specific point in time and collection of data at any other period could 
result in different findings. The cross sectional studies cannot answer questions on the 
stability of a certain phenomenon or process over time (Miller, 1998, cited in Robinson et 
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al., 2008). Another criticism based on this work, is the effect that ‘historical’ differences 
might have on external validity. For example, if a new recommendation is introduced in a 
corporate governance code, it is expected to alter behaviours in the boards, which is 
considered a historical event. These limitations are common to all cross sectional studies, 
even though longitudinal studies also have their own limitations. 
Finally, while the sample size was large, the response rate was very low. This can 
be explained by the nature of the sample that consists of board directors, who are 
considered to be difficult to approach. The limited number of existing studies—offering 
survey results from board members—appears to corroborate this argument. Pettigrew and 
Reber (2013: 343) support this by claiming that “many board members are reluctant to 
speak about their participation on corporate boards, and corporate executives may not see 
the work of researchers pursuing primary research of this kind as important, and thus 
requests get ignored or pushed to the side”. 
8.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Following the previous section that discusses the limitations of the current thesis, 
certain recommendations can be offered for future researchers, which are discusses in the 
following paragraphs. 
Firstly, considering the limitation of the theoretical framework, it is suggested that 
future researchers use other theoretical framework with various modifications, additions to 
the existing constructs. It is expected that the directors’ roles are affected by other 
constructs as well, therefore it would be important in future research to try and propose 
more potential predictors (e.g. organisational life-cycle stage, ownership structure etc.). In 
addition, while this thesis mainly finds support from the dominant agency and resource 
dependence perspectives, future researchers should examine the board roles through 
different theoretical lenses.  
Secondly, use of mixed methods can be a consideration for future research. While 
this thesis is based on collection and interpretation of quantitative data, future researchers 
can consider collecting a combination of quantitative and qualitative data that may offer an 
integrated approach with mixed findings. This approach can be also combined with 
collection of longitudinal data, attempting to capture the changing effects over time. 
Another approach that could be beneficial for future researchers in further understanding 
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the roles of directors and their possible predictors, would be to attend board meetings in 
order to collect data from the processes and activities that the directors involve with.  
Thirdly, as also mentioned in limitations, the findings of this thesis come from UK 
companies. Future researchers could replicate the framework in other countries, to further 
understand whether different national context—with their accompanied attributes (e.g. 
legal structures)—is an important determinant of the directors’ roles. 
Fourthly, while the current study collected responses from individual directors 
trying to understand the roles in their boards, future researchers could survey multiple 
directors from the same companies, in order to capture the overall contribution of board 
members in the boards. 
Finally, even though the instrument of the thesis was carefully designed by 
adopting measurements from other existing studies, the questions used to capture external 
environment’s dimensions might need to be updated. This recommendation is proposed, as 
the findings showed limited relationship between the external environment and directors’ 
roles, while the literature suggests arguments that would lead to a significant relationship 
(e.g. resource dependence perspective). 
 
8.6 Summary 
 
 
The thesis examined the relationship between the external environment and the 
board characteristics with the roles of directors. It has provided a useful contribution in the 
literature review on board roles. In addition, it suggests a methodological instrument of 
board roles for future studies. Moreover, findings from UK organisations contribute to the 
limited existing findings on board roles. Last but not least, the direct effect of 
environmental dimensions on board roles is examined for the first time—according to the 
best of my knowledge.  
In this concluding part of the thesis—and personal intellectual journey—I would 
like to present a statement coming from Popper’s work, which to my opinion explains in 
few lines the approach that researchers and scientists should have to the systematic inquiry 
of knowledge and truth:  
“I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being 
singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its 
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logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical 
tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific 
system to be refuted by experience” (1959:18). 
  
 This statement describes his doctrine of falsification, which—despite various 
objections—I believe highlights the most important fact about all scientific theories. It is 
the fact that theories are never empirically verifiable. I think this expresses in more 
practical terms what pre-Socratic philosophers (referred in previous parts of the thesis) 
believed; that absolute truth can never be reached, because the only standard of measure is 
human measure (Protagoras) and even if by chance it is reached, we wouldn’t know it 
(Xenophanes). And Heraclitus (cited in Popper, 1998: 25) continues on similar grounds: 
 
“It is not in the nature or character of man to possess true knowledge, 
though it is in the divine nature. … He who does not expect the unexpected 
will not detect it: for him it will remain undetectable and unapproachable”. 
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Prenotification Letter 
 
 
Dear «Title» «Last Name», 
 
We are currently conducting a research on UK companies, to understand the way that 
Boards and Directors contemplate Competitive Environmental Pressures and 
Challenges. More specifically we are interested in the activities undertaken by board 
members as a response to the Competitive Environment. 
 
The research is carried out for the purposes of a PhD thesis and it would be of invaluable 
help if you could kindly participate, by providing your views. The questionnaire will be 
administered online and will take less than 20 minutes of your time to complete.  
 
Although entirely optional, your participation would be highly appreciated, as it will 
contribute in having a significant number of survey responses. Furthermore, we would like 
to inform you that your participation in this research study will be kept completely 
anonymous.  
 
An e-mail with details on how to complete the questionnaire and a link to the 
questionnaire itself will be sent to you next week. 
 
Once the data collection and the thesis are complete and approved by the University, we 
would be more than happy to share the results with you. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Ioannis P. Gkliatis  
BSc, MSc  
Researcher  
ioannis.gkliatis@brunel.ac.uk   
 
Dimitrios N. Koufopoulos 
BSc, MBA, PhD, MCMI, FIB, MCSI 
Senior Lecturer 
dimitrios.koufopoulos@brunel.ac.uk  
 
Brunel University, Brunel Business School, Eastern Gateway Building 
 
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, United Kingdom 
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1
st
 Wave email 
 
 
Ref: Competitive Environmental Challenges and Board Dynamics  
Dear «Title» «Last Name», 
 
We are currently conducting a survey on UK companies, with the aim to better understand 
how the competitive environment’s challenges drive board members to undertake 
specific roles.  
 
You have been personally selected on the basis of a sample drawn from UK companies and 
we would be grateful if you could take a few minutes of your precious time to complete the 
questionnaire. Participation in the study is entirely voluntary and will take less than 20 
minutes of your time.  
 
If you are a Board Member and You DO wish to participate in the survey please visit 
the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SL735R3  
 
If you are not a board member in the company, please disregard this invitation and 
accept our apologies for contacting you. 
 
Many thanks in advance for your valuable contribution and time to the research project. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Ioannis P. Gkliatis  
BSc, MSc  
Researcher  
ioannis.gkliatis@brunel.ac.uk   
 
Dimitrios N. Koufopoulos 
BSc, MBA, PhD, MCMI, FIB, MCSI 
Senior Lecturer 
dimitrios.koufopoulos@brunel.ac.uk  
 
Brunel University, Brunel Business School, Eastern Gateway Building 
 
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, United Kingdom 
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2
nd
 Wave Email 
 
 
Dear «Title» «Last Name», 
 
Last week an invitation was sent to you, to participate on our survey that is conducted on 
UK companies. The study aims to better understand how the competitive environmental 
challenges drive board members to take upon specific roles and seeks views and 
opinions only from board members. 
 
If you have already completed the questionnaire, please accept our sincere thanks. Your 
participation to our study is deeply appreciated. 
 
If you haven’t completed the survey we would be grateful if you could take a few minutes 
of your precious time to complete it. Participation in the study is entirely voluntary and 
will take less than 20 minutes of your time.  
 
If you are a Board Member and You DO wish to participate in the survey please visit 
the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/8B7HVJ5 
 
If you are not a board member, please disregard this invitation and accept our 
apologies for contacting you. 
 
Many thanks in advance for your valuable contribution and time to our research project. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Ioannis P. Gkliatis  
BSc, MSc  
Researcher  
ioannis.gkliatis@brunel.ac.uk   
 
Dimitrios N. Koufopoulos 
BSc, MBA, PhD, MCMI, FIB, MCSI 
Senior Lecturer 
dimitrios.koufopoulos@brunel.ac.uk  
 
Brunel University, Brunel Business School, Eastern Gateway Building 
 
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, United Kingdom 
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Final Email Call 
 
 
Ref: Final Call to Participate by Tomorrow, March 21
st
: Board Roles and Competitive 
Environment  
Dear «Title» «Last Name», 
 
This is the last kind reminder inviting you to our survey, which aims at capturing board 
members’ activities and the challenges of the competitive environment.   
 
If you have already completed the questionnaire, please accept our gratitude and ignore 
this email. Your participation to our study is highly appreciated. 
 
If you haven’t completed the survey, this will be your last chance; the deadline is 
tomorrow, March 21
st
. We kindly ask you to take a few minutes of your precious time to 
complete it. As mentioned in previous emails, the participation in the study is entirely 
voluntary and will take less than 20 minutes of your time. Also, all your responses will be 
kept confidential. 
 
If you are a Board Member and You DO wish to participate in the survey please visit 
the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SL735R3  
 
If you are not a board member, please disregard this invitation and accept our 
apologies for contacting you. 
 
Once again, many thanks in advance for your valuable contribution and time to our 
research project. We look forward to receiving your responses. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Ioannis P. Gkliatis  
BSc, MSc  
Researcher  
ioannis.gkliatis@brunel.ac.uk   
 
Dimitrios N. Koufopoulos 
BSc, MBA, PhD, MCMI, FIB, MCSI 
Senior Lecturer 
dimitrios.koufopoulos@brunel.ac.uk  
 
Brunel University, Brunel Business School, Eastern Gateway Building 
 
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, United Kingdom 
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Survey Monkey Front Page 
 
Dear participant, 
 
First of all, many thanks for taking the time to support this crucial part of our research. 
 
This is a national multi-industry research effort, which seeks to understand elements of 
board configuration, the board directors' roles, and the effect that competitive environment 
developments and challenges have on them.  
 
Your co-operation in completing the questionnaire is central to the success of this research 
project. In order to assist us, please answer all of the questions as fully and honestly as 
possible. Please note there are no “right” or “wrong” answers to any of the questions and it 
is your initial impression and response, which we are looking for. 
 
For the purpose of this study, you are kindly invited to answer all questions as a board 
director of the organisation (i.e. company/focal organisation) to which you received the 
questionnaire (email address).  
 
 
ALL THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL 
REMAIN ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENTIAL AND ONLY BE SEEN BY THE 
ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY.  
 
 
ONLY SUMMARIES WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE FINAL REPORT AND 
NO COMPANIES OR INDIVIDUALS WILL BE IDENTIFIED. 
 
May we thank you in again for your co-operation. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
Ioannis P. Gkliatis  
BSc, MSc  
Researcher  
ioannis.gkliatis@brunel.ac.uk   
 
Dimitrios N. Koufopoulos 
BSc, MBA, PhD, MCMI, FIC 
Senior Lecturer 
dimitrios.koufopoulos@brunel.ac.uk  
 
Brunel University 
Brunel Business School 
Eastern Gateway Building 
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH 
United Kingdom 
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The Questionnaire 
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